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SUMMARY
In 1974, at the International Intervisitation Programme 
(I.I.P.) in Bristol, Thomas B. Greenfield launched a 
subjective approach to educational administration, with 
an attack on what he saw as the prevailing systems
perspective of the "New Movement", which grew up in the 
late 1950's and early 1960's centred on the University 
of Chicago, but drawing inspiration from the work of 
Herbert Simon.
The resulting subjective/systems debates plunged 
educational administration into a period of uncertainty, 
and yet, paradoxically, at the same time, produced an
examination of the very philosophical and theoretical 
bases of the field of educational administration and 
brought to the forefront of the debate many issues, for
example, the role of science in educational administration, 
the nature of theory, the reality of organisations and 
the 'right' way to conduct educational research.
The first section provides an overview of events 
surrounding the Greenfield/Griffiths Debate. It focuses 
on the period immediately after the I.I.P. Address at 
Bristol, where Daniel Griffiths' challenges to Greenfield's 
stance led to what was called the Greenfield/Griffiths 
Debate. Finally, the critiques of Jean Hills and Donald 
Willower are considered in the aftermath of the 
Greenfield/Griffiths Debate. This provides a foundation 
on which to build the specific debates of the later 
sections, where comparative and analytical methods are
u s e d .
The methodological implications of the way this thesis 
has attempted critically to analyse the thoughts of various
(v)
writers, and to suggest new insights that the author brings 
to the debate, are considered in the Preface. The w r i t e r ’s 
physics background has enabled him to provide examples 
and comparisons from the natural sciences and to clear 
up what he regards as misconceptions about the nature
of science that Greenfield and other contributers exhibit 
in their work.
Section 2. explores the justificatory philosophical sources 
which Greenfield and his critics use to buttress their 
views. Greenfield, for example, draws on the work of
Weber, Laing and Hodgkinson, but does so in such a way 
that makes it difficult to locate his exact philosophical 
position. Labels such as action theorist, phenomenologist 
and existentialist, appear only to have limited 
applicability to G r e e n f i e l d ’s stance. Investigations 
have been undertaken into the philosophies of Husserl 
and Schutz to try to clarify this position, but in no 
sense is it claimed that this is a philosophical thesis.
Its concern is with educational administration.
Sections 3. and 4. compare Greenfield's 'new perspective'
with the so called, 'new directions' in the sociology 
of education, which, while superficially sharing 
similarities with the 'new perspective', also indicate 
underlying fundamental differences in the way the two 
fields progressed. For instance, although a
phenomenological period is claimed by Sarup for the 'new 
directions' in the sociology of education, on analysis, 
it does not appear really to have existed, there being, 
instead, an early push towards neo-Marxist perspectives. 
Hence, the need to examine neo-Marxist perspectives in 
both fields in Section 4.
Section 5. discusses the importance of anthropological 
and ethnographic research methods in educational 
administration, as a result of their almost inevitable
(vi)
use, as the only methods available, if research is to 
remain within subjective approaches.
Section 6. examines ambiguity models such as the 'Garbage 
Can' model of Cohen, March and Olsen, and the 'loose 
coupling' of Weick. Such models are often considered 
to have a sympathy with subjective approaches, in their 
citation of 'fuzzy' organisational goals and unclear 
technologies, and notions of 'organised anarchy'. Yet, 
the thesis shows that this philosophical orientation is 
much closer to systems perspectives, i.e. goals may be 
'fuzzy', but they are still organisational goals, something 
impossible under Greenfield's subjective approach.
Section 7. examines the concept, 'paradigm' and the idea 
that the subjective/systems debate has given way to 
paradigm diversity. However, appeals to Kuhn's scientific 
notion of paradigm help to reveal inconsistencies in the 
way the term is applied in educational administration, 
and to question its appropriateness to the field.
Section 8. examines the INLOGOV Report, (a report by the 
Institute of Local Government Studies and School of 
Education, University of Birmingham, on the arrangements 
of the Education Department of Strathclyde Regional 
Council), in the light of the various philosophical and 
theoretical approaches put forward in this thesis, to 
provide an example of the relevance of such work to a 
specific educational administration situation, i.e. the 
arrangements for educational administration in Strathclyde 
Regional Council's Education Department.
Section 9. attempts to break new ground over the problem 
of intersubjectivity, the attempt to bridge the gap between 
subjective and systems approaches. First highlighted 
in Section 2., this forms a fundamental problem in 
philosophy, and so, after demonstrating the difficulty
( vii)
of taking a purely philosophical approach, the writer 
attempts to take a new direction to the issue by appealing 
to concepts such as culture, chaos and time 
irreversibility, to provide new ideas and insights to 
the problem. The concepts, 'language' and 'communication' 
from culture, are examined along with the new ideas
emerging in the natural sciences on the universality of 
chaos patterns across discipline boundaries, and the
ability of apparent chaos to reveal an intricate fine 
structure underneath. Finally, drawing on ideas throughout 
the thesis, the concept of time irreversibility is used 
to explore the possibility of connections, through the 
fact that each human consciousness is simultaneously locked 
into the same time progression.
Section 10. attempts to assess Greenfield's contribution 
to educational administration by considering, in turn, 
various concepts usually associated with what many would
regard as 'mainstream' educational administration, 
derived from systems approaches, such as organisation, 
goal, environment, accountability, leadership, training
and research. Finally, an assessment is made of 
Greenfield's overall impact on the future of educational 
administration.
(viii)
PREFACE.
METHODOLOGY.
Parameters of the Debate.
This thesis is primarily a study of a debate within 
educational administration as it has evolved over the 
last twenty years.
The work of Thomas B. Greenfield features highly in this
work, and while this is not a biographical study of 
Greenfield, his ideas on a subjective approach to 
educational administration provide a thread that runs 
throughout the work.
However, Greenfield has raised issues like the nature 
of theory, the reality of organisations and the taken- 
for-granted philosophical assumptions within the
traditional field of educational administration. These 
issues have made it essential to consider other fields 
of study and disciplines, where parallel problems have
appeared, in order to try to seek understanding through
comparative study.
Thus fields and disciplines such as sociology of education, 
anthropology, philosophy and general organisation theory 
as applied to institutions other than educational 
establishments have been investigated.
(ix)
For instance, the parallel developments in the 'new' 
sociology of education and their consequences have been 
considered in Section 3. and Section 4., where, in the 
early 1970's both fields experienced a claimed 
subjective/phenomenological input. To the writer's
knowledge, this forms an original initiative in the thesis.
Section 7. devoted to the concept, 'paradigm' is necessary 
because the term can be used in many different ways.
Until recently, Greenfield has not used the term and does 
not provide his own definition of the word.
Where is the Data Coming From?
The data for this thesis are primarily works generated 
within educational administration. Greenfield's 'new 
perspective' paper, "Theory About Organization: A New
Perspective and its Implications for Schools", [in,
"Administering Education - International Challenge" (1975), 
edited by M. Hughes,] forms a central source of citation, 
for within the confines of twenty six pages Greenfield 
raises many fundamental sociological, philosophical and 
theoretical issues, which have application and relevance 
far outside the confines of educational administration. 
The work of Daniel Griffiths, Donald Willower and Peter 
Gronn form central critiques which have provided much 
data for the debate. The contributors to Boyan's "Handbook 
of Research on Educational A dministration"(1988) Griffiths, 
Willower, Hughes, Culbertson and Everhart, provide much 
data for Section 7. where the concept, 'paradigm' is 
a d d r e s s e d .
The inclusion of philosophy has raised difficult issues 
of the depth of treatment required.
(x)
Problems of Encountering Philosophical Issues.
This is not intended to be a philosophical thesis, nor 
does the author consider himself equipped to embark upon 
such a work; he is not a philosopher. The question: "how
much do educational administrators need to know about 
philosophy?" remains problematic. It raises the issue 
of whether those writing within the subjective/systems 
and wider paradigmatic debates within educational 
administration, who draw freely on justificatory 
philosophical sources to strengthen their arguments, have 
specific expertise in philosophy.
In the subjective/systems debate, from a philosophical 
point of view, there is much confusion over the concept, 
'phenomenology'. Although initially adopting the term 
for his stance, Greenfield, after much criticism, appears 
to use the term less frequently. His approach appears 
to favour a phenomenology that always respects the 
subject's view of reality, but other phenomenological 
writers, such as Schutz, sometimes use the term in a much 
more interactionist way. However, Section 2., is devoted 
to the philosophical issues raised by Greenfield and his 
critics, and data from secondary sources have been used 
to express the ideas of philosophers such as Husserl, 
Heidegger, Schutz, Berger, Luckmann and Wittgenstein.
Secondary Sources.
The use of secondary sources for data, the author considers 
to be justified by the vast area to be covered in 
addressing philosophical, sociological and theoretical 
problems within several fields. This has resulted in 
such sources being taken as starting points for premises, 
and as such, they have been assumed to be factually 
correct. However, primary sources predominate when issues
(xi)
are being drawn from writers who are primarily working 
within the field of educational administration.
Problems of Citation.
The work draws heavily on citation, which the writer 
considers to be his evidence. This raises the problem 
of taking quotations out of context, a problem exacerbated 
by the practice of comparing a quotation from one author 
with that of another in order to highlight disagreements 
or conflicts. However, it is such activity, risky though 
it may be, that can lead to insights into sometimes subtle 
differences of orientation between different writers, 
and the implications these raise for the study of 
educational administration.
Not only is the work wide academically across fields and 
disciplines, it is also, of necessity, wide
geographically. The fact that the debates are over 
theoretical, philosophical, and sociological issues within 
educational administration, as outlined earlier, rather 
than specific debates within the administration of 
education in one country, has resulted in the debate being 
conducted across the English speaking world, with, for 
instance, Greenfield's (Canadian) work being criticised 
and supported in the United States, Britain and Australia.
Problems of Interpretation of English across Continents.
When citations are taken across continents, and compared 
across continents, this raises the question of whether 
English can be regarded as a universal language within 
the debate.
The author has not attempted any analysis of the cultural 
differences in the meaning of language, for example,
(xii)
between American English and that used on this side of 
the Atlantic.
The nature of the study aided this decision. With the 
exception of Section 8., most of the key citations refer
to general issues of the study of educational
administration, especially when subjective approaches 
are being considered.
A subjective approach implies a focus on the individual
and interpretation of organisations, from his specific
viewpoint, involving the meanings he brings to the 
situation. Greenfield favours a stance that supports 
the integrity of subjective meaning above any cultural
shared meanings, a point to be stressed later in the 
thesis. This in itself, lends support to the a u t h o r ’s
decision not to become preoccupied with the problems of 
cultural interpretations of language, until the ninth 
section on the meaning of culture. In his opinion, the 
problems of the cultural interpretations of language mainly 
arise from specific considerations of administrative 
systems, for instance, between the U.K. and the U.S.A., 
rather than consideration of general approaches such as 
subjective, systems or ambiguity. For example, cultural 
differences occur between the concept of a headmaster 
in a British school, who, in spite of his position, is
seen as retaining a teaching role, and the concept of
a principal in an American school who is seen to be 
primarily an administrator. On the other hand, the more 
theoretical concept of a 'Garbage Can' model, within 
ambiguity approaches to educational administration, while 
containing the American use of the word 'garbage', is 
easily interpreted as refuse or household waste and, as 
such, retains its metaphoric concept of 'dumping' of 
issues, to be 'processed' at a later time.
(xiii)
A Debate Across the Boundaries of Individual Educational 
Administration Units.
In order to address the various issues that commentators 
on Greenfield's approach have put forward, and to be able 
to argue across cultural boundaries, with the exception 
of Section 8., the work has remained outside specific 
debates about individual administrative systems within 
localities, (which also, incidentally, supports the 
citation issue just considered).
Section 8., however, attempts to provide an example of 
how such theoretical, philosophical and sociological 
debates, and their relation to other approaches, can have 
application in criticism of an individual report on the 
administration of education within a specific local 
authority. Because it confines itself in this way, with 
no attempt at comparative studies with other specific 
administrative systems, in other regions or countries, 
(this is not a thesis on comparative education,) the author 
considers that the problem of cultural differences of 
language interpretation have still been kept to a minimum, 
even within this section. Although citations from the 
INLOGOV Report have been used, (the report reviewing the 
specific administrative arrangements within Strathclyde 
Regional Council's Education Department,) they have only 
been compared with citations on general theoretical and 
philosophical issues, and not with other specific reports 
on the process of educational administration in other 
systems, or geographical areas. The intention is to 
show the extent of the relevance and applicability of 
the theoretical and philosophical ideas, to a specific 
situation, and not to became preoccupied with a comparative 
study of educational administrative systems, which would 
direct attention away from the subjective/systems debate
( xi v )
and the resulting paradigm diversity, that form the central 
thrust of this thesis.
The Problems of Trying to Imagine Greenfield's Reaction
to Specific Suggestions made by other Commentators.
At various stages within the thesis the author tries 
to imagine what Greenfield's reaction would be to specific 
suggestions made by other commentators. This is justified 
on the grounds that it aids attempts to identify 
Greenfield's specific subjective orientation and to enable 
the general debates within educational administration, 
for instance the concept 'paradigm diversity', to be 
considered, from his viewpoint. Such attempts have been 
decided purely on the logical deductions of the actual 
issues being considered, and it should not be implied 
that Greenfield would agree with the author's deductions. 
The writer is merely attempting to see the issues through 
the eyes of Greenfield's specific subjective orientation, 
with its emphasis on the integrity of the meanings that 
the subject brings to a situation.
The Input into the Debate of the Author's Physics 
B a c k g r o u n d .
The writer has brought his knowledge of physics to debates 
which centre on the question of whether educational 
administration is a science, and whether scientific 
principles can be applied. He considers that there are 
various misconceptions about the nature of physics and 
other natural sciences held by Greenfield and his 
commentators, and that sometimes appeals to specific ideas, 
theories and usages in physics, can clarify these 
misconceptions; for example, the misconception that, at 
any one time, there can be only one prevailing paradigm
(xv)
in physics, in other words, one prevailing theoretical 
explanation of a physical phenomenon, that cannot exist 
side by side with conflicting paradigms, and can only 
eventually be overthrown by a new paradigm, with the 
resulting rejection of the former.
A good example would be the theories of Newtonian and 
Einsteinian mechanics. The theories of relativity of 
Einstein extend the knowledge of Mechanics, but Newton's 
Laws of Motion have become special cases of Einstein's 
theory, and in many everyday situations, Newtonian 
mechanics provides satisfactory results to theoretical 
calculations. It would be wrong to imply that Newtonian 
mechanics has been rejected in favour of Einsteinian 
m e c h a n i c s .
A Field in Confusion.
The writer's physics input will hopefully lend support 
to the view that the field of educational administration 
cannot be studied in isolation. Ideas have always arrived 
from other fields and disciplines, but whereas the ideas 
from organisation theory tended to assist the debate within 
systems approaches, those provided by Greenfield have 
acted as contradictions to the established field and 
resulted in confusion that still exists today. However, 
this is the background against which the field now has 
to try to progress.
1SECTION 1.
THE GREENFIELD/GRIFFITHS DEBATE.
The 1 9 5 0 fs and 1960's must have been a 'comfortable' time 
to study educational administration. Classical management 
theory had provided an apparently solid foundation to 
the field, based on principles drawn from industrial 
organisations and also wide accumulated experience. This 
foundation was based on Taylor's (1911) "Scientific 
Management" and Fayol's (1916) "Universal Principles 
Movement", but later analysed and synthesised by Urwick 
(1943) .
The human relations approach had provided the "human touch" 
by studying organisations in terms of the behaviour of 
people. However, the purpose behind this approach was 
to enable people to co-operate and work together for the 
"good of the organisation", rather than their individual 
needs and requirements.
Finally, the systems perspective had placed the study 
of educational administration on an apparently firm 
scientific footing, with its concept of the study of 
organisations, as systems, and sub-systems, which are 
considered to act together to serve the requirements of 
the organisation. Systems could be scientifically designed 
to facilitate decision making through an analysis of 
information, needs and communication networks.
2The "New Move ment!>.
By the late 195 0 ’s, an approach called by Halpin the "New 
Movement" had grown up which, based in Chicago, had 
attempted to incorporate the wisdom of the classical 
approaches into scientific principles. Kendell and Byrne, 
in their paper, "Thinking about the Greenfield-Griffiths 
d e b a t e " (1977) , explain how the "New Movement" was based 
on hypothetical and deductive research, viewing educational 
institutions as social systems. In his 1986 paper, "The 
Decline and Fall of Science in Educational 
Administration.", Thomas Greenfield considers that, by
1957, the "New Movement" was dominating thinking within 
American educational administration.
The think-tank of the "New Movement", advocating scientific 
approaches to educational administration, produced the 
systems approach to educational administration. Drawing 
on parallel developments in organisation theory in the 
United States, it presented the idea that educational 
organisations should be viewed as a system of parts
which integrate to serve the organisation and allow it
to achieve its goals. Through flow charts and diagrams, 
the structure and communication networks within 
organisations could be studied in a rational scientific 
w a y .
However, this apparently firm scientific footing for the 
study of educational administration was to be short-lived.
The I.I.P. Address.
In 1974 the British Educational Administration Society 
(B.E.S.) invited Thomas Greenfield to speak at their
International Intervisitation Programme (IIP) at Bristol. 
Whilst G r e enfield’s first criticisms were made in 1973,
3it was the Bristol address that is generally regarded 
as having launched his crusade on what he saw as the
pre-occupation of educational administration with systems 
perspectives, based on structural functional philosophy,
i.e., that educational organisations consist of a structure 
of functional parts which faithfully serve the whole in
all matters.
Greenfield's alternative was a subjective stance, that 
focused on the individual within educational organisations, 
and his or her subjective view of reality. This quickly 
led to the concept that o r ganisations, including
educational organisations, have no objective reality except 
that which the individual subject perceives to exist.
In his recent work with Peter Ribbins, "Greenfield on
Educational Administration: Toward a Humane Science."
(1993), Greenfield, while in dialogue with Ribbins, recalls 
his 1974 IIP Address and its immediate impact. He explains 
how his address paper had been circulated before he arrived 
and that this resulted in an "electric tension" that
exploded at the address. Greenfield talks of a "whispering 
campaign" and relates recollection of an interruption 
by Daniel Griffiths to his answer to a question where
he implied that the dominating theorists in the field 
of educational administration were systems thinkers.
Griffiths had demanded that he name one; to which
Greenfield replied, "Talcott Parsons". After the meeting, 
Greenfield relates that Griffiths suggested that he was 
"poorly informed" and that "he should read more." Thus 
began the Greenfield/Griffiths debate.
4The "New Persp ective” .
The views expressed by Greenfield, in his address, were 
elaborated in his paper, "Theory About Organisation: A
New Perspective and its Implication for Schools", which 
first appeared in "Administering Education, International 
C h a l l e n g e " (1975), edited by Meredydd Hughes, and later, 
in "Approaches to School Management"(1980) edited by T. 
Bush, R. Glatter, I. Goodey and C. Riches.
G r e e n f i e l d ’s "new perspective" led to a subjective approach 
which questioned the use of systems concepts of 
organisations in which organisations were viewed as 
cohesive parts which served the whole, much as the organs 
of the body of animals serve the whole organism. The 
"new perspective" also questions the systems concept that 
organisations interact with, and respond to, their 
environments and that they have goals to which they can 
direct themselves.
In his "new perspective" paper Greenfield, at the time, 
saw himself as putting forward a phenomenological 
alternative to the systems approach.
G r e e n f i e l d ’s Subjective Approach
In putting forward his "phenomenological perspective", 
(the status of which his critics were later to question), 
Greenfield was introducing philosophical issues into the 
heart of the debate within educational administration.
A subjective approach, which questions the nature of 
reality, implying that any observed reality is that 
perceived by an individual subject, and as such, is unique 
to the individual, must also question the nature of 
knowledge and theory, as these concepts are developed
5in the minds of individual subjects. Hence, the hostile 
reaction at the 1974 IIP conference. Greenfield was 
exposing the "taken for granted" nature of the "New 
Movement" and questioning the very foundation and 
principles on which it was based, implying that there 
was another way of seeing reality, that the perception 
of the individual could be the focus of attention, rather 
than the collective organisation. Once an organisation 
is perceived as a collection of individuals, and it is 
acknowledged that each individual may have a different 
perception, then the concept "organisation" is called 
into question. Its status reduces to a perceived 
conception in the mind of an individual. It, therefore, 
cannot be "real" in an absolute sense.
The Concept "Environment".
The systems concept of an organisation taking account 
of an environment is also reduced, in G r e e n f i e l d ’s "new
perspective", to the idea that an environment, being 
basically people grouped in other organisations, is again 
a subjective reality. Greenfield discusses this in a 
later paper, titled "Environment as Subjective 
R eality"(1983) . The concept "theory" is also questioned, 
as it is in the minds of individuals that theories are
created .
The Nature of Theory.
In his "new perspective" paper, Greenfield considers that 
theory can become a "set of meanings" in the individual
mind. However, the point is, if theory can become a "set
of meanings"; a set of individual interpretations of 
events, then can it still retain its explanatory potential? 
If Greenfield uses the word "set" to imply simply meanings 
with common characteristics then the explanatory potential
6seems weak. However, if the term "set” implies some more 
complex patterned linkage betv/een the meanings, then the 
explanatory potential is much stronger.
After the Greenfield/Griffiths Debate.
Although the Greenfield/Griffiths debate raised many 
issues, such as the nature of organisations, environments, 
goals and the theories that were to govern them, Peter 
Gronn, in his work "Rethinking Educational Administration: 
T .B .Greenfield and his C r i t i c s " ,(1973) , considers that 
the concept of a Greenfield/Griffiths debate can be 
misleading. For although, in the middle 1970's, in the 
aftermath of the 1974 address, it was Griffiths who was 
Greenfield's chief critic, Gronn later considers that, 
with Griffiths' gradual accommodation of subjective
stances, Greenfield's chief critic became Donald Willower.
In Griffiths' paper "Intellectual Turmoil in Educational 
Administration", Griffiths was acknowledging that, by
1979, educational administration was no longer settled.
However, Gronn does not see Greenfield as simply presenting 
a subjective approach based on phenomenology.
There is much discussion in his book over the nature of
Greenfield's philosophical position. Gronn considers that 
Greenfield was on a "journey" progressing from the Action 
theories of Weber, through perhaps a Husserlian
phenomenology, never made explicit, to existential ideas, 
when R.D.Laing is cited in some of his later papers.
Section 2. will discuss the nature of Greenfield's
philosophical stance through the justificatory
philosophical sources he uses to buttress his arguments.
The fact that Greenfield, in his early work, linked
phenomenology to Weber's "method of understanding"
7(verstehen), implied that he was linking phenomenology 
with an Action perspective. It is more suitable to refer 
to G r e e n f i e l d ’s "new perspective" as a subjective approach, 
rather than phenomenological, as this takes into account 
his progression from Action theory to existential ideas.
The "Newness" of the "New Perspective".
What was new about Greenfield's "new perspective" was 
the introduction of subjective ideas into the field of 
educational administration. He opened up the
subjective/systems debate within that discipline. This 
was Greenfield's major contribution, rather than the 
newness of the ideas themselves, which already existed 
in organisation theory in general, as exemplified by
Silverman's work, "The Theory of O r g a n isations"(1970), 
where Silverman indicates a phenomenological approach. 
In fact, Greenfield, in dialogue with Ribbins, in
"Greenfield on Educational Administration"(1993), states 
that he had read Silverman and Weber before the preparation 
of his 1974 IIP address. So in his IIP address, Greenfield
was introducing ideas from subjective action perspective
organisation theory into the field of educational 
administration. It was not the ideas themselves that 
were new, but the audience to which they were addressed.
In Section 3. consideration will be given to the 
development of Greenfield's "new perspective", and the 
corresponding development of the "new directions" in the 
sociology of education, as both proclaim the existence 
of an early phenomenological stage and both have question 
marks over the status of the word "new" in their titles.
The Greenfield/Griffiths debate is a term that should 
only be applied to the immediate aftermath of the 1974 
IIP address. When Willower enters the debate in the 
1980's, systems approaches have other critics, namely,
8the neo-Marxist Critical Theorists.
The three way Classification of Philosophers within 
Educational Administration.
Peter Ribbins, in his article "Organisation Theory and 
the Study of Educational Institutions11 in "Managing 
E d u c ation"(1985) , edited by M.Hughes et. al., considers 
three philosophical orientations in educational 
administration, which he puts into the form of a table. 
He labels them:
1. Consensus assumed (Systems theory "open" "closed" 
"loosely coupled").
2. Order as empirically contingent (Action theory,
"social phenomenology", "ethnomethodology" and 
"symbolic interactionism").
and finally,
3. Conflict assumed (Marxist theory, critical theory).
The individual appropriateness of his various sub-divisions 
will be considered in later sections, but the main point 
considered here, is this three way classification. In 
his paper, "Re-Forming and Re-Valuing Educational
Administration. Whence and when cometh the
pho enix?"(1991), Greenfield, in reflecting back on R i b b i n s ’ 
classification, sees them quite clearly as 1. the systems- 
empiricist, 2. the subjective and 3. the critical or ethno- 
M a r x i s t .
Critical Theory.
Critical Theory entered educational administration through
9the work of Richard Bates in Australia. Bates, who will 
be considered in detail later, writes both within the 
"new sociology of education" and educational 
administration, and it appears that neo-Marxist approaches 
arrived much earlier in the new sociology of education, 
another point to be elaborated on later.
Bates defends many of the views of Greenfield and is even 
regarded by Gronn as being one of G r e e n f i e l d ’s allies 
in the subjective/systems debate. However, there is a
clear neo-Marxist impact to Bates' work, through the 
"Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School". In Section
4. the historical development of "Critical Theory" through 
the Frankfurt School will be outlined along with its 
adaptation by Bates to the concerns of educational 
administration.
The Response of Jean Hills
A detailed critique of Greenfield's 1975 position was 
undertaken by Jean Hills in "A Critique of Greenfield's 
'New Perspective'"(1980).
Hills acknowledges the vast area of human thought over 
which Greenfield argues his case. Hills implies that
all scientists, whether social or natural, would agree
with Greenfield that science cannot reveal ultimate 
reality. This is as clearly true of the natural sciences 
as the social sciences. Even in physics, for example, 
theories can only approximate to the real world. The 
physicist is used to dealing with point objects in 
frictionless worlds, and does not pretend that such 
realities actually exist.
Hills also criticises Greenfield for suggesting that 
organisations can be understood in their concrete totality 
as a human experience, while stating that it is impossible
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to have a unifying theory of organisations. Hills, by 
his own admission, at one point in his work, is confining 
himself to a scientific attack on Greenfield's stance 
and does not appear to accept that Greenfield's position 
is based on a different philosophical orientation, which 
questions the reality of socially constructed concepts 
like organisations. When Greenfield is considering "that 
organisations can be understood in their concrete 
totality", this refers to a subjective perception of an 
organisation, according to Weber's "method of 
understanding", (verstehen), which honours the integrity 
of the individual subject experiencing a situation as 
being "understood", and "real", for him or her. This 
does not imply that theories connecting individual 
perceptions are possible.
Hills also considers that the relations among individuals 
within organisations are real, which again is questionable 
to Greenfield, as inter-relations within an organisation 
are seen by Greenfield as social constructs, perceived 
and created in the minds of individual subjects.
This debate leads on to the nature of social research 
within educational administration. Greenfield's stance 
implies that there can only be individual case studies, 
qualitative research methods, with no attempt at 
statistical analysis, whereas Hills sees probabilities 
and statistics, as the best approximation to scientific 
laws, within a social science applied to educational 
administration.
Griffiths' Changing Stance.
It was indicated earlier, that by 1979, Griffiths was 
acknowledging the turmoil in educational administration 
and starting to accommodate the views of Greenfield within
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his own thinking.
In his dialogue with Ribbins, mentioned earlier, Greenfield 
acknowledges his debt to Griffiths in more recent years, 
for his help and support in his views, but, as he points 
out, it was not like that at the start!
Gronn sees Griffiths also as being more accommodating 
to Greenfield in the 1 9 8 0 ’s, but considers that Griffiths 
should be seen as addressing his own problems, rather 
than being a direct respondent to Greenfield.
This is exemplified by G r i f f i t h s ’ concept of Gestalt 
switching. This concept, seeing through different 
spectacles, indicates a back and forth switching of 
approaches to educational administration to aid 
understanding, whereas Gronn's interpretation of 
Greenfield's Gestalt switch is a one-way switch, from 
systems to subjective approaches, with a corresponding 
change of commitment, much like a change of religion.
Griffiths, like Greenfield, according to Gronn, was 
influenced by his experience as an administrator in 
educational institutions. For Griffiths, this produced 
sympathies with the ambiguity models of Cohen, March and 
Olsen and their ’’Garbage C a n ” Theory. Gronn sees this 
sympathy as being linked to Griffiths' experience of the 
non-rational or informal sides of life as an administrator.
"Garbage Can" Theory, along with Weicks' concept of loose 
coupling will be discussed in Section 6., where the 
ambiguity models, and their relation to the subjective 
approach of Greenfield, will be considered.
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The Response of Donald Willower.
Gronn sees Donald Willower as being Greenfield's chief
protagonist in more recent times. Willower sees
educational administration theory progressing through 
rigorous scientific enquiry, involving testing of 
hypotheses and methods involving validification through 
attempts at falsification. Willower sees science as 
belonging to a realm of enquiry which differs from ideology 
and religion. The fact that science itself can have 
ideological implications, is not manifest in this
v i e w p o i n t .
Willower sums up G r e e n f i e l d fs stance by seeing it as an
appeal for empathy, a sense of personal feelings. He 
uses this to try and interpret Greenfield's use of the 
word "understanding", (which comes from Weber's 
"verstehen"), that is seen by Willower as being at odds 
with explanation.
Greenfield uses the word "understanding" to indicate a 
sense of plasticity with another subject's interpretation 
of the world, rather than understanding as comprehension, 
which is more allied to the scientific concept of the 
word. This does not necessarily imply that this respect 
for another individual's interpretation of a situation 
indicates that personal feelings are shared, or even 
acknowledged, as being legitimate.
When Greenfield replies to Willower, in his paper, "The 
Man Who Comes Back Through The Door In The Wall: 
Discovering Truth, Discovering Self, Discovering 
Organ i s a t i o n s ."(1980) , it is clear that Greenfield has 
a narrow concept of science. Willower is able to attack 
Greenfield for this, calling his characterisation an 
extreme scientism, implying that Greenfield considers
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that science can only tolerate one theory, one explanation 
at any point of time. This is clearly not the case. 
In physics, for example, the concept "wave/particle
dual i t y ” means that light is sometimes regarded as a wave 
and sometimes regarded as a particle. When Kuhn's concept 
of paradigm is considered in Section 7., this notion of 
conflicting theories in science will be considered in 
some detail.
Concluding Comments.
Greenfield's IIP Address acted as a watershed in
educational administration. In arguing his case for a
subjective approach to educational administration, 
Greenfield raised fundamental issues about the 
philosophical basis of the field of study of educational 
administration. His subjective approach, which takes 
the integrity of the subject's interpretation as its
starting point, raises questions about the reality of 
concepts like organisations, goals and environments, that 
are "taken for granted" in systems approaches to
educational administration, which are based on what
Greenfield considers to be positivistic
structural-functional thinking.
If an analysis of the aftermath of the IIP Address is 
to be conducted, then it is essential to consider the 
philosophical basis on which Greenfield's subjective 
approach stands, along with those of his critics.
Section 2., with its analysis of the justificatory 
philosophical sources that Greenfield draws upon in his 
arguments, is essential to this thesis, because it forms 
a basis to his philosophical orientation, which colours 
the way he sees educational administration. Also, because 
he has highlighted the philosophical foundations of the
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various approaches, clear comparison between them requires 
their philosophical bases to be investigated.
The fact that parallel developments were occurring in 
the sociology of education, in the early 1970*8, makes 
an analysis of the comparison between this field and 
educational administration worthwhile and important, and 
so a comparative study has been undertaken in Section
3.
In his paper, "Organization Theory as Ideology"(1979), 
Greenfield refers to the work of M.F.D.Young in "Knowledge 
and Control"(1971), and Bates, who uses Greenfield's work 
to justify his arguments within a "Critical Theory" 
approach to educational administration, also writes within 
the field of the sociology of education along neo-Marxist 
l i n e s .
This comparison, which has not to the writer's knowledge, 
been undertaken elsewhere, forms a useful contribution, 
by highlighting the need for research within subjective 
approaches to be along ethnographic lines, and provides 
a link, acknowledged within both fields, to anthropological 
studies which use ethnomethodological techniques of 
individual case studies, as the chief form of research 
method.
So Section 4. extends the parallels between educational 
administration and sociology of education into the neo- 
Marxist structural approach, comparing the "Critical 
Theory" of the Frankfurt School, proposed by Bates in 
educational administration, with Whitty's neo-Marxist 
chronological discussion of the ’'progress" of the "new" 
sociology of education.
This leads into Section 5., with a consideration of the
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anthropological and ethnographic techniques that are 
implied, as the only research methods available, if 
subjective approaches are to be applied to educational 
administration, and yet, paradoxically, are the preferred 
method of research within the 'new' sociology of education, 
even taking account of the fact that there is an early 
push, within that field, into the structural approaches 
of neo-Marxism. Madan Sarup, in "Marxism and 
Ed u c a t i o n " (1978), for instance, talks of the importance 
of anthropological techniques of an ethnographic nature. 
G r i f f i t h s 1 preference for ambiguity models, which stress 
the non-rational side of organisational life, as outlined 
earlier, makes an analysis of the status of Cohen, March 
and Olsen's "Garbage Can" Theory and Weick's "loose 
coupling" ambiguity models, essential, along with a 
consideration of their place in relation to the subjective 
approach of Greenfield.
The results of the contribution of all these models, 
approaches, philosophical orientations, etc., within 
educational administration, have led people within the 
field, such as Meredydd Hughes in his contribution to 
the "Handbook of Research in Educational
A d m i nistration"(1988) , to talk of the present "paradigm 
diversity". Yet the word "paradigm", itself, poses 
problems in its use, and does not appear to be clearly 
defined. Although Greenfield, in his latest work with 
Ribbins, "Greenfield on Educational Administration"(1993) , 
uses the word "paradigm", he does so in a loose way, 
probably in response to Ribbins' use of the term, and 
does not clearly define the word. There is no Greenfield 
definition of the word "paradigm", and until his recent 
retrospective analysis of his work, he did not apply 
the term to his approach. Hence, the need for a clear 
analysis of the word and its various uses, as is undertaken 
in Section 7.
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So, before reaching the final stages of this thesis, where 
an example is provided of the use of such theoretical 
considerations within a specific report on one education 
authority, and where attempts are made to reconcile the 
problems of paradigm diversity, by introducing other 
possible concepts, eg., chaos, culture, intersubjectivity 
and time irreversibility, it is essential to consider 
philosophical sources, sociology of education, neo-Marxist 
approaches, ethnography and anthropology, ambiguity models 
and the concept "paradigm" as outlined.
17
R e f e r e n c e s .
BOYAN Norman J. (Ed.)
"Handbook of Research on Educational 
Administration". A Project of the American 
Educational Research Association. Pub. 1988 
by Longman Inc., New York.
BUSH Tony, GLATTER Ron., GOODEY Jane and RICHES 
Colin (Eds.)
"Approaches to School Management". A Reader 
of The Open University. Pub. 1980 by Harper 
and Row, in association with The Open University 
P r e s s .
GREENFIELD Thomas B.
"Theory about Organization: A New Perspective 
and its Implications for Schools", in 
"Administering Education: International 
Challenge", edited by M.Hughes pp. 71-99. Pub. 
1975 by The Athlone Press of The University 
of London.
GREENFIELD Thomas B.
"Organization Theory as Ideology". Pub. 1979 
in Curriculum Inquiry. Vol. 9. No. 2. pp. 97- 
112 .
GREENFIELD Thomas B.
"The Man Who Comes Back Through the Door in 
the Wall: Discovering Truth, Discovering Self, 
Discovering Organizations." Pub. 1980 in 
Educational Administration Quarterly, Vol.
16. No. 3. pp. 25-59.
GREENFIELD Thomas B.
"Environment as Subjective Reality". 1983 
(April). Paper presented to the Conference of 
the American Educational Research Association, 
( m i m e o .)
GREENFIELD Thomas B.
"The Decline and Fall of Science in Educational 
Administration". Pub. 1986 in
"Interchange"(0.I .S .E .) Vol. 17. No. 2. pp.57- 
80.
GREENFIELD Thomas B.
"Re-Forming and Re-Valuing Educational 
Administration: Whence and When Cometh the 
Phoenix?" Pub. 1991 in Educational Management 
and Administration. Vol. 19. No. 4. pp. 200- 
218.
GREENFIELD T. and RIBBINS P. (Eds.)
"Greenfield on Educational Administration". 
'Towards a Humane S c i e n c e 1. Pub. 1993 by 
R o u t l e d g e .
GRIFFITHS Daniel E.
"Intellectual Turmoil in Educational 
Administration". Pub. 1979 in Educational 
Administration Quarterly. Vol. 15. No. 3. pp.43 
65.
GRONN Peter
"Rethinking Educational Administration.
T.B.Greenfield and his Critics." Pub. 1983 
by Deakin University, Victoria, Australia.
3217. ESA.841. Theory and Practice in 
Educational Administration.
HILLS Jean
"A Critique of Greenfield's 'New Perspective'". 
Pub. 1980 in Educational Administration 
Quarterly. Vol. 16. No. 1. pp. 20-44.
HUGHES M., RIBBINS P., THOMAS H. (Eds.) 
"Managing Education: The System and the 
Institution." Pub. 1985 by Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston.
KENDELL Richard, BYRNE David R.
"Thinking about the Greenfield-Griffiths 
Debate." Pub. 1977 in The University Council 
for Educational Administration Review, Columbus 
Ohio. Vol. 19. No. 1. pp. 6-16.
SARUP Madan
"Marxism and Education". Pub. 1978 by Routledge 
and Kegan Paul.
SILVERMAN David
"The Theory of Organisations." Pub. 1970 by 
Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., London.
YOUNG Michael F.D. (Ed.)
"Knowledge and Control. New Directions for 
the Sociology of Education." Pub. 1971 by 
Collier-MacMillan.
19
SECTION 2.
THE USE OF JUSTIFICATORY PHILOSOPHICAL SOURCES
IN THE SUBJECTIVE/SYSTEMS DEBATE.
Before proceeding to widen the debate into other 
disciplines, some consideration will be given to the
justificatory philosophical sources used by Greenfield 
and his critics.
It is clear in Greenfield's writing, that he sees his
proposals as offering a different philosophical viewpoint 
to that of systems theory. What is not so obvious, is 
how to classify his philosophical standpoint, as in 
clarifying his position he uses various philosophers and 
t h i n k e r s .
Greenfield and Phenomenology.
It has already been mentioned, in the last section, how 
Gronn considers that it is inappropriate to think of
Greenfield as a p h e n omenologist, hence the use of the 
more general label, "subjectivist". One of the reasons 
is that Gronn claims that Greenfield does not quote 
Husserl, whom Gronn considers to be the father of 
phenomenology. However, Husserl's transcendental
phenomenology has to be seen, in the present, as just
one branch of phenomenological thinking which has been 
adapted and added to by later generations of 
phenomenologists, such as Schutz and Berger. Greenfield,
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therefore, may, in his early subjective writing, not have 
considered Husserl's phenomenology appropriate to his 
s t a n c e .
It is difficult to avoid the fact that in the "new 
perspective" paper Greenfield, (at the time), considered 
himself to be drawing on phenomenological ideas, as a 
reading of the paper indicates frequent use of the word 
phenomenology. Gronn points to Greenfield's progressive 
abandonment of the term, but it could be argued, that 
in his "new perspective" paper, he did see himself as 
putting forward a phenomenological position.
Greenfield and Weber.
It is true, as Gronn says, that Greenfield draws heavily 
on Max Weber's ' verstehen' work. This is noticeable, even 
in his later paper, "Environment as Subjective
Reality"(1983), where Greenfield is careful to distinguish 
between Weber's 'verstehen' work, and his work on 
bureaucracy. He also states how Weber's work is in
opposition to systems perspectives:
"Weber stands for the individual and for the 
subjective understanding of reality in 
organization. Such a stance places him in 
opposition to the assumptions of modern 
organization theory that sees reality in the 
collectivity and ignores the action of 
individuals."
(Greenfield 1983 p40)
This does not directly imply that Weber's work is allied 
to a phenomenological approach, just because it is in 
opposition to positivistic approaches, based on functional 
perspectives. However, it is possible to find links 
between Weber's 'verstehen' work and phenomenology.
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Schutz, who is generally regarded as a phenomenologist, 
drew, according to Wagner, (in "Alfred Schutz: An
Intellectual Biography"(1983)), on the work of Max Weber 
for his sociological viewpoint:
"Max Weber remained the mainstay of Schutz's 
sociology. At least half of the articles he 
published in the United States contain quotations 
from, discussions of aspects of, and references 
to Weber's writings. He reiterated that Weber 
had given Sociology the 'central task' of 
understanding 'the meaning which the actor 
bestows upon his action', its 'subjective 
m e a n i n g '."
(Wagner 1983 pl23)
Weber: a Source of Phenomenological Ideas?
The link between sociology and phenomenology which Schutz 
provides could explain why, in the new sociology of 
education, the phenomenological influences come from 
Schutz, whereas, Greenfield, working in educational 
administration, is perhaps drawn directly to Max Weber.
Although this will be considered in more detail in the 
next section, it is interesting to speculate that 
Greenfield, in his "new perspective" paper, saw Weber 
as a source of phenomenological ideas, even though, as 
Gronn states, Weber is not normally regarded in this light. 
The authors of 'Cultural Analysis', when discussing the 
phenomenology of Peter Berger, consider that Max Weber 
has links to phenomenology. They state:
"...whereas Weber's methodology operated out 
of an incipient and rough-hewn phenomenology, 
Schutz sought to refine Weber's methodology 
by clarifying his postulates and developing 
his concepts. To the degree that Berger depends 
upon Schutz for this sort of clarification of
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the interpretive method of sociology, Berger 
is the benefactor” .
(Wuthnow et.al. (Eds.) 1984 p31)
Greenfield, in his "new perspective" paper, quotes from 
Silverman with the statement:
"The phenomenological view leads to the concept 
of organizations as 'invented social
r e a l i t y '  and to the paradox that, having
invented such reality, man is perfectly capable 
of responding to it as though it were not of 
his own invention",
(Greenfield in Hughes (Ed) 1975 p81)
and yet, Silverman, in his analysis, in "The Theory of 
Organisation", under the heading of "The Action Frame 
of Reference", draws on both Schutz and Berger, as well 
as Weber's 'verstehen* work.
The Individual Subject: Responsible for his Own Reality?
The above quotation implies, with the use of the word 
"man" rather than "men", that it is the individual subject 
who is responsible for responding to organisations as 
if they are real.
This is the view Greenfield favours, where each person 
is responsible for their own subjective reality, and comes 
from Weber. Silverman considers the concept, 'verstehen':
"...it begins with 'the observation and 
theoretical interpretation of the subjective 
"states of mind" of actors'. This may take 
the form of 'the actually intended meaning'
for concrete individual a c t i o n ........ (or) the
average of, or an approximation to, the actually 
'intended m e a n i n g '...... More usually, however,
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explanations are in terms of ideal - typical 
actors whom we take to be pursuing certain ends 
by choosing appropriate means on the basis of 
a subjective definition of the situation".
(Silverman 1970 pl39)
This appears to be straight from Weber, but then, 
immediately, in the next section, Silverman brings in 
Schutz's notion of shared ideas which, it could be argued, 
leads to the possibility of imposition of meanings. 
Silverman states:
"'It is not even n e c e s s a r y 1, Schutz argues, 
'to reduce human acts to a more or less well 
known individual actor. To understand them 
it is sufficient to find typical motives of 
typical actors which explain the act as a typical 
one arising out of a typical situation'".
(Silverman 1970 pl39)
The Problems of In tersubjectivity.
However, this view has to be contrasted with Wagner's 
opinion that intersubjectivity has been a fundamental 
problem both for Husserl and Schutz, and probably remains 
a difficult one in phenomenology.
On Husserl, Wagner states that the problem of 
transcendental intersubjectivity:
"...was to be solved within the second volume 
of Ideen. But Husserl ran into unexpected 
difficulties when writing it. After long years, 
he laid it aside unfinished".
(Wagner 1983 p313)
On Schutz, Wagner explains how the problems of
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intersubjectivity led to a requirement to step outside 
transcendental phenomenology. Wagner states that Schutz:
"...wrote in no uncertain terms that 
phenomenology 'claims to be a philosophy of
man in his life-world'...... He left no doubt
that the main accent was on the life-worldly 
basis and not on the constituting agency of 
the transcendental ego".
(Wagner 1983 pp314-315)
The transcendental phenomenology of Husserl, with its 
mental directedness, in effect, cuts off the possibility 
of other subjects, through the idea that each person is 
responsible for directing their mind towards the perceived 
world. In "The Great Phil osophers"(1987), edited by Bryan 
Magee, Hubert Dreyfus explains how the phenomenological 
reduction overcame the problem of the objectivity of the 
world. However, at the same time, it makes the problem 
of intersubjectivity manifest.
Intersubjectivity and the Action Frame of Reference.
It could be argued, though, that the Action frame of 
reference also poses this problem of intersubjectivity. 
Weber has to start with ideal type typical actors and 
discusses the meaning of their actions for them.
Rex has taken up this problem and considers the problem 
of interaction in relation to the unit act:
"Some but by no means all of the theoretical 
models of unit acts would include as means or 
conditions of the act the behaviour of other 
persons. A sociological explanation of the 
behaviour of these other persons consists in 
showing that it has a place in terms of the 
model of the unit act. It should be noticed
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that though there may be a valid explanation 
of the behaviour of these other persons in terms 
of their own motivation, the relevant point 
for the sociologist is the role which their 
behaviour plays in terms of the scheme of action 
of the hypothetical actor with which the model 
s t a r t s " .
(Rex 1961 pp93-94)
One of the main problems with this view of 
intersubjectivity which, as Rex points out, Weber himself 
realised, was that it provides an infinite number of
starting points for sociological analysis. This, of 
course, is the problem with intersubjectivity; every 
individual perception of the world is different. Any 
real analysis of a social system would have to include 
every subject's perception of the system at all points 
in time since, it could be argued, their perceptions 
may be different, on different occasions.
Greenfield may have favoured an action approach because
it does confine itself to observable actions of 
individuals, and limits itself to trying to understand 
the meanings behind them. To work at the level of meaning 
though, as the phenomenologist tries to do, means that 
there is not even the security of the observable act. 
People's resulting acts may not always be in agreement
with their intentions and the meanings that they brought 
to the situation to produce these intentions. At a basic 
level physical conditions could intervene. For instance, 
someone could intend to pursue the act of pegging out 
washing, to find that it is impossible because of the 
strength of the wind.
Transcendental Phenomenology and the Unit Act.
Transcendental phenomenology may solve the problem of
the reality of the world, but it only solves this problem
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for the subject. An interesting problem would be to try 
to relate the observed unit act to the phenomenological 
stance of the subject. Dreyfus considers that it does
not matter whether there is a table out there, only that 
the transcendental phenomenologist considers that there 
is a table out there. So, can we then deduce that it 
does not matter whether the transcendental phenomenologist 
actually observes a unit act, all that matters, is that 
he took it that he has observed the unit act being 
committed by another? This may be the experience of the 
individual, but another subject could interpret the same 
act differently. This then raises the whole question 
of the reliability of observing the unit act.
Greenfield, in his "new perspective" paper, is content 
to accept the fact that one is limited to the subject's
interpretation of events. He even sees this as a strength, 
because he considers that in the natural sciences such 
subjective interpretations cannot be sought.
He states:
"In Weber's view, then, it is impossible for 
the cultural sciences to penetrate behind social 
perception to reach objective social reality.
Paradoxically, this limitation on the cultural
sciences is also their strength, since it permits 
them to do what is never possible in the physical 
sciences: the cultural scientist may enter into
and take the viewpoint of the actor whose 
behaviour is to be explained".
(Greenfield in Hughes (Ed) 1975 pp81-82)
This raises the question, though, of whether this is 
possible. Can the cultural scientist ever take the 
viewpoint of the actor? Can one person ever really know, 
fully, another's viewpoint? Apart from the question of 
deception, there is the problem of communication between 
individuals and the roles of languages and images.
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Much ethnographic work has to tackle these problems when 
observational techniques are used in fieldwork. These 
will be considered in detail, in Section 5., on 
anthropology and ethnography.
Greenfield and Existentialism.
These limitations of phenomenological and action approaches 
could have led Greenfield away from Weber's "method of 
understanding" towards a more existential approach.
Gronn considers how, in his later papers, there is a move 
towards such an approach:
"The third and final reason why his writings 
are not to be seen as phenomenological is, as 
has been suggested, his own progressive 
abandonment of the term. In fact, the words
which start to appear in his writings when 
R.D.Laing begins to be cited are the words
'existential1 and 'existential reality'".
(Gronn 1983 pl2)
Indeed, Greenfield sees the problematic nature of his
earlier proposals when he quotes from Laing at the start 
of his "Organization Theory as Ideology"(1979) paper:
"Experience is mysterious, for it is not entirely 
clear how we come to understand what we do and 
what is happening to us (c.f. Laing 1967,pl7).
This article argues, therefore, that the placing 
of meaning upon experience is an act of enormous 
importance".
(Greenfield 1979 p97)
In other words, how can we interpret another subject's 
experience, if that experience is not manifest to the 
subject themselves.
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Laing, in "The Divided Self", refers to what he calls 
existential phenomenology, where, in an attempt to overcome 
some of the problems discussed so far, he brings in the 
existential concept of being -in-the-world. He states:
"Existential phenomenology attempts to
characterize the nature of a person's experience 
of his world and himself. It is not so much 
an attempt to describe particular objects of 
his experience as to set all particular 
experiences within the context of his whole 
being-in-his-world".
(Laing 1965 pl7)
It would seem, then, that an attempt is to be made to 
overcome problems of individual perception and 
understanding, by an appeal to the idea that the individual 
is "immersed" in the world.
Heidegger's Concept of Primordial Coping.
Heidegger, although not himself accepting the label 
existentialist, did adopt the concept of being-in-the- 
world in his philosophy as a way of overcoming the problems 
of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology.
Dreyfus, in "The Great Philosophers" states how Heidegger 
considered that, often, we are not subjects directing 
our mental directedness towards objects, but often work 
at a level of primordial coping, where what we do is 
automatic to us. This occurs whenever routine repetitive 
physical tasks are carried out without the requirement 
for conscious concentrated thought. Heidegger discusses 
a carpenter's routine hammering of nails in this way.
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The Interpretation of Human Experience.
It is questionable whether shared meanings and shared 
practices could be regarded as our experiences, but this 
could certainly be one interpretation. Greenfield does 
not quote from Heidegger. His existential ideas come 
via Laing. Laing, in the earlier quotation, considered 
t h a t :
"Existential phenomenology attempts to
characterize the nature of a p e r s o n ’s experience 
of his world and himself” .
(Laing 1965 pl7)
Greenfield picks up this notion of experience and applies 
it to organisations, in his "Organization Theory as 
Ideology" paper. He uses the concept to attack systems 
t h e o r y :
"...the argument recognizes the interpretation 
of human experience as the bedrock upon which 
human life is built and upon which organization 
theory should stand. Organization theory, 
however, usually ignores such mysteries in human 
life, and it does so at the cost of impoverishing 
its own insight into people's lives and social 
reality. In the name of comprehensiveness and 
simplicity, theory usually oversimplifies the 
variety and complexity of human experience within 
organizations".
(Greenfield 1979 p97)
It is not then, the mental directedness of a subject that 
gives him his meaning, but in his existential sense, it 
is his experience. The idea of meanings coming through 
experience represents a more complex notion than all you 
need is experience, especially if "primordial coping", 
in Heidegger's sense, is taking place.
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The s u b j e c t ’s meaning, his way of coping, are internalised 
through his experiences so that the meanings become 
transparent to him, in certain circumstances.
To take an ’’Action” perspective, his action could be 
automatic like the hammering example, and could not, 
therefore, necessarily be used to infer, as the action 
perspective does, the meanings of his actions for him, 
as he is not aware of the meanings, since they are absorbed 
in a sub-conscious coping mode. Gronn states, for 
i n s t a n c e :
"The reference to ’m e a n i n g ’ remains throughout 
the entirety of his work. But with the 
introduction of Laing and the term 'existential', 
'meaning' becomes wedded to a dimension of 
feeling or to a notion of 'being'".
(Gronn 1983 pl2)
This can be seen in a quotation from one of Greenfield's
later works, "Environment as Subjective Real i t y "(1983):
"In these efforts to exert will in existential 
reality, the individual - - the one acting 
against fate, against the universe, or acting 
purely in response to the spark that gave him 
life - - that person is likely to seek the
assistance of others as a means of ensuring 
victory, or achievement, or the simple 
satisfaction that comes from doing something 
with others".
(Greenfield 1983 p9)
Here, the term 'existential reality' is related to the
subject acting against fate and the universe. It could
be claimed that fate and the universe refers to the
subject's being-in-the-world.
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Greenfield and Hodgkinson.
It is noticeable, in Greenfield's more recent paper, 
"The Decline and Fall of Science in Educational 
Administration"(1986), that he does not use philosophical 
sources at all. There are no references to Weber or Laing. 
In this paper, his main justificatory source is Hodgkinson, 
a fellow conspirator in the subjectivist debate. This 
paper focuses on a critique of the "New Movement" in 
educational administration, based on what Greenfield sees 
as positivistic science. His main attack focuses on 
Herbert Simon. Philosophically, this paper is concerned 
with the way that, in Greenfield's opinion, positivistic 
science, as it is applied to educational administration, 
separates facts from values. However, Greenfield's appeals 
to Hodgkinson show the limitation of a subjective approach. 
Greenfield states:
"The positivist argument is, however, a powerful 
one. It reduces all internal states, all 
perceptions, feelings, and values to
e p i p h e n o m e n a , to an unspeakable affect, to an
externality that, as H o d g k i n s o n ....... points
out, 'one can only r e b u t ........by referring
to one's own phenomenological and, therefore,
unverifiable e x p e r i e n c e ........ and by taking
a position outside the limits of positivist 
discourse'".
(Greenfield 1986 p60)
Hodgkinson's reference to unverifiable experience, again 
highlights the problems of a phenomenological stance. 
The experience which can give meanings to the subject, 
as discussed earlier, is only experience for that 
individual. As soon as attempts are made to verify it 
through intersubjective discussion or actions, it can 
no longer be the same experience.
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Greenfield : Still a Subjectivist?
Later in the paper, Greenfield quotes Hodgkinson in a 
way that indicates how Greenfield aspires to a 
philosophical position, where the individual subject is 
always responsible for his subjective reality, in a way 
that indicates that meanings cannot be imposed and 
indicates why, perhaps, even with the introduction of 
existential ideas, he still favours a stance that attempts 
to combine W e b e r ’s 'verstehen' theory with transcendental 
phenomenology, in the Husserlian sense, where the focus 
is still on the individual hypothetical actor and his 
subjective meanings.
V a l u e s .
Greenfield quotes from Hodgkinson when considering the 
need to acknowledge our values in organisational and
administrative affairs. Hodgkinson considers that 
commitment to values:
"...is, of course, subject to critique from 
other philosophical positions but all that the 
proponents of these contending positions can
do is to seek to persuade their audience by 
reason and rhetoric and all the powers at their 
disposal, that they have the better values.
In the end the act of choice is individual;
and if free and conscious, then moral".
(Hodgkinson in Greenfield 1986 p64)
The implication, in the last part of the quotation, being 
that the values we adopt are our individual responsibility. 
As Hodgkinson points out, in his work, "The Philosophy 
of Leadership"(1983) , values only exist in the minds of 
individuals:
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"We are always inclined to forget that any object 
in the world such as a gold coin or the Mona 
Lisa is in truth valueless and worthless save 
as we go through the phenomenological exercise 
of imputing value to it".
(Hodgkinson 1983 p31) 
and later:
"The world of fact is given, the world of value
m a d e .........In the same way it can be argued that
all moments, and hence all events, are 
analytically equivalent. Each is valueless 
and so, worthless or, paradoxically but 
literally, priceless. Life is a series of moment 
- fact - events to which subjectivities impute
value. And in principle we can do this freely".
(Hodgkinson 1983 p31)
Again, in the last part of the quotation, we see the focus 
on the integrity of the individual.
Different Levels of Subjective Reality?
Hodgkinson describes subjective reality in terms of
different levels, claiming that, while lower levels may
be subject to scientific investigation, the highest levels 
are inaccessible to other individuals.
Greenfield relates this in his 1983 paper, "Environment 
as Subjective Reality", where he is already using 
Hodgkinson as a justificatory phenomenological source. 
Greenfield states:
"As Hodg k i n s o n...... points out, the highest
kind of reality is personal and unique for each 
individual, though that reality may be said 
to be composed of lower or more readily 
verifiable forms of reality. He argues that 
there is a mingling of elements of the lower
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kinds of reality into the ultimate personal 
reality. But even though there are elements 
mingled into personal reality that are hard, 
scientific and verifiable, they will never allow 
us to control or predict the highest personal 
reality of the individual from a knov/ledge of 
these lower kinds of reality".
(Greenfield 1983 p6)
In this highest level of reality then, Greenfield is 
preserving his integrity of the subject, from outside 
interference, it could be argued, almost completely.
The curious point is that, although Gronn claims that
Greenfield was moving away from the use of the word 
’p henomenological1 in his later work, Hodgkinson,
G r e e n f i e l d ’s later philosophical source, claims in his 
"Philosophy of Leader s h i p " (1983) work, that Greenfield 
typifies the adoption of a phenomenological perspective 
in organisational theory. This all makes locating
Gr e e n f i e l d ’s philosophical position more difficult.
W i l l o w e r ’s Philosophical Stance.
A more rigorous attack on G r e e n f i e l d ’s subjective stance, 
in more recent times, has, in Gronn's opinion, come not 
from Griffiths but from Willower, as indicated in the 
last section. Some consideration, therefore, needs to 
be given to Willower's philosophical stance.
Willower discusses philosophical issues in relation to
educational administration, for instance, in his paper 
"Philosophy and the Study of Educational
Administration"(1985b), he states:
"A philosophy that is vague on epi s t e m o l o g y , 
or an extreme subjectivism, or transcendentalisms 
of the sort that have trouble with methodological 
explication would have difficulty meeting such
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a criterion, but it is not otherwise very
restrictive. A Deweyan theory of knowledge
in which truth is defined as warranted
assertibility fits it quite well".
(Willower 1985b p9)
The criterion Willower has in mind is a philosophy that
emphasizes communication more than verification; however, 
the verification concerned should be explicit or public.
His sympathy for Deweyan philosophy is also considered 
in his contributions to the "Handbook of Research on 
Educational Administration"(1988), where he states:
" I  have presented a position that blends
instrumentalism, naturalism, and pragmatism.
These views have in common an epistemology that 
recognizes the fallibility of science and seeks 
warranted assertibility (Dewey, 1938), not 
certainty".
(Willower in Boyan (Ed) 1988 p742)
The Fallibility of Science.
This fallibility of science, that is incorporated in the 
philosophy of John Dewey, is considered by Magee in "The 
Great Philosophers". Magee states, when talking about 
D e w e y :
"He did not see science as a body of reliable 
and changeless knowledge to which new certainties 
were being added. He saw it as an activity, 
the process of finding things out".
(Magee 1987 p293)
Willower is intolerant of Greenfield's attack on extreme 
scientism, as he sees it in educational administration, 
because he considers that much educational research is
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only too aware of the uncertainties of its findings. 
However, there do seem to be links in what Magee says 
about D e w e y ’s philosophy, with H e i d e g g e r ’s concept of 
'being-in-the-world’. Magee states that Dewey considered 
t h a t :
”We are living organisms in an environment in 
which, above all else, our concern is to survive, 
and one of the most important survival mechanisms
we h a v e ...... is knowledge, because it confers
understanding of the environment and, through 
that, a degree of mastery of it. So the fact 
is we are part of the very stuff and substance 
of the world we are trying to understand".
(Magee 1987 p293)
Wagner implies that there are links between Dewey's 
pragmatic philosophy and Schutz's phenomenology, which 
could, perhaps, suggest another reason why Greenfield 
is reluctant to enter into Schutzian phenomenology. Wagner 
considers that:
"Schutz paid sustained attention to John Dewey 
(1859-1952), the American educator and pragmatic 
philosopher".
(Wagner 1983 pl43) 
and later, in analysing action:
"Dewey had started with the pragmatic (in-order- 
to) motive of action: the "use and enjoyment"
of the "objects and materials of the
environ m e n t "  Schutz placed these
considerations into the context of his conception 
of Man's stance within and toward the social 
world, which he 'experiences primarily as a
field of his actual and possible a c t s '  Seeing
the world around him as one to be controlled 
by him, he is 'especially interested in that 
segment which is in his actual or potential 
reach'".
(Wagner 1983 pl44)
The Philosophy of the Possible,
This concept of actual or potential reach represents part 
of the stratification of the life world, by Schutz, in 
the context of space and time.
In Schutz's paper, in "Phenomenology and Sociology", edited 
by T.Luckmann, the author states:
"The stratification of the world into zones 
of actual, restorable and obtainable reach 
already refers to the structure of the life- 
world according to dimensions of objective 
temporality and their subjective correlates".
(Schutz in Luckmann (Ed) 1978 p259) 
and later:
"All these stratifications belong as 
unquestionably given to our naive experience 
of the socialized world. Even the typifications 
and symbolizations on terms of which we 
distinguish the several strata of our social 
world, construe and interpret their contents,
determine our action in it and upon it and its 
action upon us according to all degrees of
ability, are predefined as unquestionably given 
by virtue of the socially conditioned schemata 
of expression and interpretation prevailing 
in the group to which we belong and which we 
used to call the ’culture' of our group".
(Schutz in Luckmann (Ed) 1978 p260)
So we are led into the imposition of meaning by our 
culture, something which moves away from the individual 
being responsible for his own subjective reality. 
Paradoxically then, Schutz's phenomenology, Heidegger's 
existentialism and Dewey's pragmatism, favoured by 
Willower, all take us away from an emphasis on the subject
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being responsible for making sense of his world.
It may not be a coincidence that Greenfield has refrained 
from pursuing the philosophical stances outlined above. 
Although Gronn implies that he shifted towards an
existential position, in his later work, he does not appear 
to quote from Heidegger, and Gronn mentions that there 
is only one place where Schutz is quoted. It is the appeal 
to the subject's experience of the world that seems to 
give Greenfield his radically different way of looking
at organisation theory. The problem is, any attempt to
elaborate this stance beyond the subjective experience 
of individuals produces many of the philosophical problems 
outlined. This has the implication too, that, when it
comes to recipes for research in educational administration, 
one is reduced to biographical case studies of how people 
interpret the experiences they have within educational 
administration.
Concluding Comments.
There are indications that Greenfield has drawn throughout 
his work on phenomenological ideas, even though, perhaps, 
he has not quoted directly from phenomenological 
philosophers such as Husserl, Schutz or Berger. Gronn 
talks about the emergent nature of Greenfield's thinking 
and, when the philosophical implications of his "new 
perspective" are considered, it is noticeable how he tends 
to favour the Action perspective of Weber, because of 
the emphasis it puts on subjective meaning controlling 
the behaviour of the individual actor. The problem, as 
far as educational administration is concerned, is that 
it is not possible accurately to probe into observed acts 
of individuals. Under Greenfield's perspective, the 
individual may be responsible for his (or her) own 
subjective reality, but that does not mean that he
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interprets that reality, using the logical deductive 
processes of a scientific observer. It also means that 
the meaning he gives to these interpretations, the 
significance they have for him, may not be logically
related to the interpretations he deduces, and so any 
attempt to work at the level of meaning must be very 
s p e c u l a t i v e .
Greenfield's approach, like other subjective approaches, 
whether they be action frame, phenomenological or 
existential, has to cope with the problems of
intersubjectivity. Even if it were possible to 'know' 
completely the subjective meaning of the individual, how 
could these subjective meanings be accurately related 
to the subjective meaning of all other individuals? 
Greenfield tends to avoid this problem by according the 
highest respect to the subjective meaning of the 
individual, just as Weber considers that all actions have 
to be related back to the hypothetical ideal typical actor. 
The existential concept 'being-in-the-worId', with its 
'primordial coping', tries to immerse the subject in the 
world and draw attention away from his interpretive 
e x p e r i e n c e .
Greenfield's later preoccupation with values, and the 
use of Hodgkinson as a justificatory source, enables him 
to reinforce his subjective position, by appealing to
the idea that values are something that come from the 
individual subjective consciousness, i.e., only a mind 
can give value to something, to perceive it as good or 
b a d .
In this section, it has been indicated that links can 
be found between nearly all philosophical positions 
discussed, such that even Willower's pragmatic approach 
can be linked, through Dewey and Schutz, to a
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phenomenological position. Such links, though, should 
not undermine the clear distinction between the 
philosophical orientations that exist. Willower's stance, 
even though it is of a reflexive scientific nature, that 
attempts to achieve verification through continuous 
attempts at subjecting theories to falsification, does 
not persuade Greenfield that a scientific approach can 
be valid in educational administration.
Greenfield's philosophical position, which respects the 
integrity of the subject, can not accept a scientific 
perspective that tends to focus on the collective, and 
treat the collective, (in Greenfield's case the 
organisation), as if it were real. Hence, he continues 
to attack the justificatory reasoning for a scientific 
approach to organisations.
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SECTION 3.
A COMPARISON OF G R E E N F I E L D 1S SUBJECTIVE APPROACH
WITH THAT OF THE "NEW DIRECTIONS" WITHIN THE
SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION.
Greenfield's 'new perspective' was contemporary with the 
so called 'new directions' in the sociology of education, 
and it is interesting to consider to what extent they 
are related. There are certainly superficial similarities. 
Both have been described as paradigm shifts from the then 
prevailing perspectives which, in both fields, have been 
described as positivistic, based on theoretical concepts 
of structural functionalism. Madan Sarup in "Marxism 
and Education"(1978), states:
"Positivism is repudiated because it assumes 
that reality exists unproblematically; it 
stresses 'scientific' method and statistical 
measurement, and separates, 'facts' from 
'values', 'knowledge' from 'interest'".
(Sarup 1978 p3)
A similar rejection of science appears in Greenfield's 
paper on the 'new persp e c t i v e '(1975):
"The systems view assumes that the world is 
knowable as it is. Although the acquisition 
of such knowledge requires the intervention
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and help of scientists, theorists, and scholars, 
there exists an ultimate reality which may be 
discovered by application of the scientific 
method and similar forms of rational analysis".
(Greenfield in Hughes (Ed) 1975 p79)
Both disciplines have an antagonism to scientific 
approaches and any concept of statistical analysis. Sharp 
and Green (1975), in "Education and Social Control", 
distinguish between two separate approaches. First they 
identify the structural functional approach, which they 
c o n s i d e r :
"...has tended to analyse educational structures 
and processes in terms of their contribution 
to basic system requirements".
(Sharp and Green 1975 p2)
This, it could be argued, sounds similar to Greenfield's 
concept of systems perspectives, which he continually 
attacks. Secondly, Sharp and Green criticise what they 
describe as positivistic empiricism which, however, has 
structural functional implications. Such criticism, in 
the 'new' sociology of education, can be compared with 
statements by Greenfield in his 'new perspective' paper:
"...an organizational theory based upon 
understanding rejects the emphasis which much 
of contemporary social science places upon 
quantification, more complex mathematical models, 
and bigger number crunchers in the shape of 
better and faster computers".
(Greenfield in Hughes (Ed) 1975 p86)
The "Newness" of the Perspectives.
In both fields the initial phases of the paradigm shifts 
have been described as moves towards phenomenological
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perspectives. However, both fields have been criticised 
for not being new perspectives, but merely extensions 
of ongoing developments. For instance, Sharp and Green 
s t a t e :
"Recently, the sociology of education in Britain 
has received a stimulus from various 
'phenomenological1 approaches. Probably the 
most useful starting point at which to locate 
the initiation of these developments is with 
the Manchester studies".
(Sharp and Green 1975 pll)
referring, here, to the work of Hargreaves and Lacey. 
H a r g r e a v e s ’ "Social Relations in a Secondary School" 
(1967), and L a c e y ’s "Hightown Grammar; The School as a 
Social System" (1970), were also considered by Geoff. 
Whitty (1985) to have initiated the paradigm shift in 
the sociology of education.
Sharp and Green consider that Hargreaves and Lacey drew 
inspiration from American organisational theory, providing 
yet another link between the field of educational 
administration and the sociology of education, as it was
American organisational theory that Greenfield considers 
to have influenced the field of educational administration.
While the ’newness' of the ’new directions' in the 
sociology of education was being questioned, so too, was
the 'newness' of Greenfield's 'new perspective'. Thus 
Peter Gronn (1983) quotes Greenfield's 1978 response to 
his critics:
"I was wrong to let myself believe that the
word 'new' belonged either in my address to 
the 1.1.P. 1974 or in the revision of it that 
appeared in the proceedings of the conference.
What was new was not the ideas in the paper,
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but my awareness of them and the audience to 
which they were addressed."
(Gronn 1983 pl3)
Perhaps it is not surprising that the labels 'new*, in 
both fields, would lead to their being attacked for the 
significance of this word alone. Such labels invite 
criticism along the lines of the common saying, (in 
scientific circles).
The theory is not new.
If new, it is not true.
If both new and true,
Then it is not significant!
Phenomenological Pedigrees.
In spite of the common rejection of structural functional 
positivistic approaches, in both fields, there is a 
difference, even in the early stages, when one considers 
the extent to which the perspectives can be regarded as 
phenomenological. It has already been mentioned how, 
although Greenfield uses the term phenomenology in his 
1975 'new perspective' paper, he later abandons the term, 
a point highlighted by Gronn, when he suggested that it 
was inappropriate to think of Greenfield as a 
phenomenologist.
Geoff. Whitty described "Knowledge and Control" [Young 
(Ed) 1971] as the first major work of the 'new' 
sociologists of education, and it was of this publication, 
that Sarup stated:
"In opposition to a positivist sociology of
education, the g r o u p....... adopted a
phenomenological stance".
(Sarup 1978 pp5-6)
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which was to manifest itself in the 'new directions' for 
the sociology of education.
Intersub.jective Approaches.
However, it is possible to detect, even in M.F.D. Young's 
introduction to the 'new directions' publication, that 
there is a move towards intersubjective approaches with 
the stress on "imposition of meanings".
As early as page 2., Young states:
"To begin to move to explanations of how pupils, 
teachers and knowledge are org a n i z e d ,....existing 
categories that for parents, teachers, children 
and many researchers distinguish home from 
school, learning from play, academic from non- 
academic, and 'able' or 'bright' from 'dull' 
or 'stupid', must be conceived of as socially 
constructed, with some in a position to impose 
their constructions or meanings on others".
(Young 1971 p 2 )
This early stress on imposition of meaning, stems from 
the central concern of the 'new' sociologists to consider 
the way in which knowledge is socially constructed. They 
consider that the sociology of education cannot be 
separated from the sociology of knowledge, as in all 
thinking about education, knowledge is processed.
In his introduction to "Knowledge and Control", Young 
suggests that the contributors to the book:
"...are inevitably led to consider, often from 
widely different perspectives, 'what counts 
as educational knowledge' as problematic. The 
implication of this is that one major focus 
of the sociology of education becomes an enquiry 
into the social organization of knowledge in
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educational institutions. Thus, and this has 
important implications for the organization 
of sociological knowledge, sociology of education 
is no longer conceived as the area of enquiry 
distinct from the sociology of knowledge".
(Young 1971 p 3 )
However, it is necessary to be careful not to treat 
"Knowledge and Control" as presenting a united front. 
Whitty has stated that there was a R i c h n e s s *  in the work. 
Certainly, it could be argued that Esland's paper, 
"Teaching and Learning as the Organisation of Knowledge", 
can be considered as more basically phenomenological, 
than Y o u n g fs contributions. Esland states:
"The ideas of Schutz, Mead, Berger and others 
from which this analysis is derived are highly 
applicable to an understanding of teaching and 
1 e a r n i n g " .
(Esland in Young (Ed) 1971 p73) 
and in the next paragraph:
"In this kind of phenomenological analysis".
(Esland in Young (Ed) 1971 p73)
indicating, presumably, an analysis based on the ideas 
of the quoted philosophers.
Later, he admits that:
"...the study has been greatly influenced by 
the arguments advanced by Berger and Luckmann 
in 'The Social Construction of
R e a l i t y ' "  (A ND)........"by the work of Alfred
S c h u t z " .
(Esland in Young (Ed) 1971 p74)
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Whitty considered that Esland and Dale theoretically 
dominated Esland's early work, in the first course to 
be produced in the sociology of education for The Open
University, "School and Society".
Dale, in his paper, "Phenomenological Perspectives and 
the Sociology of the School", outlines what he considers 
to be the phenomenological perspective. He also mentions 
Silverman, who considered organisations from a 
phenomenological perspective, quoting the work of Berger 
and Luckmann. Greenfield also considers Silverman's work, 
"The Theory of Organisations"(1970). In his 'new 
perspective' paper, Greenfield states:
"...'feudalism', and the like, designate certain 
categories of human inter-action. Hence it
is the task of sociology to reduce these concepts 
to 'understandable' action, that is, without 
exception, to the actions of participating 
individual men".
(Greenfield 1979 pl02)
Clearly, here, one can see that the individual is still 
the focus of attention, responsible for his own actions. 
This has to be contrasted with the views of Esland in
his contribution to "Knowledge and Control".
While Greenfield develops a more generally subjective 
stance that led him to the existential views of R.D.Laing, 
the 'new' sociologists, concerned as they were with the 
way knowledge was socially constructed, were led into 
the imposition of meanings and a more structural stance.
The individual is not the centre of this approach because 
meaning can be imposed on him and make him behave in
certain ways. This idea led to the concept that all who 
occupy schools, teachers and pupils, can have meanings
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imposed on them from the prevailing social structure.
The 'new' sociologists of education see the prevailing 
structure of the education system as based upon subjects, 
that are presented as absolute knowledge to pupils in 
an unproblematical way such that it cannot be questioned. 
They also see the transmission of this knowledge as 
buttressing the values, rules and rituals of their 
contemporary society, which they see as governed by the 
rules of positivistic science, which presents these values, 
rituals and rules as logical and rational.
Hence, the early 'new' sociologists considered that it 
would be possible to change the contemporary situation 
and bring about political change, by changing teachers' 
practices from transmission of received knowledge, to 
a questioning and probing stance. This would be achieved 
by sensitising teachers to the position that the meanings 
of society were imposed upon them, without their knowledge; 
in other words, that they had a false consciousness. 
Hence, the 'new' sociologists of education, even in their 
earliest days, presented a stance with political 
implications.
The Influence of Schutz in the ’New D i r e c t i o n s 1 for the 
Sociology of Education.
The influence of Schutz is strong on the ’n e w 1 sociology 
of education, in this respect. Esland states:
”In combining the phenomenological insights 
of Husserl with those of Weber, Schutz deepened 
the conceptual fields of Verstehen and 'action*, 
and went some way towards establishing a 
sociology of mind as a subject of central 
importance in sociology."
(Esland in Young (Ed) 1971 p80)
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Whereas, Gronn states that:
"...there is only one place in which Greenfield 
cites Alfred Schutz".
(Gronn 1983 pll)
E s l a n d fs reading of Schutz implies that action is
interpreted in the present, the immediate point of time, 
and is a result of both experience and anticipated 
consequences, as they are perceived at the time.
He then considers the concept, *L e b ensfeldf, the 'life 
w o r l d 1 , which he sees as the individual's 'stock of 
knowledge', achieved through:
"...the continuing processes of constitution
and accommodation".
(Esland in Young (Ed) 1971 p80)
Presumably, the subject constitutes ideas in the mind, 
mediated by the accommodation of ideas external to the 
subject's consciousness, which then, forms his stock of 
k n o w l e d g e .
This knowledge is not, according to Esland, held in
isolation, but is shared with those who inhabit his 'life 
world'. The emphasis is on experience being achieved, 
primarily, through association with one's contemporaries 
in a process that occurs in an immediate present, rather 
than a near past or future.
Greenfield's reading of Weber's 'method of understanding', 
which he considers in his paper, "Organization Theory 
as I deology"(1979), implies that the subject experiences 
and anticipates over a period of time, and not in the
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i n s t a n t :
" W e b e r fs method is to create images of reality 
as actors in social settings understand it and
to show how action consistent with these images
has consequences - expected or unexpected.
Understanding comes from setting the images
against each other.
The images may come from different people at 
one point in time or from different vantage 
points over tim e ” .
(Greenfield 1979 pl04)
The question is, to what extent do these images, coming 
from others, constitute imposed meanings? In the above 
citation, Greenfield implies that the subject consciously 
selects and makes rational decisions about the images 
that he perceives, and that this aids his understanding, 
even if his consequent actions can have unexpected
implications. This has to be contrasted with Esland's 
reading of Schutz, where the subject's thought processes
are mediated by the ideas of others, rather than
understanding achieved purely through a selection of
images, which are compared side by side.
It is interesting to speculate that the question of whether 
meanings can be imposed on the subject, or not, could 
be responsible, in part, for leading the fields off in
the different directions already considered.
Schutz's 'Phenomenology'.
Schutz's paper, "Some Structures of the Life- W o r l d " (1966), 
as it appears in "Phenomenology and Sociology"(1978),
edited by Thomas Luckmann, considers further this concept 
of experience and time. He divides the stratification
of the world into the zones of actual, restorable and
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obtainable reach.
The actual reach covers the senses and bodily responses, 
such as hearing, seeing and manipulation. The restorable 
reach, however, only covers that part of the past that 
can be repeated. The third zone, the obtainable, is that 
which may come within one's reach in the future. This 
has to be anticipated in the light of past experience 
and is conditioned by the concept that the subject assumes 
such future experience is going to be the same for other 
individuals, subject to differences, due to their own 
biographical situation. Schutz states:
"...the problem of the structure of the social 
world intervenes here in so far as I take it 
for granted that the world within your actual 
or restorable reach is, in principle, the world 
within my potential reach although, on account 
of my biographical situation, my experiences 
of it will differ from yours, which correspond 
to your biographical situation".
(Schutz in Luckmann (Ed) 1978 p259)
The assumption that the individual anticipates that future 
experience will be the same for him as others, subject 
only to biographical differences, could be questioned. 
The subject could, conceivably, anticipate a different 
interpretation of the experience in the other's mind due 
to the perceived personality of the other person. It 
is problematic as to whether the "structure of the social 
world" would cover perceived personality differences.
Generally, this more elaborate concept of individual 
perception at one point in time, reaching into the future 
and past, as it does, starts to point to similarities 
with W e b e r fs concept of experience over time. Sharp and 
Green consider that:
54
"In spite of Weber's search for meaning, (even) 
he came to see social structures and their 
regularities as something other than mere 
constellations of meaning".
(Sharp and Green 1975 p22)
Their argument is that the phenomenologist appears to 
suggest an extreme form of subjective idealism. They state 
t h a t :
"...any form of sociological phenomenology which 
argues for the primacy of the knowing subject 
necessarily invokes Wittgenstein's argument 
against an individualistic epistemology and 
the possibility of private language".
(Sharp and Green 1975 p21)
They suggest that there is another form of phenomenology, 
stemming from Kant, which accepts Wittgenstein's private 
language concept, but consider that:
"Both forms of sociological phenomenology are 
far closer to philosophical idealism than Weber, 
who is often acknowledged as one of the 
intellectual forerunners of the movement".
(Sharp and Green 1975 p22)
Later in this work, it is noticeable that such criticism 
of phenomenological perspectives for philosophic idealism, 
pave the way for the introduction of Marxist approaches.
The interjection of Wittgenstein's later work in Sharp
and Green's debate in the 'new' sociology of education''
could be compared with Greenfield's quoting of
Wittgenstein, in "Organization Theory as Id eology"(1979),
where he considers that Wittgenstein offers:
"...metaphors and artistic images as keys to 
understanding".
(Greenfield 1979 pi06}
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It is these images that:
"...provide reservoirs of meaning for 
interpreting our experience".
(Greenfield 1979 pl06)
and presumably, then, not private language. The question 
is, to what extent can private language be considered
only to relate to the instant of time it is formulated 
as verbal thoughts, and not be the subject of recall?
In other words, it could be argued that this poses the 
question: can memory only be stored as images? It is
noticeable in Sharp and G r e e n ’s work that they do not
quote from Schutz, as much as Esland does, in his
contribution to "Knowledge and Control".
Schutz, Young and Demaine.
The place of Schutz within the ’new' sociology of education 
has been considered by Jack Demaine in his "Contemporary 
theories in the Sociology of Education"(1981). Demaine 
is highly critical of the 'new directions'. He considers 
that sociological questions, cannot, according to Young, 
be posed in terms of the social actors involved, but:
"...they can only be posed by taking them as 
a starting point, that is as the basic data 
of sociological enquiry which is to discover 
underlying meanings".
(Demaine 1981 p50)
Demaine is puzzled why sociological enquiry can only take 
this form and claims that Young gives us his answer, by 
appealing to the 'social scientific' method of Schutz,
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and that this leads to social science becoming:
"...an elaborate but nonetheless speculative 
r e a l m " .
(Demaine 1981 p50)
Later, Demaine considers how Schutz distinguishes between 
'socially derived k n o w l e d g e 1 and 'socially approved 
knowledge', the latter being that which receives additional 
weight because we respect the people giving us the 
knowledge, so that, such knowledge is often social group 
k n o w l e d g e .
Demaine considers, then, that a major flaw with both Schutz 
and Young's writings:
"...centres on how the authors conceive of the 
'imposition of meanings' as taking place. For 
Schutz 'he who lives in the social world is 
a free being: his acts proceed from spontaneous
a c t i v i t y '....How then is it possible for others 
to impose on the consciousness of an essentially 
free human subjectivity?".
(Demaine 1981 p52)
It could be argued that Greenfield would pick up this
point as arguing for the complete freedom of the subject's 
consciousness, adopting a Weberian approach, where the 
actor's view of subjective reality is such that, meaning
cannot be imposed. The subject interprets the world for 
himself, in a purely interpretive (phenomenological?)
approach. Demaine considers that Schutz's answer is that 
individuals bring it on themselves, by accepting socially 
approved knowledge, but states:
"If, on the other hand, it is the decision as
to who we recognize as competent that is imposed
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on us then we are returned to the original 
question, to which we have no answer in Schutz's 
formulations".
(Demaine 1981 p52)
In Demaine's conclusion to all this, he claims that the 
subject is both free to make choices, and yet, at the 
same time, can have meanings imposed on him; a point he 
considers also to be a dilemma in Young's work*
Perhaps it is a matter of timing and circumstances. Maybe, 
sometimes one has freewill, and at other times one does 
not. The imposition of meaning idea, it could be 
suggested, provides Young with a useful tool for moving 
towards a radical perspective.
Young and Radical Change.
It has already been mentioned how Young, in the 
introduction to "Knowledge and Control", considers 
imposition of meanings, and in his 1973 paper, "Taking 
sides against the probable", there is clearly a slant 
towards radical change. This paper is very mixed, because 
it also considers the work of Merle a u - P o n t y ; while Maxine 
Greene is also quoted, regarded by Sarup as epitomizing 
the phenomenological perspective in the sociology of 
education. Maxine Greene concedes in her "Landscapes 
of Learning"(1978), that she is an existential 
phenomenologist. Greene does not appear to be far, in 
philosophical terms, from Greenfield's position, quoting 
from Heidegger and R.D.Laing, both generally considered 
to be existentialists. However, quotes from Merleau-Ponty 
and Greene have to be squared, in Young's 1973 paper, 
with statements such as:
"The lesson of Marx's 11th Thesis on Feuerbach
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has not been learnt, 'Philosophers (and here 
read sociologists) have only interpreted the 
w o r l d  the point is to change it '” .
(Young 1973 p214)
By advocating change, such statements by Young indicate 
a move towards a more radical position.
Later, Young takes a more clearly neo-Marxist position 
in his 1977 work with Geoff Whitty, "Society, State and 
Schooling". In his "Postscript", written with Whitty, 
it is declared that:
"One of the major arguments of this book has 
been that any realistic strategy for radical 
educational change would involve linking the 
'politics of the classroom' to the 'politics 
of the class struggle".
(Young and Whitty 1977 p269) 
and later:
"Teachers have been made dramatically aware 
that it is not just reactionary or incompetent 
heads, or the conservatism of examination boards, 
which constrain their activities, but the 
material effects of decisions about priorities 
for expenditure in a capitalist society in 
c r i s i s " .
(Young and Whitty 1977 p269)
Stances Taken Towards Psychological Perspectives.
The next section will consider how neo-Marxist perspectives 
developed in both the field of the sociology of education 
and educational administration.
However, there is another area of similarity in the early 
development of both fields to be considered, and that
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is the stance taken towards psychological perspectives. 
In his paper, "Organization Theory as Ideology"(1979), 
Greenfield is highly critical of psychological 
r e d u c t i o n i s t s :
"The psychological reductionists would offer 
a set of elemental personal characteristics 
that our genes or Fortune herself distributes 
to each of us through some inscrutable design.
From these elements, one might then extrapolate 
the individual personality and ultimately the 
quality of social institutions".
(Greenfield 1979 pl02)
He then points out how Weber and Durkheim reject such 
arguments, by highlighting the fact that the meaning of 
such presumed psychological elements, or laws based upon 
them, cannot be deduced without invoking meaning already 
existing in the social context. Of course, for the ’new' 
sociologists of education, meaning does already exist in 
the social context, drawing, as they do, on the work of 
Schutz who, as indicated earlier, considers that meanings 
can be imposed upon the subject.
In "Teaching and Learning", Esland distinguishes two 
different psychological models, a psychometric model, 
which endows the child with an i n t e l l i g e n c e * ,  and the 
epistemological model of Piaget and Bruner. Esland states:
"The psychometric model endows the child with 
an 1 intelligence *, a capacity of given power 
within which his thinking develops. He is 
novitiate in a world of pre-existing, theoretical 
forms into which he is initiated and which he 
is expected to reconstitute. The teacher 
monitors his progress by means of ’objective* 
ev a l u a t i o n " .
(Esland in Young (Ed) 1971 p89)
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This is the type of model Greenfield is rejecting in his 
paper, when he states:
” ...while some psychologists might claim that 
intelligence is operationally and independently 
defined in the Binet scale, the human sociologist
points out that Binet's first step in building
the scale was to ask teachers in a Paris school 
near his laboratory what they thought
intelligence was and which of their pupils had
i t ” .
(Greenfield 1979 pl02)
Later, Greenfield considers that:
"George Herbert Mead's (1934) social psychology 
provides a rationale in which thinking becomes
an internal dialectic whereby the human organism 
adapts to its environment” .
(Greenfield 1979 pl03)
This is similar in origin to Esland's epistemological
model. This model, according to Esland, is concerned
with the way in which the child actively constructs and 
arranges his knowledge of the world and, as such, is an 
interpretive approach. Esland considers, unlike
Greenfield, that it is not a truly dialectic model because 
it assumes the social nature of reality construction. 
In other words, society constructs reality for the 
individual. The individual does not construct it himself 
and is not responsible for his own interpretations of 
reality. However, later Esland considers the importance
of this approach for the 'new1 sociology of education 
and outlines its characteristics:
"One of the main features is a preoccupation 
with subjective experience and its composition, 
in which man is represented as an active rather
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than a passive creature, that is, in the creation 
of his own objects. It is represented in the 
psychological theories of Piaget and Bruner, 
whose epistemology is akin to the dialectic 
scheme of Mead and Schutz. Their emphasis on 
the construction of thought forms through sensory 
and linguistic ordering, and the growth of 
reflexiveness, amount to an incipient 
p henomenology"•
(Esland in Young (Ed) 1971 pp93-94)
Links between Piaget and phenomenology, have also been 
established by Neil Bolton, in "Piaget and pre-reflective 
experience", his paper in "Phenomenology and 
Education"(1978), edited by Curtis and Mays.
There is also a link to the 'new* sociologists through 
Bernstein. B e r n s t e i n ’s work on ’Linguistic C o d e s ’, could 
be regarded as following a development from the work of 
Piaget and Bruner, and also, B e r n s t e i n ’s work on boundary 
maintenance between academic subject departments, is 
included as a paper in "Knowledge and Control".
Sharp and Green, in "Education and Social Control", argue 
that phenomenological sociology is mainly concerned with 
social psychological considerations. They thus call for 
a requirement for compatibility of theories at the 
different levels:
"Sociologists, unfortunately, frequently fail 
to articulate the basic psychological assumptions 
and theories on which their sociological 
formulations depend".
(Sharp and Green 1975 pl6)
This is somewhat different to G r e e n f i e l d ’s position, where 
everything has to start with the individual self. Theories 
at the psychological level, and at the collective level 
of individuals, are not acceptable starting points.
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In "Organization Theory as Ideo logy"(1979) , he criticises 
both levels. Any biological insights into the workings 
of the human mind seem to be unacceptable with his
s t a t e m e n t :
"As Goffman points out, physical and biological 
'facts' mean little compared to the social 
rituals we weave around them".
(Greenfield 1979 pl03)
Any sociological collective perspective is criticized
as follows:
" M e a d fs concept of the 'generalized o t h e r 1 thus
becomes an explanation of how society exists 
in the human mind. We now need not see man 
in society, but only society in man. The
generalized other is thus only the part of 'me* 
that expresses other's norms, values, and
b e l i e f s " .
(Greenfield 1979 pl03)
This could be seen as a flaw in Greenfield's 
phenomenological position. All insights into the workings 
of the human condition should be invited, which is more 
in agreement with Sharp and Green's position, that all 
levels require to be explored. However, their insistence 
that theories need to be compatible, could be questioned.
This insistence puts a heavy burden on any form of analysis
and could have the effect of channeling thought along 
certain lines.
This is surely what the early 'new* sociologists and 
Greenfield wished to avoid when they considered that 
sociological enquiry and educational administration had
been dominated by one perspective, that of the structural 
functionalist positivistic position and, presumably, that
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people had been channeled, (blinkered?), so that they 
failed to appreciate that they were confined to one way 
of viewing reality.
Esland and Keddie and their Contributions to "Knowledge 
and Cont r o l 11.
In the book "Knowledge and Control", there are many 
contributions, which led Whitty to proclaim that the book 
possesses a certain richness of ideas. However, it is 
usually the contributions of Young, Esland and Keddie 
that are regarded as the contributions based on 
phenomenological perspectives.
This putting together of the work of Esland and Keddie 
in "Knowledge and Control" is curious. While Esland's 
paper is highly theoretical and philosophical, K e d d i e fs 
paper focuses on particular studies within a school. 
There does not appear to be any reference to phenomenology 
or to the work of Alfred Schutz. The emphasis is on the 
way knowledge is perceived in the school, with condemnation 
of hierarchical concepts of knowledge, and calls for what 
counts as knowledge to be seen in its wider social and 
structural contexts in the community. Such theoretical 
considerations as these only really begin to appear in 
the last concluding section.
Bourdieu and his Contributions to "Knowledge and Control".
Works that could be regarded as phenomenological within 
"Knowledge and Control" are those of Pierre Bourdieu, 
who with his earlier writing, could well have been an 
influence on Young, Esland and Keddie.
John Kennett, in an article titled, "The Sociology of
64
Pierre Bourdieu” , provides a useful overview of B o u r d i e u ’s 
ideas. His concept, ’cultural capital* the idea that 
schools control the recreation of the cultural capital 
in the next generation, is considered, Kennett statejs 
t h a t :
’’B o u r d i e u ’s main postulates are: firstly, that
society is characterized by repression; secondly,
t h a t   there is, diffused within a social
space a cultural capital, comparable to economic 
capital, transmitted by inheritance and invested
in order to be c u l t i v a t e d  thirdly, that
the true, as opposed to the apparent nature 
of the education system functions to discriminate 
in favour of those who are the inheritors of 
this cultural capital; fourthly, that the 
essentialist view of man implicit in common 
sense representations of school failure as being 
due to lack of talents, or of social groups 
as ’having* certain characteristics which make 
them fit or unfit for success is a 
m y s t i f i c a t i o n f i f t h l y , that culture has,....a 
political function” .
(Kennett 1973 p238)
Young, writing in his introduction to "Knowledge and
Control", says of B o u r d i e u ’s paper, "Systems of Education
and Systems of Thought":
"Bourdieu draws most of his material from French 
society, in exploring the way, through the school 
system, particular classes maintain their
dominance by being able to confer cultural 
legitimacy on certain styles of thought and
therefore on certain aspects of reality".
(Young 1971 pi 2)
Whilst one can see a phenomenological element here, in
the concept of construction of reality, we can see the 
more structural nature of considering why reality is
constructed in certain ways.
This is some distance away from G r e e n f i e l d ’s "method of
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understanding" with emphasis on the self being responsible 
for his own construction of reality. Bourdieu's other 
paper in "Knowledge and Control", "Intellectual Field 
and Creation Project", is concerned with the way what 
counts as art is legitimized and passed on. Young states, 
in his introduction, that Bourdieu:
"...suggests the social and economic context 
for three aspects of the literary and art 
'worlds* that are normally taken for granted.
(1) The belief in art for art's sake (2) The
assumption of the 'public's' incompe t e n c e...... (3)
The growth of groups of critics who interpret 
artistic work for the public and give it its
legitimacy".
(Young 1971 plO)
Such cultural legitimacy, of a similar nature, is
institutionalised in the academic system according to 
Bourdieu. Young states:
"Bourdieu compares classical music and literature 
which have unquestioned cultural legitimacy 
and which are systematically 'taught' in academic 
curricula, with interior decoration, cookery 
and cosmetics which are only 'taught' in 
specialist 'vocational' curricula and for which 
no 'cultural legitimacy' in terms of aesthetic 
criteria is claimed".
(Young 1971 pll)
Work of this nature can be seen to be of relevance to 
the 'new directions' sociologists, with implicit concepts 
of the social construction of knowledge. That knowledge 
is not absolute but is a product of socialisation and 
is often hierarchical in nature. This leads back, of 
course, to a Schutz style of phenomenology, where meaning, 
in this case, viewing of art or school curricula, can 
be imposed on the individual as part of his subjective
construction of reality.
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In this respect, such work has to be seen as some way 
from Greenfield's 'new perspective', based on Weberian 
concepts of understanding. Whitty, in his 1985 paper 
"Society and School Knowledge", implies that Bourdieu's 
work is of a structuralist nature, although he sees links 
with the early phenomenological tradition within the 'new' 
sociology of education:
"Kuhn points out, the first macro-theorists 
to be espoused with enthusiasm, particularly 
by Esland and Dale, were Bowles and Gintis and 
not, for instance, Bourdieu whose links with 
the new sociologists had already been
es t a b l i s h e d  and whose developing concerns
had somewhat more in common with the earlier 
t r a d i t i o n " .
(Whitty 1985 p24)
Whitty here, is considering the way neo-Marxist positions 
developed out of the 'new directions' position, so the 
work of Bowles and Gintis will be considered later, when 
developments within the field of sociology of education 
are explored. The last part of the above quote does make 
the point that Bourdieu's work, according to Whitty, should 
be seen as close to that of the original concerns of the 
'new' sociologists of education as epitomised in "Knowledge 
and Control".
Bates' Critique.
An overview of the developing debate in the 'new* sociology 
of education has also been provided by Bates in his paper, 
"New Developments in the New Sociology of E d u cation"(1980). 
Bates' views are particularly important to this study 
because he also has written articles in the field of 
educational administration. As these tend to be from 
a Marxist Critical Theory perspective, they will be 
considered in the next section.
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In his paper, mentioned above, he points out the dilemmas 
of the early formulations and considers that there are 
four main issues:
"(i) The nature of the epistomological 
foundations of the New Sociology of Education,
(ii) The adequacy of phenomenology as a basis 
for structural analysis.
(iii) The stratification of knowledge and the 
power of elites in determining the curriculum.
(iv) The nature of the political action implied 
by the New Sociology of Education.”
(Bates 1980 p67)
Incredibly, pointing to the work of Clark and Freeman, 
in "Michael Young's Sociology of Knowledge: Criticisms
of Philosophers of Education R e considered"(1979), Bates 
implies that the actual language used by Young was 
complicated, because he was trying to express himself 
without using sociological and philosophical knowledge.
Bates' list does imply, yet again, that phenomenology 
was used as a tool to move into more structural approaches 
of neo-Marxist design, by suggesting that it overcame 
the problems of viewing knowledge in a technical rational 
scientific way, but implying the problematical nature 
of whether it provided a sufficient basis for structural 
change. (His second issue in the citation ). Such issues, 
however, are the concern of the next section.
Concluding Comments.
This section has been confined, in the main, to the early 
work of the 'new' sociologists of education as embodied 
in "Knowledge and Control". Attempts have been made to 
try to draw comparisons with Greenfield's 'new
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pe r s p e c t i v e 1, especially as it appeared in his first main 
work in this field, "Theory About Organization: A New
Perspective and its Implications for Schools".
It was in this early work that a phenomenological 
perspective was supposed to have been applied to the 
concerns of the sociology of education. It is clear, 
however, that this purely phenomenological stance never 
really existed within the work of the sociologists who 
were the authors of "Knowledge and Control". The nearest 
one comes to this stance is in the work of Esland, but, 
even here, the influence of Schutz has led to a more
structuralist approach. Young, certainly, even in his 
introduction, is already moving away from any purely
subjective approach, with his concept of ‘imposition of
meanings*. So, it is considered, that the phenomenological 
perspective never really existed within "Knowledge and 
C o n t r o l " .
What the authors did do was to draw on phenomenological 
work, for instance, that of Alfred Schutz, Berger and
Luckmann, and Maxine Greene, mainly in order to reinforce 
the argument for a move away from positivistic approaches. 
Of course, it could be argued that a purely
phenomenological perspective never existed within
Greenfield*s work either, based, as it was in its early 
stages, on Weber*s social action theory. However, while
Greenfield remained with a generally subjective stance, 
this was not the case within the sociology of education, 
as has been outlined.
The early 'new' sociologists of education were preoccupied 
with the concept that schools are places where knowledge 
is 'proce ssed1, not merely transmitted. In other words, 
the idea that any attempt at learning involves the 
transmission of preconceived political and moral ideas,
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that are presented as 'taken for g r a n t e d ' , and
unquestionable by the educators.
The early structuralist 'imposition of meaning' concept 
blinded the 'new' sociologists of education to a
consideration of the implications of the way knowledge
was constructed.
A subjective approach, according to Greenfield, would
enable the individual to view 'knowledge* as a subjective 
reality, something that society constructs, with no 
meaning, except that which the individual perceives to
exist. Hence, the knowledge that one subject perceives 
may be different from the knowledge others perceive. 
The 'new' sociology of education, with the idea that 
knowledge is accepted unquestionably as true, by the
prevailing society that presents it, undermines the 
Greenfield subjective approach concept of the integrity 
of the subject.
The concept that all knowledge is socially constructed, 
also poses the question of the base of that knowledge. 
It presupposes that all knowledge comes from outwith the 
individual subject; that there is no source of knowledge 
within the brain of the subject. Reflex actions within 
the body are an example of knowledge stored within the 
body's biological structure, passed on genetically and
free of social constructs.
The subjective stance of Greenfield, which 'honours' the 
integrity of the subject, would provide for both this 
internal innate knowledge and the concept that external 
knowledge, although not real in an absolute sense, is 
perceived as real by the subject. The subject may, or
may not, perceive social constructions in this external 
knowledge, but under Greenfield's approach, these
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perceptions would be a subjective reality, having no 
meaning, except that which the subject perceives to exist.
The early push into neo-Marxist perspectives in the 'new 
directions' sociology of education, removes the integrity 
of the subject to judge, for him or herself, the 'social 
trappings' that knowledge may have taken onboard.
The implicit argument of the 'new directions' thinkers
is that all except neo-Marxist intellectuals will fail 
to perceive the conservative nature of much of what counts 
as knowledge in schools. Yet, the concept that perceives 
academic knowledge, in other words, school subjects, as 
hierarchical and elitist, with structures that place one
subject above another, also would perceive administrative 
structures within the school as bureaucratic. These would 
have elitist levels of management, under this perception, 
and there would be no scope for the free flow of ideas.
In questioning the reality of all such structures and 
hierarchies, but in not seeking to impose new ones along
neo-Marxist lines, Greenfield's ideas could have aided
the 'new' sociology of education. This could have been 
achieved by extending these ideas from educational
administration, into the way knowledge is processed in 
learning situations within schools, by questioning the 
basis of the concept that knowledge can be socially 
constructed, and making that basis problematic. The 'new 
directions' sociologists could have learned from the 
educational administration of Greenfield, if they had 
re-examined their early push into structural concepts
and recognised the problematic nature of the source of
the very concept, 'the processing of knowledge', which
they were attempting to analyse.
The main lesson to be drawn from this consideration, with
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respect to the field of educational administration and 
management, is that G r e e n f i e l d ’s ideas, that have had 
such a profound effect in the field, have to be seen in 
the context of development of a similar nature, (though 
certainly not identical), in another educational field 
of enquiry, namely, the sociology of education. The 
concerns of managers within schools, for instance, are 
not that far removed from the concerns of classroom
teachers, in respect that both have to deal with 
conceptions of knowledge, as perceived within a school 
c o n t e x t •
In Britain, those involved with management within the 
school are often the same people who are still involved 
with what counts as knowledge in the classroom, and so 
the social construction of knowledge, as perceived by
the ’new dire c t i o n s ’, is of importance in both respects
of an educationalist’s work, because management decisions 
are usually decisions where knowledge is processed as
w e l l .
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SECTION 4.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEO-MARXIST PERSPECTIVES
WITHIN SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION AND EDUCATIONAL
ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT.
There are considerable differences between the way neo- 
Marxist perspectives entered the field of the sociology 
of education and the way they were introduced into 
educational administration. As outlined in the last 
section, it is difficult to tease out a period when there 
were not neo-Marxist influences within the 'new directions' 
for the sociology of education. The concept 'imposition 
of meaning', gave even Young's work in "Knowledge and 
Control"(1971), a Marxist slant, and made it difficult 
to establish a phenomenological period within his work.
On the other hand, Greenfield's early work, though not 
phenomenological in a purist sense, was of a basic 
subjective nature without any structuralist overtones. 
In fact, he resists passionately any move in that 
direction. As was considered in Section 2., Greenfield's 
work developed from an early social action theory approach, 
through, perhaps, a phenomenological period not made 
explicit, into existential approaches based on the work 
of R.D.Laing.
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Neo-Marxist Perspectives vithin Educational Administration.
To find neo-Marxist perspectives within educational 
administration one has to look elsewhere, Peter Ribbins, 
in his article, "Organisation Theory and the Study of 
Educational Institutions", in "Managing Education"(1985), 
considers that there are three competing paradigms for 
the analysis of organisational theory.
Firstly, "Consensus assumed (Systems theory, 'open1
'closed1 loosely coupled)". Secondly, "Order as empirically 
contingent, (Action theory, 'social phenomenology',
ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionism)", and 
finally, "Conflict assumed, (Marxist theory and Critical 
t heory)".
It is his third paradigm then, in which we find Marxist 
approaches, but he considers that any attempt at a 
comprehensive critique of the third paradigm seems
premature, stating that:
"...although Nash can plausibly claim that 
currently, the British sociology of education 
is dominated by Marxist perspectives, until 
very recently such perspectives have made little 
impact upon the field of educational management 
and administration".
(Ribbins in Hughes (Ed) 1985 p254)
He does, however, point to the work of Bates in Australia, 
and it is there that we can find neo-Marxist perspectives 
in the form of Critical Theory.
Bates, in his paper "Towards a Critical Practice of 
Educational Administration"(1982), considers that:
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"...it is somewhat surprising that so few links 
have been made with the work of phenoraenologists 
of organisation theory in education such as
G r e e n f i e l d  or with the advocates of critical
social theory".
(Bates 1982 p8)
Here, Bates is making a comparison with the work of the 
'new* sociologists of education and, indeed, is exceptional 
in producing papers within both sociology of education 
and educational administration.
However, it is clear in this paper that his sympathies 
lie with Critical Theory, which he considers to be 
exemplified by the work of Habermas.
Critical Theory.
Critical Theory is usually associated with the "Institute 
for Social Research", founded at Frankfurt, often referred 
to as the Frankfurt School. Its chief proponents, in 
its early stages, were Horkehimer, Adorno, Fromm and 
M a r c u s e .
In "Cultural Analysis"(1984), the authors, (Robert Wuthnow, 
James Davison Hunter, Albert Bergesen and Edith Kurzweil), 
explain how Critical Theory emerged in Germany after the 
First World War. The School, while embracing the Marxist 
critique of capitalism, re-examined its philosophical 
foundations in the hope of making it more applicable to 
the post war situation. They attempted to develop a single 
theoretical framework in which scientific investigation, 
and the political implication of these investigations, 
could be united.
Under this concept, the investigator is required to take 
his own position in relation to the society into account,
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rather than attempting to suppress it in the interests 
of discovering universal scientific laws.
The authors of "Cultural Analysis" then, suggest that 
there is a focus on the individual within Critical Theory 
which makes it less structural than other Marxist 
perspectives, and, perhaps, has something in common with
'action t h e o r y 1 and phenomenological perspectives. They 
consider that Critical Theory is concerned with the 
critical examination of our circumstances, institutions 
and cultural predispositions and values. It could be 
claimed that such considerations are also of central 
importance to subjective approaches in general.
Habermas is often given a special status within the school, 
with his more recent writing. David Held, in his 
"Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkeimer to
Habermas"(1980), sees Habermas in this light, although 
others include Habermas in the Frankfurt School.
Generally, Critical Theorists have been concerned with 
interpretations of why traditional Marxism did not evolve 
historically in Western democracies, in the way Marx 
p r e d icted.
Such considerations, as outlined above, put Critical Theory 
in a slightly different aspect to other neo-Marxist 
perspectives. Whitty, for instance, in "Sociology and 
School Knowledge"(1985), considers that, in the sociology 
of education, there was a period when Marxist approaches 
were adopted in a very simplistic way, with the acceptance 
of Bowles and Gintis's political economy. In fact, he 
considers that:
"...the programme set out in Knowledge and
C o n t r o l .for s tu d y i n g " ....(the detail of
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the curriculum) "was put on one side in
the search for a more basic explanation of the 
nature of capitalist society and the place of 
schooling within it".
(Whitty 1985 p30)
Retaining Phenomenology.
However Apple, in his paper, "Power and School 
K n o w l e d g e " (1977), advocates that phenomenology is retained 
within Marxist perspectives:
"One does not throw out social phenomenology
h e r e ...... One combines it with a more critical
social interpretation that looks at the 
negotiation of identities and meanings in 
specific institutions like schools as taking 
place within a context that often determines 
the parameters of what is negotiable or 
m e a n i n g f u l " .
(Apple 1977 p4 3 )
Critical Theory and the Sociology of Education.
In fact, in this paper, Apple calls for Critical Theory 
to be applied to the sociology of education along the 
lines that Bates has suggested, for both sociology of 
education and educational administration. Apple states:
"I am approaching this topic with a perspective 
that grows out of a commitment to critical
t h e o r y...... I want to bracket, to make
problematic, the apolitical ways we usually 
view our own activity as inquirers or
r e searchers".
(Apple 1977 p 3 0 )
Later, he quotes Habermas in a way that makes it clear 
that he is referring to Critical Theory, as it evolved 
from the Frankfurt School:
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"...we need to know, as well, what the 
relationships are between educational
investigations whose analyses and logic depend 
upon control and certainty and social and 
educational institutions whose own fundamental 
interest lies in increasing control and certainty 
of outcome. It is here that the historical 
and analytic work of the critical theorists 
such as Habermas (1971), Schroyer (1973) and 
Wellmer (1971) would be most helpful".
(Apple 1977 p 3 7 )
However, as Whitty has outlined, more elaborate forms 
of Marxist perspective were not accepted generally at 
this time, (i.e. in the m i d - 1 9 7 0 ’s).
It is here that Whitty points out how Kuhn had suggested 
that the first macro-theorists to be espoused, particularly 
by Esland and Dale, were Bowles and Gintis and not 
Bourdieu, in spite of the earlier links with the 'new' 
sociologists of education.
Whitty considers that there was an early division between 
those who concerned themselves with classroom studies 
of an ethnographic nature, and those who took a more 
theoretical line.
Anthropology, Ethnography and Phenomenology.
The link between anthropology and phenomenology has been 
considered by Sarup to be a close one:
"One of the features of the ’new* sociology 
of education is its use of anthropological 
studies. I show how anthropology has contributed 
to the examination of our taken-for-granted 
suppositions".
(Sarup 1978 p6)
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Ethnography appears to be the research arm of anthropology. 
However, Kathleen Wilcox states, in "Doing the Ethnography 
of S c h ooling"(1982), edited by George Spindler:
"Ethnography is not synonymous with participant 
observation, fieldwork or qualitative research.
A thorough understanding of ethnography requires 
an understanding of the discipline of 
anthropology as well".
(Wilcox in Spindler (Ed) 1982 p457)
It appears that anthropological studies, using ethnographic 
techniques, were an inspiration to the 'new1 sociologists 
who progressed along the micro path and provided a new 
technique for classroom studies.
Whitty is critical of those who followed this path implying 
that their work lacked theoretical rigour:
"The other direction was followed by those 'who 
were more interested in the question of what 
went on in schools' and led to the development 
of ethnographic techniques for studying classroom 
interaction. Although there seems no inherent 
reason why one of these sets of interests should 
necessarily lead to more theoretically inclined 
or empirically oriented work than the other, 
it did seem to be the case that those concerned 
with the broader issues devoted most of their 
attention to theoretical debate, while the other 
group concentrated upon the production of 
under-theorized classroom ethnographies".
(Whitty 1985 p22)
The whole relation of phenomenology to anthropology and 
ethnography is a complex one, and, as such, will be 
considered in detail in the next section. In the above 
quote, Whitty is showing his sympathies for neo-Marxist 
perspectives, because it is his theoretical path which 
is of this nature, and hence gets the 'soft' treatment.
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C o r r e s p o n d e n c e  T heory” ,
Yet, Whitty, in tracing Esland and Dale's move into the
macro-stance is critical of the way, in the late 1 9 7 0 fs, 
that the work of Bowles and Gintis was accepted. Whitty
refers to this approach as "Correspondence Theory", because 
of the way it tried to draw simple connections between 
capital in the economic world, with cultural capital in 
the educational world.
Qualifications were cultural capital, obtained in
educational 'factories' that processed the cultural
c a p i t a l .
Even a move to incorporate Althusserian concepts of
"Ideological State Apparatus" does not, in Whitty's
opinion, enable neo-Marxist perspectives to escape from 
a position where the problem of the social construction 
of knowledge is seen simplistically, as due to the
capitalist state structure. Indeed, he considers that 
it is legitimate to consider such positions as functional, 
in the sense that they stressed the coercive nature of
the state system, such that nothing could be achieved 
this side of a revolution.
By the turn of the decade, Whitty considers that there 
was a re-examination, in Marxist circles, of the relation 
between the state and schooling which implied that there 
were complex relationships, between the two, with many 
sites of conflict. It is here, that Whitty considers 
Gramsci's concept of hegemony as crucial:
"Ideologies were seen to become hegemonic when 
they made a contribution to the process by which 
'commonsense is made to conform to the
"necessities of production"' and to the
'construction of "consent" and a political
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o r d e r 1".
(Whitty 1985 p33)
False Consciousness.
It is at this stage, perhaps, that Whitty has brought 
us to a position where comparisons can again be made with 
Critical Theory within educational administration. The 
link comes through the concept, ’false c o nsciousness1.
Donald Willower, in his paper, "Marxian Critical Theory 
and Educational Administration"(1985a) , has implied that 
Critical Theorists attempt to explain the fact that Marxist 
revolution did not unfold in Western democracies by talking 
about the concept of false consciousness. The ruling 
class in Western democracies constructed their institutions 
in such a way that the workers lost sight of their true 
class consciousness. Willower considers that Critical 
Theorists attempted to explain this position by talking 
about false consciousness. The implication is that this 
is an intellectual form of Marxism. Eyerman, in "False 
Consciousness and Ideology in Marxist Theory"(1981), 
s t a t e s :
"Today, especially in America but to a growing 
extent in Western Europe as well, it seems 
collective experience or class itself, can only 
be produced theoretically, that is, by Marxist 
intellectuals".
(Eyerman 1981 p236)
Critical Theorists are concerned with the problems of 
developing 'true* class consciousness, (which they see 
as the working classes being aware of their inferior 
status, and wishing to seek revolutionary change,) from 
the 'false' consciousness that they consider is imposed 
by the ruling classes. These ideas are used to help explain
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why Marxism did not unfold in Western democracies in the 
way Marx predicted.
The idea that we are all intellectuals and philosophers, 
is a notion of Gramsci's. Sarup considers that there 
is a link between phenomenological perspectives and 
Gramsci's form of Marxism, in the idea that everybody 
is a philosopher.
H e g e m o n y .
Entwistle, in "Antonio Gramsci: Conservative Schooling
for Radical Politics"(1979), states:
"In Gramsci's formulation, hegemonic direction 
is by moral and intellectual persuasion rather 
than control by the police, the military, or 
the coercive power of the law: 'rule by
intellectual and moral hegemony is the form 
of power which gives stability and founds power 
on wide-ranging consent and acquiescence".
(Entwistle 1979 pl2) 
and later:
"...bourgeois hegemony depends upon the 'false 
consciousness' of the working class".
(Entwistle 1979 pl2)
Presumably then, one is led to the paradox that the only 
people who can see through the false consciousness, are 
the few Marxist intellectuals, who can form a true class 
consciousness.
Gramsci's claim is that the working classes cannot become 
ruling classes through coercion alone but that they must 
become involved in a counter-hegemonic revolution.
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Later, Entwistle questions how schools can have 
revolutionary potential when they are, presumably, able 
to manipulate the curriculum to produce false consciousness 
among the working classes, through their ruling hegemony:
"If schools are a major hegemonic instrument 
of existing class rule, how can counter-hegemonic 
change occur except through radical curricular 
reform and a liberal pedagogy? Do not the 
schools which already serve the capitalist 
hegemony succeed in developing a false working- 
class consciousness through manipulation of 
the curriculum".
(Entwistle 1979 pl6)
C.A.R.E., Phenomenology and Critical Theory.
It is interesting that W h i t t y !s account of the work of 
the C.A.R.E. group, [Centre for Applied Research in 
Education at the University of East Anglia,] indicates 
a link with neo-Marxist approaches in educational 
administration, through the concept of Critical Theory. 
Whitty's account also implies a sympathy towards a 
phenomenological position:
"The strength of most of the writers associated 
with C.A.R.E. lies in their commitment to the 
integrity of lived experience and their abiding 
interest in the subjective interpretations of 
curricular reality made by teachers and pupils".
(Whitty 1985 p70)
He is generally critical of this position, but points 
out that some authors, notably Elliot, are moving towards 
a stance where the curriculum is placed in a broader social 
co n t e x t .
It is interesting that Bates, in his paper, "Towards a
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Critical Practice of Educational Administration"(1982), 
while proposing a Critical Theory stance, also shows 
distinct sympathy with the subjective approaches of 
Greenfield. In fact, Bates quotes from G r e e n f i e l d ’s 1973 
paper, "Organizations as Social Inventions: Rethinking
Assumptions about Change", to justify his own position:
"In particular, the insistence of critical social 
theory on the incorporation of discussion over 
normative issues in practical discourse and 
its commitment to processes of communication
and discussion free from the distorting effects 
of domination matches well with G r e e n f i e l d ’s 
observation that in the world of everyday life 
’what many people seem to want from schools
is that schools reflect the values that are 
central and meaningful in their lives.'"
(Bates 1982 plO)
It seems to be the case then, that in both the sociology 
of education and educational administration, close links 
have been developed between subjective approaches, like 
phenomenology, and neo-Marxist Critical Theory. However, 
it appears, yet again, that the subjective approach is
the tool to justify the neo-Marxist position, even though
that position contains contradictions as well. In other 
words, the adoption of a phenomenological approach leads 
to the questioning of the perceived prevailing system, 
which is seen by Critical Theorists as posi t i v i s t i c , 
that is, based upon taken for granted assumptions about 
the goodness of democratic and liberal ideas in education, 
which are presented as logical and unquestionable, because 
they are based on scientific principles.
However, confinement to a subjective view is not in keeping 
with the development of change as a collective philosophy 
requirement, that brings people together in a common 
programme, in the case of Critical Theorists, the overthrow
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of the perceived class structure.
The introduction of Gramsci's concept h e g e m o n y 1, itself, 
poses problems. The fact that Gramsci could see
revolutionary potential in a traditional pedagogy, is 
a paradox in his work.
Hegemony and Looser Connections.
Whitty considers that, although the introduction of 
hegemony into the sociology of education overcame the
charges of functionalism, there were still problems and 
divisions. The hegemonic approach had replaced economic 
determinism with:
"...a rather looser process of setting limits 
and exerting pressures".
(Whitty 1985 p33)
There is the possibility, here, of a link with the
ambiguity models in educational administration. Weick 
considers in, "Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled 
S ystems"(1976), that, within educational organisations, 
there is not tight systematic control, but parts of
organisations are only loosely coupled:
"More time should be spent examining the 
possibility that educational organizations are 
most usefully viewed as loosely coupled systems".
(Weick 1976 pl6)
Whitty implies that, as an escape from 'Correspondence 
T h e o r y 1, which had been accused of being functional, the 
hegemonic models provide for looser connections between 
t h e :
"...ideological practice in and around the state" 
(Whitty 1985 p33)
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and the educational system. Weick considered that the 
systems perspective, often too linked to functionalism, 
through its philosophical base of structural functionalism, 
was unsuitable for explaining educational organisations, 
when he suggested his model of loosely coupled 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s .
Whitty implies that the hegemonic models led to some 
reunification within the 'new1 sociology of education, 
with a link between classroom studies and a 
phenomenological, (ethnographic?), focus on meaning, and 
the neo-Marxist theoretical group. However, he considers 
t h a t :
"There is  a considerable tension within
contemporary Marxist theory between the notions 
of relative autonomy on the one hand and economic 
determination on the other".
(Whitty 1985 p33)
Concepts of Hegemony.
Whitty's implication, that relative autonomy is linked 
to hegemonic considerations, suggests a somewhat different 
interpretation of hegemony than that proposed by Gramsci.
It is the hegemony of the ruling class that is responsible 
for the false consciousness of the subordinate classes. 
If Whitty's implication is that those who occupy schools 
are of a subordinate class, and are affected by false 
consciousness, then this, according to Gramsci, is a 
totally socializing influence. The control is subtle, 
but complete, and there is no room for relative autonomy.
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However, Entwistle concedes that Gramsci's concept 
'hegemony' is very complex. One of its strengths is that 
it can adapt and absorb small changes. Whether relative 
autonomy, in Whitty's sense, can be accommodated within 
these limits is a debatable question. Whitty implies 
a loose connexion between the state and the educational 
system, ideologically, rather than small changes that 
can be hidden and absorbed.
Hegemony in Educational Administration.
The concept 'hegemony' does not appear so frequently in 
educational administration. Critical Theory, such as 
that proposed by Bates, is based on the work of Habermas.
Habermas does not feature the concept 'hegemony' in terms 
of covert social pressure on one group, or another, to 
behave in a certain way. The concept of hegemonic 
influences being achieved by a dominant class, because 
of the false consciousness of the dominated class, is 
replaced, in Habermas's thinking, by 'distorted 
communication'; reflecting the importance of communication 
in Habermas's thoughts on the nature of culture and 
s o c i e t y .
The authors of "Cultural A n a l ysis"(1984), make this clear. 
They consider that:
"Systematically distorted communication is for
H a b e r m a s  what false consciousness was for
Marx: it prevents the resolution of major social 
c r i s e s " .
(Wuthnow et. al. 1984 p224)
and that when systematic distortion occurs:
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"...participants assume they have understood 
one another and have arrived at some consensus, 
but because of unacknowledged interests they 
have engaged only in pseudo-communication, and 
have failed to achieve genuine consensus".
(Wuthnow et. al. 1984 p224)
When the term 'hegemony' appears in writings within the 
field of educational administration, it is usually used 
without analysis, in a sloganized way, presumably to 
produce impact.
For instance, Greenfield states, in "Organization Theory 
as Ideology"(1979) that he sees system theory and 
structural functionalist thinking as:
"...the ideological hegemony in administrative 
s t u d i e s " .
(Greenfield 1979 98)
This, presumably, means that Greenfield sees structural 
functionalist thinking as 'taken for granted'; as the 
'right' way to research and debate educational 
administration, such that the 'rightness' of the method 
pervades educational administration, and is presented 
as unquestionable.
Also Griffiths points out, how Clegg and Dunkerly accuse 
t h e :
"'Administrative Science Quarterly' of 'hegemony' 
in traditional research methodology",
(Griffiths 1979 p44)
Such statements, however, do little to bring out the 
subtleties of the concept and lead to the sloganized stance
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that Entwistle cautions against.
Critical Theory and Wider Influences.
Where it is possible to see a link between the more 
advanced stages of Whitty's discourse and Critical Theory 
in educational administration, is through the work of 
American writers such as Giroux and Wexler.
In his paper, "Towards a Critical Practice of Educational 
Adm inistration"(1982), Bates questions why links have 
not been made between the concerns of the ‘new' sociology 
of education and the:
"...advocates of critical social theory....in 
its....North American application to education. 
(Giroux, 1981; Foster, 1 9 8 0 ( a ) ,1 9 8 0 ( b ) ; Wexler, 
1976".
(Bates 1982 p8)
In his opinion the:
"...apparent ignorance of the traditional social 
theory is disappointing because, firstly, the 
problems at the root of the new sociology of 
education are also those that preoccupy the 
critical social theorists and, secondly, because 
critical social theory appears to have resolved 
some of the more troubling theoretical 
difficulties faced by the new sociology of 
ed u cation".
(Bates 1982 p8)
Yet, by 1985, Whitty implies that the descendants of the
’new' sociologists were aware of this work. He states:
"The work we had in mind, which included that 
of Anyon, Apple, Giroux, Taxel and W e x l e r  had
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these three characteristics in common. The 
first distinguishing characteristic lay in its 
greater openness to a variety of theoretical 
perspectives at any one time".
(Whitty 1985 p85)
Yet Bates sees close links between the subjective work 
of Greenfield and Critical Theory. However, the major 
influence on Bates* work is clearly Habermas. The authors 
of "Cultural Analysis" point out, though, that Habermas 
was influenced by many other disciplines, including 
p h e n o m e n o l o g y .
It is debatable whether all this accommodation of doctrines 
leads to an acceptable progression where ideas gradually 
unfold. It appears, from Whitty*s account, that this 
happened in the early stages of the neo-Marxist critique, 
where * Correspondence Theory* was replaced by hegemonic 
concepts, but the complexity implied by these stages of 
Critical Theory development implies an inability to see 
an adequate way forward.
Indeed, paradoxically, it seems the phenomenological 
approaches, rejected in the early days of the *new 
directions', are to be reincorporated within the field 
of the sociology of education.
Legitimacy and Values.
It is Habermas's work on rationality, legitimacy and 
motivation that Bates brings to the field of educational 
administration. However, there is clearly a link, here, 
with the critical social theory of Taxel, as considered 
by Whitty, when he is discussing work done by Critical 
Theorists like Taxel, Giroux and Wexler, on school text 
b o o k s :
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(Taxel)....... "also emphasizes that cultural
practice involves not just the process of 
reproduction of legitimation, but also the 
processes of production and creating meanings.
The independent work of authors, publishers
and editors points to the necessity, in his
eyes, of developing an analysis of the
p r o d u c t i o n  of texts* that can integrate with
a theory of the reproduction of meanings and 
v a l u e s " .
(Whitty 1985 p45)
Bates' use of Habermas leads him, also, to a consideration 
of values:
"The crisis of rationality is rooted in the
positivistic separation of fact from value,
means from ends, politics from administration, 
and the exclusion of discourse over ends, values 
and purposes".
(Bates 1982 p9)
The implications of whether facts can be separated from 
values forms a topic for consideration in Section 8, when 
the INLOGOV Report is analysed in the light of the 
subjective/systems and wider paradigmatic debates. The 
INLOGOV Report (1989) was prepared for Strathclyde Regional 
Council by the School of Education, University of 
Birmingham. In subjecting the Region*s Education 
Department to a detailed overall review it implied that 
fact could be separated from value. The factual 
information of the *learning department*, (the Report 
proposed that the Education Department must *learn' from 
all the agencies involved with education in its area), 
is to be used to add weight to the shared values that 
the department wishes to promote. This goes against 
Greenfield*s notion that facts and values are intertwined 
and reinforces Bates* criticism in the last citation. 
Bates suggests that educational administrators need to
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be sensitive to the processes of management of metaphors, 
rituals and negotiations, which he considers to be the 
key aspects of the cultural myths of schools. They also 
need to be:
"...aware of its importance in the processes 
of rationalisation, legitimation and motivation 
involved in schooling".
(Bates 1982 pl4)
However, neo-Marxists, would also surely be concerned 
with such issues. Greenfield, in his paper, "The Decline 
and Fall of Science in Educational Administration"(1986), 
has more recently focused on values in educational 
administration, as mentioned in Section 2., and Morgan 
has considered the role of metaphors in organisational 
administration, in his paper, "Paradigms, Metaphors, and 
Puzzle Solving in Organization Theory"(1980), (a main 
topic for Section7.)
There is nothing unique in what Bates is proposing, but 
it may be the case, that Greenfield, with his later work, 
has been influenced by Bates. If this is the case, then 
Critical Theory is influencing the subjective stance of 
G r e e n f i e l d !
Critiques of the neo-Marxist Perspective.
Willower is generally critical of the application of 
Critical Theory to educational administration, in his 
"Marxian Critical Theory and Educational
Administration"(19 8 5 a ) , because it:
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"...incorporates the essential dogmas of Marxism 
and because it has so little to offer in the 
way of empirical research".
(Willower 1985a pl8)
In a similar way, Whitty's account in "Sociology and School
Knowledge", is criticised by Lawton in the "Review
Symposium". He implies that Whitty does not consider
the American work in the curriculum field that is not
neo-Marxist in nature.
Presumably, Lawton considers that Whitty is only focusing 
on the critical social theory of Taxel, Apple, Giroux, 
Wexler, etc. Colin Lacey, in his contribution to the 
symposium, is critical of Whitty's work for only including 
ideas that support the neo-Marxist cause. He states:
"The methodological limitation of the 'new' 
sociology of education stems from the way its 
proponents have dealt with pre-existing work 
in the field and to some extent later work which 
does not emerge from adherents or exadherents 
of the 'new' sociology. The effect is to 
underemphasise the in school organisation and 
political constraint affecting reforms of the 
curriculum and almost write off the research 
that demonstrates the effects of the intensely 
individualistic (family-based) competition that 
characterises all modern educational systems".
(Lacey 1986 p89)
An interesting question would be, to what extent Critical 
Theory work in educational administration could be viewed 
in the same light? Bates' calls for work on the underlying 
myths of school organisation, mentioned earlier, would 
tend to quell a criticism within the field of Critical 
Theory and educational administration. Willower, in fact, 
suggests that critical theorists have produced useful 
concepts for application to educational administration:
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"Some of the ideas of critical theory can be 
detached from the ideological web that enmeshes 
them and examined independently of that web.
For instance, power, legitimacy, and control 
are useful concepts to use in attempting to 
understand what goes on in schools as well as 
other settings".
(Willower 1985a pl7)
Similarly, the concept, 'false c o n s c iousness1 is useful 
if it is used to mean conditioning of the mind. There
must be situations where people do not act freely, but 
instead act in a conditioned way, of which they might
not be aware.
This could affect decisions in educational administration. 
For instance, a proposal to cut back on pre-school 
provision during financial restraint, is routinely carried 
forward, through conditioning of the mind, into more
prosperous times.
However, why should such false consciousness necessarily 
be replaced by class consciousness? Surely conscious 
awareness can take other forms, i.e. individual self
consciousness, family group awareness, generational peer 
group awareness, etc?
Concluding Comments.
It is important to consider neo-Marxist perspectives in 
both educational administration and the sociology of 
education in order to trace developments within the two 
fields. The fact that subjective perspectives have been 
used, by the 'new* sociologists of education, to act as 
springboards into Marxism, makes it almost impossible 
to compare the subjective developments in the two fields, 
without considering the accompanying neo-Marxist
96
p e r s p e c t i v e s .
Whitty, in spite of his politically committed writing,
has provided an excellent historical account of the
development of neo-Marxist perspectives within the 
sociology of education and has made it possible to compare 
developments from the early 1 9 7 0 fs, with parallel 
developments within educational administration.
At one point, he makes it clear that he is aware of the 
work of Bates within educational administration, but his 
comment indicates a general antagonism towards what he
sees as the generally positivistic nature of traditional 
educational administration theory.
Whitty has indicated that, within the sociology of 
education, there has been a gradual arrival of Critical
Theory perspectives through phenomenology, 'Correspondence 
Theory* and hegemonic concepts, whereas, in educational 
administration, Critical Theory appears to have emerged 
more directly from the subjective stances of Greenfield, 
although Greenfield himself, does not appear to endorse 
this progression.
The retaining of systems and subjective stances, and the 
development of ambiguity models, has produced a resulting 
paradigm diversity within educational administration. 
It is possible that there is more consensus about the 
acceptance of this diversity in educational administration, 
than within the sociology of education where, perhaps, 
there is more of a tendency to argue from ideological 
camps. One thinks of Griffiths' gradual accommodation 
of Greenfield's values, as indicated within 'Intellectual 
Turmoil in Educational Administration"(1979), and Sander 
and Wiggins attempts to assimilate various paradigms 
in educational administration, in "Cultural Context of
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Administrative Theory: In Consideration of a
Multidimensional Paradigm” (1985) . Bush too, in "Theories 
of Educational Management"(1986), compares systems, 
subjective, micro-political and ambiguity models in a 
balanced way.
These approaches, in educational administration, can be 
compared with Whitty's account of the way in which the 
'new* sociology of education divided into two camps, one 
basically, a theoretical neo-Marxist approach, and the 
other, concentrating on ethnographic classroom studies, 
which Whitty considers to lack theoretical rigour.
Similarly, it is possible to include here, the criticism 
of Lawton, that Whitty, himself, only considers neo-Marxist 
approaches in the American literature.
However, concepts such as hegemony and false consciousness, 
as indicated earlier, can be useful tools in the 
development of understanding if stripped of their neo- 
Marxist political commitments and could probably, under 
these circumstances, find useful applications in 
educational administration. The hegemonic idea is that 
subtle social pressure can operate to encourage people 
to behave in certain ways, without overt compulsion being 
required; while the proposed concept 'false consc i o u s n e s s 1 
is that operation of the concept occurs through routine 
conditioned responses, rather than through responses based 
on critical thought in every situation. For instance, 
in an administrative situation, a subordinate may be 
influenced by a hegemony that one 'must get o n 1, and ignore 
requests to delegate, so that he will be able closely 
to control his own success in his work. An example of 
false consciousness was provided earlier in the section, 
when it was considered that the concept could lead to 
routine financial restraint within educational
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administration, even after the need for a strict budget 
had passed.
The concept 'hegemony1 could also aid an analysis of the 
interaction of systems and ambiguity models of educational 
organisation. The systems perspective lays emphasis on 
the order within an educational organisation. The 
ambiguity models of Cohen, March and Olsen under 'Garbage 
Can' theory, and the 'loose coupling' of Weick, (both 
to be discussed in Section 6.), suggest that there is
disorder, or at least apparent disorder, whereby, 
organisations function as much looser controls and checks.
The concept 'hegemony', with its subtle conditioned 
control, could contribute to an analysis of the interface 
between systems and ambiguity models. Bates has 
highlighted, through Habermas, the importance of ritual. 
In educational organisations, ritual is an aid to control,
if it can be established. Appeals to tradition and
bureaucracy within educational organisations, are attempts 
to establish an unquestionable 'right' to accept control
through the structure of the organisation. The time 
dimension of tradition, i.e. the attitude 'it has always 
been done this way', aids this 'lack of right to question' 
concept, and stresses the importance of time continuity. 
In other words, when there is no break with tradition, 
the impact of tradition on the organisation is increased. 
In certain schools, for example, the tradition of wearing 
school uniform, that has persisted for decades, is used 
as an argument for the wearing of school uniform to 
continue. It could be argued, that tradition is a 
hegemony, a concept of subtle persuasion, which is, 
perhaps, aided by an innate human predisposition to feel 
'comfortable' with conservation and uneasy about change.
Bureaucracy, with its patterns of organisational status,
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its concepts of command and delegation, by establishing 
an ordered pattern, also produces an appeal for stability
that could be considered to be hegemonic. The hegemony,
again, operates through the subtle pressure that routine 
can provide for 'ritualised responses of the m i n d 1, so 
that one continues to adopt those stances that routine 
has provided. This again, is brought about by the innate 
human condition, to feel comfortable with conformity and 
uneasy about change, in as much as change requires 
innovation, critical thought and the taking of risks.
If this is the pattern of systems approaches, then 
ambiguity models might appear to contradict the existence 
of these hegemonic controls. Yet, although Weick's 'loose 
coupling' operates with the concept that organisations 
are broken down into small units, that link with each 
other through loose control, there is, with the model, 
scope for tight coupling within the units.
It could be argued that tight control within units may 
rely on hegemonic patterns, sustained by ritual, and by 
established bureaucratic patterns. This is exemplified
by the notion of established groups that resist 
interference from other parts of the organisation. The 
paradox is that 'hegemony', as subtle social pressure 
through ritual, can operate at different levels, both 
to provide cohesion in organisations and, at the same
time, to provide barriers between its parts.
It is clear, however, that Greenfield's subjective approach 
would not accommodate the suggested concept, 'hegemony' 
as 'subtle social pressure through ritual', even stripped 
of its neo-Marxist implications. The integrity of the 
subject, the fact that his interpretations are sacrosanct, 
would not allow any suggestion that the subject could 
respond to ritual. Only a Schutzian concept of 'imposition
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of m e a n i n g 1 would allow this to occur.
The other 'useful* concept that neo-Marxist ideas have 
provided, 'false consciousness' as 'routine conditioned 
responses', would not aid a systems perspective, where 
decisions are to be made in response to the needs of the 
organisation. To serve the organisation, wholly and 
faithfully, would require critical thought and analysis 
in each situation. Trying to apply 'false consciousness' 
to ambiguity models would present the same problem.
In the 'Garbage Can' model, the administrator responds 
to the immediate situation, to leave some problems to 
resolve themselves, dealing with other situations before 
they become critical. However, this model stresses the 
timing of the arrival of problems and solutions, rather 
than the lack of critical thought.
The administrator is responding to situations under 
pressure but the model presents this as high critical 
brain activity rather than the conditioned response that 
false consciousness would suggest.
It could be argued, however, that it is precisely under 
these conditions that an administrator could respond in 
a conditioned way, with routine responses providing a 
false consciousness that helps the individual to cope, 
i.e., he may use responses that have 'worked in the past', 
rather than fresh critical analysis.
Weick's concept, 'loose coupling' would provide situations 
where false consciousness could be acceptable and others, 
where it would not fit the model. Where there is tight 
coupling within organisations, the systems concept, that 
critical thought is needed faithfully to serve the 
organisation, would prevent false consciousness under
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this model. However, where looser links could be defined, 
such that there is less organisational responsibility 
observed, then there is more scope for conditioned 
response, where routine procedures, that might be counter 
productive to organisational requirements, could take 
p l a c e .
However, it is clear, as it was with the concept, 
'hegemony', that 'false consc i o u s n e s s 1 as 'routine 
conditioning of the mind', could not operate under 
Greenfield's subjective approach, where each individual 
is responsible for his own interpretation of reality, 
which, in an organisational context, means that the 
subject's perceptions of a situation in an organisation 
are valid as his or her interpretation and must be based 
on conscious thought which is free, and cannot, therefore, 
be a conditioned response.
So the concept, 'false consciousness' like 'hegemony', 
even when its neo-Marxist political implications have 
been removed, cannot be accommodated within Greenfield's 
subjective approach.
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SECTION 5.
THE ETHNOGRAPHIC METHODOLOGY OF ANTHROPOLOGY
AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE "NEW” SOCIOLOGY OF
E D U C A T I O N , ORGANISATION THEORY AND
EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION.
In the last section, it became clear, at one point, that 
a consideration of anthropological and ethnographic 
approaches could enhance the debate within the field of 
the sociology of education and, perhaps, provide useful 
pointers for educational administration.
Sarup, in "Marxism and Educ a t i o n " (1978), considers that 
there was a clear anthropological and ethnographic 
influence in the early phenomenological approach to the 
'new directions' within the sociology of education.
Social Anthropology and Phenomenology.
The closeness of social anthropology to phenomenology 
is well documented in the development of phenomenology 
since Husserl. Thomas Luckmann, in his 'Preface' to 
"Phenomenology and Sociology"(1978) , considers that:
"Aron Gurwitsch, the philosophers Maurice
Merleau-Ponty and Alphonse de Waelhens, and
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other scholars working in the period between 
the thirties and the sixties continued the work 
of Husserl in a critique of empiricist psychology 
and in reconstructing the philosophical 
foundations of social science. The biologist 
- philosopher Helmuth Plessner, who with Max 
Scheler became one of the founding fathers of 
modern philosophical anthropology, followed 
an independent but often parallel path".
(Luckmann 1978 ppll-12)
Bourdieu, in his anthropological work, "Outline of a theory 
of Practice"(1977), when considering theoretical knowledge, 
almost views phenomenology as synonymous with 
ethnomethodology.
Anthropology, Ethnography and Educational Administration.
In educational administration, there are indications that 
a consideration of a link with anthropology and ethnography 
could be useful. For instance, Calhoun and Ianni, in 
their introduction to "The Anthropological Study of 
Education"(1976) , state:
"There is another side to the study of 
institutional education, however. This is to 
focus on the nature and operation of the 
educational institutions themselves. This is 
probably the largest of the subsections of the 
current anthropological study of education".
(Calhoun and Ianni 1976 p4)
Also, Sander and Wiggins, in "Cultural Context of 
Administrative Theory: In Consideration of a
Multidimensional Paradigm"(1985) , while evaluating their 
"Cultural Dimension", consider the importance of 
anthropological approaches of various kinds:
"Although the cultural dimension includes many
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aspects and levels, its basic characteristic 
is its global perspective that makes it possible 
for culture to take into account the physical, 
psychological, anthropological, social, and 
philosophical aspects of human life. In this 
dimension, the role of the educational 
administrator is one of coordinating the action 
of the persons and groups who participate 
directly or indirectly in the educational process 
in the community".
(Sander and Wiggins 1985 pll2)
Here Sander and Wiggins have captured the essence of the 
importance of anthropological studies. They probe into 
the basics of human existence and raise fundamental 
questions about how the human A n i m a l 1 behaves in social
situations, including that of being an educational 
administrator. The links with phenomenology are clear 
when one thinks of the preoccupation of phenomenology 
with experiences in the 'Life -world1, (Lebensfeld).
Perhaps, the emphasis is different in that the
anthropologist/ethnographer focuses on the human animal 
in the social situation, whereas the phenomenologist gives 
that 'animal' extra status as a subject, a human
consciousness, and tries to see the world through his 
e y e s .
Ethnography as a Methodology.
Delamont and Atkinson, in "The two Traditions in
Educational Ethnography: Sociology and Anthropology
Compared"(1980), are also concerned with the way that 
ethnography has been taken up with so much enthusiasm 
in the sociology of education.
They go on to compare how ethnographic techniques have 
been applied in Britain and the United States under the
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auspices of sociology and anthropology:
"There is an obvious and striking difference 
between British and American school ethnography. 
Whereas the American research on schools and 
classrooms has been conducted primarily by 
applied anthropologists, that in Britain has 
been done overwhelmingly by researchers who 
see themselves as sociologists. It is noticeable 
that several researchers now working as 
sociologists were trained as anthropologists, 
or began work in anthropology departments".
(Delamont and Atkinson 1980 pl40)
After stating that they themselves fall into this category, 
they then interestingly point to the work of Hargreaves, 
"Social Relations in a Secondary Sch o o l " (1967), and 
Lacey's, "Hightown Grammar"(1970), as being studies 
undertaken at Manchester in a joint department of sociology 
and anthropology.
In Section 3. it was considered how these works are often 
claimed to be the forerunners to the 'new d i r e c t i o n s 1 
in the sociology of education, while Calhoun and Ianni, 
in their introduction to "The Anthropological Study of 
Education"(1976), include Lacey's "Hightown Grammar" in 
an analysis under the heading of, "The Organization of 
Educational Institutions".
Delamont and Atkinson, while commenting on the Manchester 
work, state:
"While there was a strong anthropological impetus 
and an ethnographic approach to this work, it 
is apparent that the school studies are more 
strongly sociological in flavour. Since these 
initial studies both Lacey and Hargreaves have 
looked increasingly to sociological paradigms 
such as symbolic interactionism".
(Delamont and Atkinson 1980 pl40)
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Yet Lacey, in his contribution to "The Anthropological 
Study of Education” (1976), had stated that, while progress 
has been made in America to link anthropology and
e d u c a t i o n .
”In Britain, however, the present situation 
does not as yet allow the writer to talk about 
even 'a handful of joint appointments in 
education and a n t h r o p o l o g y 1. To my knowledge 
there are none. It is still axiomatic that 
any young anthropologist who wishes to study 
education within his own culture becomes a 
sociologist” .
(Lacey in Calhoun and Ianni (Eds) 1976 pl90)
The Colonial Implications of Anthropology.
Delamont and Atkinson, drawing on a survey by Landman 
(1978), "Applied anthropology in postcolonial Britain: 
the present and the prospect," indicate that the label 
’applied anthropologist', in Britain, could suffer because 
of colonial implications. Sol. Tax, the general editor 
of "The Anthropological Study of E d u cation"(1976) , agrees 
when, in the ’Preface', he states:
"Like most contemporary sciences, anthropology 
is a product of the European Tradition. Some 
argue that it is a product of colonialism, with 
one small and self-interested part of the species 
dominating the study of the whole".
(Sol. Tax in Calhoun and Ianni (Eds) 1976 p(V) 
(Preface))
It is this kind of anthropology that Sarup is probably 
considering, when he talks about nineteenth century
anthropology, to be contrasted with modern social
anthropology, with its ethno m e t h o d o l o g y . This will be
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discussed later in the section, when Sarup's work, in 
anthropology, within the ’new' sociology of education, 
is considered.
Educational Ethnography: The Two Traditions.
Whether there are colonial links or not, Delamont and 
Atkinson make clear the distinction between American and 
British research. The American work, of an anthropological 
nature, tends to focus on ethnic groups. Whereas, when 
discussing the British scene, they say:
”Despite the very visible presence of different 
ethnic groups in many British schools, this 
has not been the subject of ethnographic school 
studies.... Of course, the situations differ 
as between the two countries. Amongst other 
things there exist in North America schools 
which are exclusively Indian, Eskimo and so 
on, and to that extent, perhaps, may appear 
to offer more "obvious” research potential” .
(Delamont and Atkinson 1980 pl45)
It may be the case that it is less controversial to study 
ethnic groups when they are within one school. There
is not the problem of drawing attention to ethnic 
differences because the study is probably applied to the
whole school population, and, even if it is not, will 
not be seen to be focusing on one group for racial reasons, 
since all the pupils belong to the same ethnic group.
It would be more controversial to select an ethnic minority 
group out of a school population, with the problems of 
classification of individuals, and the drawing of attention 
to ethnic differences which, perhaps, authorities would 
wish not to be highlighted, because of a risk of racial
t e n s i o n s .
Later, Delamont and Atkinson point out that:
Ill
"...the North American anthropologists treat 
as problematic the juxtaposition and incongruence 
of cultures, and the school as an arena for 
such conflict. On the other hand, the actual 
process of schooling tends to be glossed over.
That is, the organisation and day-to-day 
accomplishment of social life in the schools 
and classrooms remains implicit".
(Delamont and Atkinson 1980 pl47)
Thus, by implication, British studies would be more 
important to the educational administrator, with the focus 
on the organisation of the school. The main point Delamont 
and Atkinson draw out in their paper, though, is that 
ethnographic approaches have been applied in the name 
of several theoretical approaches, including anthropology, 
sociology and even Marxism, as exemplified in the work 
of Willis, "Learning to Labour"(1977).
Ethnographic Techniques in Organisational Study.
It is perhaps, in this light, that it is legitimate to 
consider the papers of Van Maanen, "The Fact of Fiction 
in Organizational Ethnography"(1979) , and Gephart, "Status 
Degradation and Organisational Succession. An
Ethnomethodological A p p r oach"(1978), as employing 
ethnographic techniques in the field of organisational 
study, rather than being anthropological in nature.
Van Maanen's paper focuses on American Police as an 
organisation. His intensive fieldwork brings out the 
problems of interpreting the data.
G e p h a r t fs paper, on the other hand, is based on participant 
observation of the change of a chairman of a student 
committee, with the author being the deposed chairman. 
In Gephart's case, it appears that the actual course of 
events would have occurred anyway, whether or not he had
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undertaken the study, as his status as participant was 
not dependent on his status as an observer. Where, 
however, a researcher enters a situation as participant 
observer, this raises issues of interference in the 
organisation to be studied.
In a similar way, Sarup, in his anthropological chapter 
within "Marxism and Education"(1978) , is very conscious 
of the importance of respecting the worthwhileness of 
the native's position in anthropological studies. He 
is dismissive of presumably traditional (colonial?) 
anthropological ideas, and adopts an ethnographic approach.
The Deficient/Different Syndrome in Anthropology and 
E d u c a t i o n .
Sarup considers that nineteenth century anthropologists, 
in studying non-Western cultures, made the false assumption 
that the primitive adult was equivalent to the civilised 
child, and quotes L^vy-Bruhl on the point that the
primitive mentality was 1 pre-l o g i c a l f. He then claims
that the assumptions of 1970's educators were similar 
when they consider working class children:
"Just as the native is made to feel ashamed 
of his world and is prescribed a new way of 
seeing the world by the western anthropologist, 
so children are prescribed reified forms of 
knowledge which produce a view of social reality 
that is mechanistic and deterministic".
(Sarup 1978 p25-26)
The danger is that judgements about the nature of working
class children or primitive culture are turned into
evaluative statements about their worth.
However, Sarup then considers that modern anthropologists
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have overcome this problem, pointing to the work of Nell 
Keddie, in "Tinker, Tailor, The Myth of Cultural 
Deprivation"(1973), where anthropological studies were 
used, by the 'new' sociologists of education, to criticise 
the idea of working class cultural deprivation.
The Problems of Researcher Influence in Ethnographic 
S t u d i e s .
Sarup considers that ethnographers have made the following 
contributions to the sociology of education:
"...first, they maintain that categories should 
not be imposed. An ethnographer does not attempt 
to impose his views and categories of experience 
on the phenomena he studies".
(Sarup 1978 p27)
His claim is that this is similar to the position of
phenomenological sociologists:
"...who hold that one has to take the role of 
the actor, see the world from his standpoint".
(Sarup 1978 p27)
Indeed, Delamont and Atkinson (1980) consider the 
imposition of views to be a problem in some American
anthropological work. They point out Vine D e l o r i a fs (1973) 
claim that Indians in America have been influenced by 
anthropologists.
Whilst it could be argued that views should not be imposed 
on the subjects under enquiry, there is nothing wrong 
with bringing outside ideas to the field of enquiry as
they may provide extra enlightenment. The point is though, 
that one must always be aware of the fact that outside
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ideas are being introduced to the culture under study.
It may be useful sometimes to fgo native* and attempt
to adopt the position of the individual in the culture, 
but there are pitfalls.
Friedrichs and Ludtke in "Participant Observation, Theory 
and P r a c t i c e " (1975), consider both aspects:
"The problems involved in the method of 
participant observation can be most clearly
seen when studied within the fields of cultural 
or social anthropology because they are much 
more pronounced than in sociology. A constituent 
property of anthropological observation is the 
cultural distance between the observer and the 
foreign culture. Its negative sides include
language difficulties and endless material.
Its positive quality is the discovery of social 
rou tines1'.
(Friedrichs and Ludtke 1975 p7)
Cognitive Action and Cultural Context.
Sarup also considers that ethnographers have contributed 
to the sociology of education by maintaining that thought 
processes are related to the cultural context in which 
they are developed, and, as such, can only be studied 
within their own particular environment. He links this 
to phenomenological theorizing by suggesting that actions 
too, are dependent on cultural context and should, 
therefore, be related to the phenomenological meaning 
of the context, while, at the same time, the cultural 
context should be interpreted through the same actions.
However, cognitive behaviour and resulting action cannot 
be regarded as synonymous. Certain thought processes, 
even within one individual, could lead to different courses 
of action at different times and in different situations 
for reasons, both external to the individual, such as
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environmental influences, and reasons internal to the
individual, such as biological changes within his or her 
body, for instance, ill health and lack of sleep.
Sarup's third ethnographic contribution is:
"...that people are good at doing what is
important to them. They have shown us that 
societies vary in the kinds of tasks they pose
for their members. It follows that people will
be good at doing the things that are important 
to them and that they have occasion to do often.
Thus the Kpelle in Nigeria are good at estimating 
rice, the Subanun of the Philippines at
diagnosing diseases and the Puluwat Islanders 
of the Pacific at navigation".
(Sarup 1978 p28)
This is not remarkable. If a kind of cultural selection
operates then those who prosper within the society will 
tend to be those who are good at doing the important things 
required by that society.
The question is, to what extent all individuals in the
society are good at these tasks? It would be very easy
to give the illusion that all were good to an 
anthropologist because the less able would be less
prominent when tasks are being viewed.
Abstract Thinking and Innovative Thinking.
Sarup then discusses in some detail the work of Thomas 
Gladwin, "East is a Big Bird; Navigation and Logic on 
Puluwat Atoll"(1970). The main point of relevance in 
Sarup's work is that the Puluwat islanders have a complex 
form of navigation that enables them to navigate about 
the Pacific Ocean for thousands of miles:
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Sarup states:
"Their navigation depends upon features of sea 
and sky and is founded on a system of logic 
so complex that westerners cannot duplicate 
it without the use of advanced instruments.
Thus what is learnt as ‘p r a c t i c a l 1 on Puluwat 
would be categorized as highly ‘t h e oretical1, 
‘abstract', in one of our naval colleges".
(Sarup 1978 p28)
The point that this raises with Gladwin is that 'abstract* 
thinking should not be regarded as synonymous with 
innovative thinking. Sarup picks up this point and relates 
it to Western working class culture, claiming that the 
working classes are often perceived as incapable of 
abstract thought, as being restricted to a 'concrete' 
style of thinking. He claims further, that both Puluwat 
islanders and the working class often do not need to be 
innovative, but that they are capable of it.
He then draws parallels with the work of Robin Horton 
in "Knowledge and Control", that what is considered as 
abstract depends on the culture.
In "African Traditional Thought and Western Science", 
Horton considers that all people try to understand their 
world by constructing explanatory theories, and that there 
are links between the traditional African belief system 
he studied, and Western scientific culture. In both 
cultures, he claims that there is a quest to place events 
in a causal context, fuller than common sense can provide, 
presumably requiring abstract levels of thinking. He 
s t a t e s :
"To say of the traditional African thinker that 
he is interested in supernatural rather than
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natural causes makes little more sense, 
therefore, than to say of the physicist that 
he is interested in nuclear rather than natural 
causes. In fact, both are making the same use 
of theory to transcend the limited vision of 
natural causes provided by common sense".
(Horton in Young (Ed) 1971 p213)
The t e r m 'supernatural * , implies an interest in phenomena 
that are incapable of explanation using the postulates 
of natural science. A nuclear physicist, on the other 
hand, is interested in attempting to explain the observed 
'natural' processes of nuclear physics by considering 
the postulates of natural science. In the one case, the 
thinker is stepping out of natural processes to build 
his theory, whereas, in the other case, the thinker remains 
within the confines of thinking about natural processes. 
So, it is incorrect to claim that both are making the 
same use of theory. (The term 'natural' is being used
to mean any observable physical process, irrespective 
of whether it occurs because of the influence of man).
This does not solve the problem, though, of whether 
innovative thinking takes place in all societies. Horton 
considers that:
"...once a particular theoretical idiom has 
been adopted, it tends to direct peoples' 
attention towards certain kinds of causal linkage 
and away from others".
(Horton in Young (Ed) 1971 p213)
He explains how most traditional African cultures have 
adopted a personal idiom as the basis of their attempt 
to understand the world. This, he claims, leads to a 
predisposition:
118
” ...towards seeing a nexus between social 
disturbance and individual affliction".
(Horton in Young(Ed) 1971 p213)
This is exemplified, in African societies, where disease 
and misfortune are seen as punishment for undermining 
the solidarity of the social group.
There is however, an implication, that innovative thinking 
is being impaired through the idea, that the development 
of a particular theoretical idiom, is regarded as an 
abstraction because it is above the level of concrete 
thinking. This, in H o r t o n ’s view, leads to channeling 
along certain lines of causal linkage, so that abstract 
thinking stifles innovative thinking.
Abstract Thinking, Innovative Thinking and Systems Theory.
There does seem to be a link, here, with the concept, 
’i n n o v a t i o n 1 in systems organisational theory. Burns 
and Stalker, in "The Management of Innov ation"(1961) , 
contrast two types of organisation, the 'Mechanistic', 
suited to stable situations, and the 'Organic', suited 
to situations of change.
The authors claim that the mechanistic management system 
is characterised by individual tasks that are abstract 
in nature, while the innovative organic form is 
characterised by the 'realistic' nature of each individual 
task. The implication being, again, that abstract thinking 
is not conducive to innovative thinking. So, on this 
particular point, systems organisational theory is in 
agreement with 'new directions' sociology of education!
However, the issue of the nature of relations between 
abstract theory and innovation is much more complex.
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Abstract thinking could enable generalisations to be 
made because it is possible to rise above the problems 
of thinking only in certain specific situations. Abstract 
thinking makes it possible to see patterns of behaviour 
which can be transposed to other situations and other 
times. The patterns can be compared with the other 
concrete situations and their abstractions.
This would provide extra insights which could lead to 
a new thought process of an innovative nature. There 
is, however, the question of the extent to which innovative 
thought is synonymous with inspirational thought. It
could be that Horton tends to see a need for simplistic 
thought to provide inspiration; the idea of an uncluttered 
mind being free to innovate, preventing the 'causal
linkage* mentioned in one of the quotations. It may come
down to the ability of the individual to resist channeling,
to see all the links for what they are, and to be capable 
of working both inside and outside the linkages. Such 
people would be capable of even higher levels of innovative 
thinking than those confined to innovative thinking from
concrete situations. It appears, as Sarup suggests, that 
notions like *abstract* and *theory* are certainly 
p r o b l e m a t i c .
The Problems of Trying to Cross Cultural Boundaries.
Sarup has pointed out the difficulties faced by
ethnographers in trying to understand other cultures,
while Bourdieu, in one of his contributions to "Knowledge 
and Control", "Systems of Education and Systems of
Thought", with an anthropological flavour, considers the 
dilemma of the ethnologist:
"As a social individual, the ethnologist is
on terms of intimacy with his culture and
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therefore finds it difficult to think objectively 
about the patterns governing his own thought, 
the more completely those patterns have been 
mastered and have become a part of his mak e ­
up - and therefore coextensive and consubstantial 
with his consciousness - the more impossible 
is it for him to apply conscious thought to 
t h e m " .
(Bourdieu in Young (Ed) 1971 pl90)
Hence, the need to avoid going completely native.
Sarup considers three methods of obtaining data and their 
co-existing problems, derived from Charles Frake, in "The 
Diagnosis of Disease among the Subanun of Mindanao", in 
Nell Keddie (Ed), "Tinker, Tailor the Myth of Cultural 
Deprivation". Frake labels them, 'the analytic method', 
'the perceptual method' and the 'explicit Method'.
The analytic method uses entirely the Western logic coding 
to arrive at the data:
"Second, there is the perceptual method; this 
is when a disease is named by a native and the 
observer tries to note the physical symptons 
that the native is perceiving. The difficulty 
with this method is that one does not know what 
precisely the native is perceiving, and so 
mistakes can be made".
(Sarup 1978 p31)
Finally, Sarup considers the explicit method, where the 
native is asked direct questions. The disadvantage of 
this method, Sarup states, is:
"...that it gives knowledge of the meaning of
terms 'in principle* but not of their application
in socially defined situations. In other words, 
knowing an abstract rule is not enough; we have 
to know 'the rule in use', when and how it is
applied in a particular context or on a
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particular occasion.”
(Sarup 1978 p31)
Sarup considers that Frake's paper reminds us that children 
learning at school face the same difficulties as the 
anthropologist in trying to understand a different culture.
The Importance of Time.
One place where educational administration can learn both 
from anthropology and phenomenology is in the question 
of the importance of time, in situations.
This was dealt with partly in Section 3. where the
phenomenological ideas of Schutz were considered in 
relation to perceptions of experience over time. Bourdieu, 
in his anthropological work, "Outline of a Theory of
P r a c t i c e " (1977), considers the question of the importance
of time in gift exchange. He also states how science 
has been made time independent, i.e. the idea that
experiments repeated under the same circumstances will 
produce the same results. He states, in relation to gift 
e x c h a n g e :
"In every society it may be observed that, if
it is not to constitute an insult, the counter­
gift must be deferred and different".
(Bourdieu 1977 p5) 
and later:
"Until he has given in return, the receiver
is O b l i g e d 1, expected to show his gratitude
towards his be n e f a c t o r ,  lest he be accused
of ingratitude and stand condemned by "what
people say", which is what gives his actions 
their social meaning".
(Bourdieu 1977 p6)
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Hence, the idea of strategy requirement in gift exchange 
and, indeed, other situations where time is important.
The Implications of Time for Educational Administration.
Now this could have a key implication for educational 
administration. The educational administrator has to 
work over time, within time, and does not always have 
the time to totalize, as Bourdieu says, "to overcome time". 
Hence, this could be an important indicator that 
educational administration cannot be treated like a natural 
science. 'Garbage Can* models, interestingly, stress 
the importance of time.
Cohen and March, in "Leadership and Ambiguity"(1986), 
state, in considering 'Garbage C a n 1 processes:
"Such a view of organizational choice focuses 
attention on the ways in which the meaning of 
choice changes over time. It calls attention 
to the strategic effects of timing (in the 
introduction of choices and problems), the time 
pattern of available energy, and the impact 
of organizational structure on these".
(Cohen and March 1986 p81)
'Garbage Can' processes will be considered, in detail, 
in the next section, but the similarities with Bourdieu's 
anthropological arrival at the importance of the link 
between time and strategy, are clearly seen from the above 
c i t a t i o n .
This could all be linked to Schutz's statement about the 
philosophical importance of time, to the subject's 
interpretation of the life-world:
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"The stratification of the world into zones 
of actual, restorable and obtainable reach 
already refers to the structure of the life- 
world according to dimensions of objective 
temporality and their subjective correlates, 
the phenomena of retention and protention, recall 
and expectancy, and to the peculiar 
differentiations of the experience of time which 
correspond to the manifold dimensions of
r e a l i t y " .
(Schutz in Luckmann (Ed) 1978 p259)
The concepts of actual, restorable and obtainable reach 
were considered in Section 3. where S c h u t z O  phenomenology 
was discussed.
Some Problems of Applying Ethnographic Approaches to 
Organisational Study
Robert Gephart in "Status Degradation and Organisational 
Succession: An Ethnomethodological A p p r o a c h " (1978) , also
draws on the phenomenological ideas of Schutz, for his 
analysis of the way successors are appointed in 
organisations. He states, for instance:
"Ethnomethodologists seek first to understand 
common activities of organizational participants
in the language these participants use, that
is, the concepts of actors in their daily lives".
(Gephart 1978 p556)
Drawing on the work of Bittner, in "The Concept of
O r ganization"(1974), Gephart outlines an approach that 
stresses a phenomenological perspective, where the concept, 
O r g a n i s a t i o n 1 is investigated mainly in terms of the 
meaning the work has to the individual subjects within
the organisation. However, this perspective is limited
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to the linguistic activities of the individuals concerned:
"Thus the organization is constituted by 
linguistic devices and interpretational schemes 
which members use to make sensible certain 
conduct, events, and states of affairs and to 
methodically locate them as falling within the 
purview of 'the o r g a n i z a t i o n 1".
(Gephart 1978 p557)
This may be all that can be expected from an 
ethnomethodological approach. Van Maanen, in "The Fact 
of Fiction in Organisational Ethnography"(1979) , has 
pointed out the way ethnographers rely, in the main, on 
data obtained through verbal transaction from informants.
The implication is that the researcher is usually only 
fortunate enough to witness a few important events and 
that most of his 'picture' must be built up by what he 
is 'told'. This leads to many problems of the reliability 
of informant's information. Van Maanen, in his paper, 
discusses both lies and evasion. Such problems must 
question the phenomenological status of such ethnographic 
work. The subjective views of the individuals, their 
interpretation of their life-world, can only be hinted 
at by the most penetrating of ethnographic studies.
However, both the works of Gephart and Van Maanen are 
useful examples of how ethnographic techniques can be 
applied to the study of organisations.
In particular, Gephart's work, which studies the succession 
of chairmen to a graduate students committee, places the 
ethnomethodological study of an organisation in an 
educational setting.
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Concluding Comments.
Modern ethnographic techniques of anthropology have 
awakened many disciplines to the problem of trying to 
study ’alien* cultural contexts. Whether it is a tribal 
culture in Africa, or a working class culture within the 
school, the ethnographic techniques have raised many 
important questions about attempts to cross the cultural 
d i v i d e .
Fundamental issues have been raised with clear implications 
for educational administration, such as the nature of 
the link between abstract thinking and innovative thinking, 
and the importance of time and strategy in the social 
s c i e n c e s .
The mechanistic view of organisation, with its stress 
on abstract thought, restricts thought to certain lines 
of progression that the abstract logic patterns demand. 
Under the systems perspective of organisations, where 
a rigid structure is perceived, although there would be 
a requirement for complicated administrative patterns 
of an abstract nature, the willingness to break into new 
thought patterns, which could possibly affect the existing 
structure, would, under this perspective, have to be 
r e s t r i c t e d .
More open ambiguity models, as considered in the next 
section, with concepts of 'loose c o u p l i n g 1 and the flexible 
treatment of problems and decisions, as the 'Garbage Can* 
model of Cohen, March and Olsen suggests, would be open 
to more innovative ideas and would be more in sympathy 
with Burns and Stalker's organic model.
Greenfield, with his stress on the integrity of personal 
feelings as subjective meaning, perceived by the subject,
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and therefore valid, would be likely to be suspicious 
of abstract thought within educational administration,
that might be interpreted as ’logical scientific t h o u g h t 1.
However, the concept ’a b s t r a c t 1 in terms of artistic
creation in painting, would presumably find favour, as
the creative interpretations of an individual artist as
a subject.
The inspirational side of innovative thought would appeal 
to Greenfield as the individual interpreting his or her 
personal environment and responding creatively to it. 
However, any links between innovative thought and
scientific thinking within educational administration 
would almost certainly be regarded in a negative way by
Greenfield. He is hostile to the transposing of ideas 
from other fields, such as general organisation theory, 
to educational administration, and any innovational 
thoughts, along these lines, would not be acceptable to 
him. The innovation would have to be generated within 
educational administration, to be acceptable to Greenfield. 
Hence, a case can be made that Greenfield would neither
wholly endorse nor reject, either of Burns and S t a l k e r ’s
categories of 'mechanistic* or 'organic', in terms of
their links with abstract and innovative thought
respectively. What would clearly be criticised, however, 
is the attachment of these terms to the concept,
’organisation', in other words, Burns and Stalker's idea 
that one can conceive of mechanistic organisations and 
organic organisations. Greenfield, as stated many times, 
rejects the reality of organisations.
When the 'Garbage Can' ambiguity model of Cohen, March 
and Olsen is considered in the next section, links will 
be illustrated between the anthropological aspects of 
time progression and strategy, and the 'Garbage Can' model. 
The implications for educational administration will be
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further explored in Section 9., so these fundamental 
issues, raised by anthropological considerations, will 
be examined in detail later.
This section has also raised the problems associated with 
the term E t h n o g r a p h y ' .  It would appear that it should 
be regarded as a methodology independent of any discipline, 
such as sociology, anthropology or educational 
administration. There is some indication that
anthropologists, like Wilcox, wish to supervise the use 
of the methodology in other disciplines, and see a 
requirement for it to maintain its anthropological roots, 
when being applied elsewhere.
The philosophical foundations of ethnographic research 
do appear to come from phenomenological perspectives, 
and it is, perhaps, these influences that helped 
traditional anthropology move away from the 'superior 
status of the researcher' position, towards the problems
of trying to study cultures, or sub-cultures, in a way 
that does not interfere with the culture itself.
There is an analogy in physics, when the physicist is 
trying to measure electric current with a meter. As soon 
as he places the meter in the circuit, he changes the 
current, as he is no longer measuring the current that 
was there originally. This appears to be the problem 
with ethnographic studies. The work of Van Maanen and 
Gephart has shown how difficult it is to obtain a true 
picture of what is going on. The mere presence of the 
observer can attract false information and lead to 
'unnatural' behaviour.
The need to respect the integrity of the subject, in
Greenfield's subjective approach, prevents even an
ethnomethodological approach from being applied to
128
educational administration research, under his 
philosophical orientation.
Although Greenfield proposes individual case study as 
the preferred method of research, such that particular 
attention is paid to p e o p l e d  innermost feelings, it is 
questionable whether an ethnographic study would really 
reach this level.
Ethnomethodology can only observe the actions of 
individuals and, as such, could be used to research Weber's 
'method of understanding' based on the 'action' of 
individuals. Greenfield's subjective level requires 
interpretation of these actions for the individual, 
including his perceptions of reality. It is not clear 
how participant observation could reach these perceptions 
without grave risk of misinterpretation.
Van Maanen has pointed out that observation of events 
of significance is very rare in participant observation. 
Much information has to be collected 'second hand' by 
asking individuals about past events. Even though it 
may be possible to get several accounts of the same events, 
individuals 'cloud' their recollections with their own 
preferences, memory abilities and the temptation to mislead 
the researcher for various reasons, as indicated earlier.
Even when an event is observed by a researcher, his or 
her own interpretation may influence his or her recorded 
observation. Hence the difficulty of applying ethnographic 
techniques to Greenfield's subjective stance. Greenfield 
suggests case studies, based on feelings of individuals, 
as the nearest practical research can come to his 
philosophical orientation.
Phenomenology, with its stress on the importance of the
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individual, the need for the individual to construct his 
own reality, finds sympathy with the ethnographic approach 
not to interfere. The best, perhaps, the ethnographer 
can hope for is to be aware of all these problems when 
conducting his or her research; for instance, the need 
not to compare the individual views of those under study, 
the requirement to be as 'invisible* as possible, and 
yet, sensitive to the needs of the culture. At the same 
time, views that the researcher brings to the situation 
can help that researcher to clarify ideas in a way a native 
of the culture would not be able to do.
The wider experience of the researcher, in many cases, 
would provide extra insights, as long as he or she realises 
the source of these insights and adapts them to the 
situation. However, there is a need to be aware of the 
problems of misinformation and changed behaviour on the 
part of the individuals of the culture, and yet, at the 
same time, realise that even witnessed events can be open 
to misinterpretation, because the researcher may misjudge 
their significance within the context of the whole culture.
Ethnographic researchers using observation techniques 
within an educational organisation have to confront the 
problem of interpreting a culture which is basically their 
own. There is the danger of overlooking the significance 
of events which appear commonplace. Researchers may be 
used to similar administrative structures, within their 
own organisation, and may cloud their interpretation, 
with what they would do in similar situations.
By becoming participant observers, researchers may be 
able to divorce, more clearly, themselves from their own 
organisational experiences, by being forced to work within 
the structure of the organisation under observation, 
although they could still sub-consciously relate
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observations to their own organisational experiences.
However, there is also the danger that by ’interfering 
with organisational procedures’, by being participants, 
the organisation which the researchers wish, merely to 
study, will have changed.
Also, the pressure of being participants, especially
where the workload is heavy, may interfere with their
role as observers and even present problems of conflicting 
loyalties between their own work, within the organisation, 
and the responsibilities they have to the observation 
study programme.
Perhaps, one of the most significant contributions 
ethnographic studies can make to educational administration 
is to make researchers within educational administration 
aware of all these difficulties. In an ideal world, each 
individual administrator would need to take into account 
all these research problems, whenever he or she attempts
to make a decision; in an attempt to analyse the motives
behind the decisions and to develop self awareness of 
the social situation in which he or she operates. This 
could be linked to the phenomenological idea that each 
individual is a philosopher, (may be an ethnographic 
researcher!), trying to make sense of his or her life- 
world, and needs therefore, if that ’sense* is to be 
informed, to be aware of all the problems outlined.
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SECTION 6.
SUBJECTIVE APPROACHES AND AMBIGUITY MODELS:
THE PROBLEMS OF CLASSIFICATION AND THE
ACCOMPANYING PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES.
In this section, an attempt will be made to consider the 
relationship of subjective approaches within educational 
administration to the, so called, ambiguity models. 
Ambiguity models such as the ’loose c o u p l i n g 1 concept 
of Weick (1976), and the ’Garbage Can' models of Cohen, 
March and Olsen (1972), have been generated within 
educational administration. This is unusual and makes 
them rather unique.
At the same time, they satisfy one of G r e e n f i e l d ’s 
requirements that educational administration theory should 
come from within educational administration. In his ’new 
perspective' paper, Greenfield (1975), starts off by 
criticising systems theory, partly because it has been 
introduced into education from general systems 
organisational theory.
Ambiguity models also share links with subjective 
approaches, in a departure from the structural functional 
approaches of systems theory, with its emphasis on order 
and consensus. 'Garbage Can' models focus on the concept, 
'organised anarchy'; for instance, Cohen and March state
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in "Leadership and Ambiguity: The American College
President" (Second Edition):
"The properties of universities as organized 
anarchies make the garbage can ideas particularly 
appropriate to an understanding of organizational 
choice within higher education” .
(Cohen and March 1986 p82)
Weick, in his 'loose coupling' paper, even indicates links 
with phenomenology, with an emphasis on meanings and 
constructing social reality:
"What kinds of information do loosely coupled 
systems provide members around which they can 
organize meanings"?
(Weick 1976 pl3) 
and later:
"Given the ambiguity of loosely coupled 
structures, this suggests that there may be 
increased pressure on members to construct or 
negotiate some kind of social reality they can 
live with".
(Weick 1976 pl3)
However, one needs to be cautious about the links with 
phenomenology. The term 'organise meaning', in the first 
quote, and the statement, "increased pressure on members 
to construct or negotiate some kind of social real ity” , 
from the second, imply an imposition of meanings, almost 
in the Schutzian sense, as mentioned earlier, when the 
'new directions' in the sociology of education were being 
considered. It was pointed out, in Section 3., that the 
imposition of meaning could be seen as a departure from 
a pure subjective approach, where only the individual
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is responsible for constructing his social reality.
Weick's statement thus implies conflict, which, whilst 
not being subjective in the sense considered above, does, 
like the subjective approaches of Greenfield, imply a 
departure from the consensus of the traditional approaches 
of systems theory, as Greenfield considers them, where 
the parts of the organisation faithfully attempt to serve 
the whole.
Organisations and Goals.
However, there are other pointers that place ambiguity 
models within systems theory. ’Garbage Can' models do 
consider the concept, 'organisational g o a l s ’. In these 
models, goals are ’’unclear’’ and ’’diffuse", but the use 
of the term indicates that they presumably exist, if only 
the theory could be devised to detect them. Cohen and 
March state, for instance, under the heading "Problematic 
Goals" :
"It is difficult to impute a set of goals to 
the organization that satisfies the standard 
consistency requirements of theories of choice.
The organization appears to operate on a variety 
of inconsistent and ill-defined preferences".
(Cohen and March 1986 p3)
This, however, has to be contrasted with Greenfield's 
statement, quoted in "Theories of Educational 
Management"(1986), by Bush, when subjective approaches 
to educational management were being considered. 
Greenfield states:
"What is an organisation that it can have such 
a thing as a goal?".
(Greenfield (1973) quoted in Bush 1986 p92)
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Bush claims that:
"The view that organizations have no existence 
independent of their members leads on naturally 
to the assumption that individuals, and not 
organizations, have objectives".
(Bush 1986 p 9 2 )
Greenfield, in his later work, "Environment as Subjective 
R e a l i t y "(1983) , appears to accept the use of the word 
'goal* in connection with the individual. The term 'goal' 
is rejected because of its attachment to the term 
’o r g a n i s a t i o n 1 which, under subjective approaches, can 
only be used in relation to the individuals that comprise 
the organisation.
It could be argued, that there is almost a difference 
of philosophy between the two approaches, (subjective 
and ambiguity), in relation to the concepts, 'goal* and 
’o r g a n i s a t i o n ’. In spite of arguments that Greenfield's 
subjective approach is not phenomenological, in the pure 
sense, (as considered by Gronn (1983) and mentioned in 
Section 1.), his approach clearly adopts phenomenological 
concepts such as the ideas of subjective reality. 
G r e e n f i e l d ’s ’new pe r s p e c t i v e ’ is often regarded as a 
paradigm shift, because it questions the whole idea of 
organisations having a material existence, except that 
which is perceived by individual members, and, as such, 
becomes part of their life-world.
On the other hand, the ambiguity models use the term 
’o r g a n i s a t i o n ’ in an unproblematic way, presumably 
inferring the systems concept, as Greenfield sees it , 
that organisations do really exist, and have goals, even 
if they are difficult to detect. Hence, it could be argued
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that, philosophically, ambiguity models lie within the 
realm of systems approaches, on this particular issue 
of the status of the concepts, ‘organis a t i o n 1 and 'goal1.
That ambiguity models work with the concept, 'organisation' 
can be seen in terms such as 'organised anarchy', and 
in Weick's concept, 'loose coupling':
"Using educational organizations as a case in 
point, it is argued that the concept of loose 
coupling incorporates a surprising number of 
disparate observations about organizations".
(Weick 1976 pi)
In this quote, it is then 'organisation' that can be 
loosely coupled. There is no hint that the concept, 
'organisation' could be problematic.
The Use of Computers.
Another clear distinction with Greenfield is the 
willingness to use computers to help in theory building. 
Cohen and March use computer simulations to test their 
'Garbage Can' process, whereas Greenfield is highly 
critical of the use of computers:
"...an organizational theory based upon 
understanding rejects the emphasis which much 
of contemporary social science places upon 
quantification, more complex mathematical models, 
and bigger number crunchers in the shape of 
better and faster computers".
(Greenfield in Hughes (Ed) 1975 p86)
Temporal Considerations.
However, while the ambiguity models adopt scientific tools
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such as computers, they are in agreement with Greenfield 
over the question of the importance of temporal 
considerations.
In the last section, it was considered how the importance 
of time provided a link between ethnographic ideas of 
anthropology, and the ambiguity models within educational 
administration.
Cohen and March, when considering the "efficiency" of 
decision processes within 'Garbage Can' models, stress 
three time concepts, "problem activity", "problem latency", 
and "decision time":
"...problem a c t i v i t y "  ( i s )  "...the amount
of time unresolved problems are actively attached 
to choice situations. Problem activity is a 
rough measure of potential for decision conflict 
in the organization. It assesses the degree 
of involvement of problems in choices. The 
second aspect is problem latency - the amount 
of time that problems spend activated but not 
linked to choices. The third aspect is decision 
time - the persistence of choices".
(Cohen and March 1986 p85)
Greenfield, in his ’new p e r spective’ paper, criticises
systems approaches for not considering time:
"Studies have therefore focused largely on the 
variety of organizational structures and their 
effects upon people. These structures are
usually seen as invariate over time and place".
(Greenfield in Hughes (Ed) 1975 p72) 
and later:
"...the aim of scientific investigation is to
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understand how that glossing of reality goes 
on at one time and place and to compare it with 
what goes on in different times and places11.
(Greenfield in Hughes (Ed) 1975 p83)
It is interesting that, while Greenfield is often critical 
of scientific approaches, he uses the term, 'scientific 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n 1, in the above quote, in a positive way. 
This is encouraging and provides a link with Bourdieu's 
anthropological work, in "Outline of a Theory of
P r a c t i c e " (1977), quoted in the last section, where it
was stressed that educational administration is a social 
science, partly, because it is time dependent. Research 
experiments cannot be repeated in such a way that they 
become independent of time, as physics experiments can, 
but time can be used as a variable and make it possible 
to use scientific approaches, as Cohen and March do with 
their computer simulations. The point to appreciate is 
that the time variable, in physics experiments, can be 
reproduced because of the possibility of tight control 
of all the other variables. In educational administration 
experiments, the variable 'time1, can only be used in 
relation to a specific situation, and is not transferable 
to other situations, because it is impossible to produce 
a controlled situation.
Thus Cohen and March's computer simulations, because they 
are repeatable, (within the computer), can only be 
approximations to real situations. However, if these
allowances are made, then there is no reason why computer 
simulations cannot make a useful contribution. The key 
consideration is to be aware of the importance of time. 
For instance, when Cohen and March consider the idea of 
'work load', it could be argued that is linked to time, 
in as much as load is dependent on the choices having
to be made within a certain time.
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Organisational Participation.
Another similarity with G r e e n f i e l d ’s ideas is the 
importance of organisational participation. Greenfield 
criticises systems theory in this respect:
’’The common view in organization studies holds 
that people occupy organizations in somewhat 
the same way as they inhabit houses. The tenants 
may change but, apart from wear and tear, the 
basic structure remains and in some way shapes 
the behaviour of people within".
(Greenfield in Hughes (Ed) 1975 p72)
Cohen and March consider one of the features of the 
'Garbage C a n ’ process is fluid participation, which has 
a considerable effect on the organisation:
"The participants in the organization vary among 
themselves in the amount of time and effort
they devote to the organization; individual
participants vary from one time to another.
As a result, standard theories of power and 
choice seem to be inadequate; and the boundaries 
of the organization appear to be uncertain and 
c h a n g i n g " .
(Cohen and March 1986 p3)
However, it is possible to detect a difference in 
philosophy in relation to the question of participants
and their relations to the organisation. The quote from
Cohen and March indicates that an organisation has a 
boundary, even if it is unclear and moving, but Greenfield, 
in his paper, "Environment as Subjective Reali t y " (1983) , 
implies that the ideas of organisational boundaries, 
presumably, either with other organisations or the 
environment, is a fiction, like the concept, 'organisation' 
i t s e l f .
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For instance, Greenfield states:
"Environment is simply more people grouped in 
more organisations".
(Greenfield 1983 p54)
implying, presumably, that there is no difference between 
organisation / organisation boundary and organisation
/ environment boundary. Earlier, Greenfield had stated:
"For the most part when people in organisations 
relate to the world about them, they are not
dealing with a cohesive and objective force 
called the environment but with more people
in other organisations".
(Greenfield 1983 p38)
inferring then, that in all situations, it is individuals 
interacting with individuals.
However, in Cohen and March's case, it appears that the 
boundaries between organisations are real, even if they 
are difficult to detect, because of the behaviour of
organisational participants. Therefore, under Cohen and 
March's philosophy, presumably the individuals of the 
organisation are perceived as crossing real boundaries, 
as they go from working for an organisation to not working 
for it, or possibly, transferring effort to another 
organisation.
These individuals, under the subjective approach, would 
be merely acting out their subjective reality, and so, 
whilst they might perceive an organisational boundary, 
in fact, no natural change in their actual being has taken 
place, even though they may perceive their efforts as 
being applied in a different direction.
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So, while participants may be important in both 
Gr e e n f i e l d ’s subjective approach, and the 'Garbage C a n 1 
models of Cohen and March, there is certainly a difference 
of emphasis, and, probably, an underlying difference in 
philosophical orientation.
The Location Of Ambiguity Models By Various Writers,
The difficulty of classifying ambiguity models is reflected 
in the different placings of such models by writers within 
educational administration and organisational theory. 
In the next few pages, an attempt will be made to analyse 
these placings.
Ambiguity Models as Systems Approaches.
Ribbins, in his article, "Organisation Theory and the
Study of Educational Institutions", in "Managing Education" 
(1985), places loose coupling amongst systems models.
His first category is, "Consensus assumed, (Systems theory 
'open' 'closed' loosely coupled)", which is to be
contrasted with subjective models, and the conflict models 
such as Marxian Critical Theory.
In a similar way, Morgan, in "Paradigms, Metaphors, and
Puzzle Solving in Organization T heory"(1980) , places loose 
coupling within his "Functionalist paradigm" under the 
heading of "Social system theory" along with "cybernetic
system", "population-ecology" and "organism".
However, he does imply a departure from the confines of
a simplistic organism theory of organisation, (i.e. the 
parts serve the whole and are functional to it), and a
related emphasis on the mechanistic nature of
144
organisations, where the organisation is seen as a machine 
of related parts. He states:
"These m e t a p h o r s "  (including loose coupling)
....... "create means of seeing organizations
and their functioning in ways which elude the 
traditional mechanical and organismic metaphors.
Yet they can all be used in a functionalist 
manner, generating modes of theorizing based 
upon the assumption that the reality of 
organizational life rests in a network of 
ontologically real relationships, which are 
relatively ordered and cohesive. As a result, 
they may simply develop different approaches 
toward study of a common paradigm".
(Morgan 1980 p616)
It appears that, here, Morgan is stressing the idea that 
loose coupling should be seen in terms of a philosophy 
that regards what happens in organisations as real, and 
not simply perceived as real by the participants, a point 
highlighted earlier. He continues:
"The cybernetic, loosely-coupled system, and 
population-ecology metaphors all have their
roots in the natural sciences, and all in one 
way or another emphasize the idea that
organizations can be seen as adaptive systems".
(Morgan 1980 p616)
The cybernetic metaphor, with its emphasis on learning 
processes through negative feedback, can be seen as an 
adaptive response to the circumstances of the organisation, 
and possibly, the population-ecology metaphor, which Morgan 
s a y s :
"...emphasizes the importance of focusing upon 
competition and selection in populations of 
organizations"
(Morgan 1980 p615)
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can also be seen as adaptive with ideas of competition
and selection. It is questionable whether loose coupled 
systems can be seen in this light. Adaptation may be
easier at sub-organisational level because of the smaller 
size of the unit concerned. However, the loose coupling
between the elements in the organisation could make it
more difficult for overall larger adaptation to occur 
in an organisation that was regarded as loosely coupled. 
Weick states, for instance:
"...that a loosely coupled system may be a good 
system for localized adaptation. If all of 
the elements in a large system are loosely 
coupled to one another, then any one element 
can adjust to and modify a local unique 
contingency without affecting the whole system” .
(Weick 1976 pp6-7)
While Morgan states:
"The metaphor of a loosely coupled s y s t e m ,.....
...specifically attempts to counter the 
assumptions implicit in mechanical and organismic 
metaphors that organizations are tidy, efficient, 
and well-coordinated systems".
(Morgan 1980 p615)
So, if loose coupled organisations are not well 
coordinated, then overall adaptation would, presumably, 
be more difficult. Morgan's claim that loose coupling 
has its roots in the natural sciences would, however, 
agree with the idea that organisations are real, and so 
cannot be placed within Greenfield's subjective approach.
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Ambiguity Models and a Political Approach.
Sander and Wiggins, in "Cultural Context of Administration 
Theory: In Consideration of a Multidimensional
P a r a d i g m " (1985), place Weick's loose coupling concept
in a potentially political framework.
To appreciate this stance it is necessary to consider, 
briefly, the overall multidimensional paradigm of 
educational administration that the authors construct. 
Sander and Wiggins consider four paradigms of educational 
administration. Firstly, administration for efficiency, 
which they link to the classical approaches of Fayol, 
Weber and Taylor. Secondly, administration for 
effectiveness, which they link to the work of Barnard. 
Thirdly, administration for responsiveness, which is 
considered to have the political dimension, and forms 
the category into which loose coupling falls, and finally, 
administration for relevance, which appears to contain 
the subjective approaches, which initially appear to be 
separated from the ambiguity model of loose coupling. 
Sander and Wiggins state:
"These four paradigms are defined using the 
four criteria that have historically been adapted 
to evaluate and guide the performance of
administrative acts: efficiency, effectiveness,
responsiveness, and relevance".
(Sander and Wiggins 1985 p98)
Later, the concept, 'responsiveness' is related to a 
political dimension. The authors state:
"The concept of responsiveness presupposes a 
real and true commitment to the social objectives 
and political demands of the community, including 
its educational system. The materialization
of this commitment demands an even greater 
concrete obligation on the part of the
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administration to the life of the community 
through a philosophy of solidarity and a
participatory methodology".
(Sander and Wiggins 1985 pl02)
It is this participatory methodology, through which the 
responsiveness is supposed to operate, that apparently 
enables tight coupled organisations to be uncoupled. 
The inference is that administrators adapting a responsive 
strategy are producing a loose coupled organisation. 
This would imply that if they adopted other less responsive 
strategies, the organisation would remain tightly coupled. 
This does not agree with the idea that loose coupled 
organisations are a fact. In other words, something the 
administrator within education has to cope with, not 
something he can choose to create at will. The ambiguity 
model ideas of ill defined goals and unclear technology 
would support the idea that educational administrators 
do not have the ability to create a tighter system if 
they wished to do so. Sander and Wiggins point to Weick's 
idea, that:
"Open systems, characterized as loosely coupled 
systems, in reality contain elements that range 
from interrelated to reasonably autonomous 
components".
(Sander and Wiggins 1985 pl02)
The idea that educational systems may contain tightly 
coupled events, as well as loosely coupled events, does 
not imply that administrators can decide into which 
categories to put the events. Weick describes the problems 
of identifying loose coupled events:
"...if one goes into an organization and watches 
which parts affect which other parts, he or 
she will see the tightly coupled parts and the
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parts that vary the most. Those parts which 
vary slightly, infrequently, and aperiodically 
will be less visible11.
(Weick 1976 p9)
However, Sander and Wiggins do make it clear that the 
concept, R e s p o n s i v e n e s s '  has been used in different ways:
"To describe the degree of the political 
commitment of educational administration, some 
authors employ the concept of relevance instead 
of responsiveness. However, for the purposes 
of this discussion, responsiveness is conceived 
within a political perspective and relevance 
is reserved for use within a cultural perspective 
as will be developed in the next section".
(Sander and Wiggins 1985 pl02)
Their cultural perspective can be seen to have subjective 
implications in the concepts of meaning and perception, 
and interpretation of individuals, (subjects?), which 
they relate to the quality of human life.
However, when Sander and Wiggins do develop the concept, 
'relevance', within their cultural perspective, there 
is an implication that political approaches could also 
be categorised within the cultural perspective.
The authors tie up a subjective approach, concerned with 
the individual, and a collective political approach. 
There are parallels here with the approach of neo-Marxists 
within the 'new' sociology of education, who used 
subjective approaches to justify a Marxist political 
approach, (the concern of Sections 3. and 4.). It is 
possible, then, that loose coupling could find its way 
into Sander and Wiggins'; 'subjective (cultural) approach'.
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Ambiguity Models and a Subjective Approach.
Bolman and Deal, in "Modern Approaches to Understanding 
and Managing Organizations"(1984), place ambiguity models 
in their symbolic approach, which appears to resemble 
most closely the subjective approach of Greenfield. For 
instance, they consider that it is distinct from their 
other main approaches, the structural frame, the human 
resource frame and the political frame, because it does 
not emphasise rationality. Also, their symbolic approach 
has an emphasis on meaning for the individual:
"The meaning of an event is determined not simply 
by what happened but by the ways that humans 
interpret what happened".
(Bolman and Deal 1984 pl50)
This statement indicates an interpretive, (subjective?) 
approach, and yet, in the next statement, this is clearly 
allied to an ambiguity model:
"Many of the most significant events and
processes in organizations are substantially 
ambiguous or uncertain".
(Bolman and Deal 1984 pl50)
The link comes through the ideas that such an approach 
evokes myths, rituals and ceremonies within organisations. 
The authors even see a connection with anthropology:
"Myths, rituals, and ceremonies are often seen 
as the province of theologians, anthropologists, 
mystics, and clergy, but those concepts are 
now being applied to secular organizations".
(Bolman and Deal 1984 pl51)
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However, it is perhaps in this respect, that the departure 
from Greenfield's subjective model is more clear, because 
Bolman and Deal imply that myths can mask the subjective 
reality of the individual:
"Myths keep us sane - but also dampen our 
curiosity, distort our images, and misdirect 
our attention".
(Bolman and Deal 1984 pl54)
This would indicate that myths are a first step along 
the road to imposition of meaning. If myths "dampen our 
curiosity", and "misdirect our attention", then this would 
certainly make it easier to impose meanings on the 
individual, and if our images are distorted, are we not 
moving in the direction of false consciousness? (One 
uses the term without confining it to the Marxist notion 
of class consciousness, as discussed in Section 4.)
Greenfield emphasises the integrity of the subject, for 
instance, he states:
"...social reality may be construed as images 
in the mind of men having no necessary or 
inevitable forms except as man creates them 
and endows them with reality and authority".
(Greenfield in Hughes (Ed) 1975 p76)
This implies that each individual creates his or her own 
image and any distortion can only come from within the 
self, and cannot be imposed by an external myth, which 
is a social invention.
Also, in his 1979 paper, "Organization Theory as Ideology", 
Greenfield quotes Weber in a way that reinforces this 
position:
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"Interpretive sociology considers the individual 
and his action as the basic unit, as its
'atom'........ In this approach, the individual
is also the upper limit and the sole carrier 
of meaningful conduct".
(Weber in Greenfield 1979 pl02)
The interpretation of myths that Bolman and Deal provide 
could be linked to B a t e s 1 consideration of myths in 
Critical Theory. When considering the role of myths in 
educational administration Bates states:
"Any adequate theory or effective practice of 
educational administration must necessarily, 
therefore, be concerned with the nature of the 
myths that guide the organisational life of 
schools and with the characteristics of 
interpersonal life through which such myths 
are perpetuated and negotiated".
(Bates 1982 pl4)
There is a clear indication that myths can be controlling 
in the statement, "guide the organisational life of
schools". So the myths that are supposed to enable
individuals to cope with ambiguity can be seen, ironically,
to lead to less understanding, in the subjective sense, 
and possibly, ultimately, to the imposition of meanings.
Philosophically, Bolman and Deal adopt a stance allied 
to the idea that organisations are real and so, in a sense, 
place subjective approaches within the philosophical camp 
of the ambiguity approach.
In combining subjective approaches with ambiguity models 
Bolman and Deal appear to have placed subjective approaches 
within the realm that, it has been argued previously, 
would normally be occupied by ambiguity and systems
perspectives; the philosophical point of view that implies
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that organisations are real. This can be seen in the 
following statement:
T,The symbolic frame is most applicable in 
organizations with unclear goals and uncertain 
t e c h n o logies".
(Bolman and Deal 1984 pl50)
The idea again is that organisations have goals, even 
if they are difficult to detect. It thus appears that 
Bolman and Deal's symbolic frame is not really allied 
to Greenfield's subjective stance and it is this fact 
that has made it possible to include ambiguity models 
within such a framework.
Ambiguity Models as a Separate Category.
Bush, in "Theories of Educational Mana g e m e n t "(1986), places 
ambiguity models in a separate category. This is obviously 
a safe response because it overcomes many of the problems 
discussed so far. He classifies his "models of educational 
management" into five categories, namely, Formal, 
Democratic, Political, Subjective and Ambiguity. His 
justification for this categorisation is the usefulness 
of theories within a British context.
However, when Bush criticises ambiguity models he adopts 
what Greenfield would probably regard as a systems 
perspective, because he adopts a philosophy which assumes 
that organisations, their boundaries and their 
environments, are real. For instance, Bush states:
"Ambiguity models are not suited to stable 
organizations or to any institutions during
periods of s t a b i l i t y  Where institutions
are able to maintain relatively impervious 
boundaries they can exert strong control over
153
their own activities and processes".
(Bush 1986 pi23)
and later:
"The ambiguity perspective is relevant to those 
institutions which are subject to changes imposed 
by an increasingly turbulent environment".
(Bush 1986 pi23)
These statements indicate that Bush is using the concepts, 
’o r g a n i s a t i o n 1, ’b o u n d a r y ’, and ’environment' in an 
unproblematic way, irrespective of whether he is discussing 
conditions of relative stability, or turbulent periods. 
Another of his criticisms is that:
"Ambiguity models offer little practical guidance 
to leaders in educational institutions".
(Bush 1986 pl23) 
and later:
"While formal models emphasize the head's leading 
role in policy-making and democratic models 
stress the importance of team work, ambiguity 
models can offer nothing more tangible than 
unobtrusive management".
(Bush 1986 pl24)
The implication being that a model of educational 
management should enable educational administrators to 
be able to change their organisation.
The fact that ambiguity models do not provide this service, 
could be a case for philosophically including them within 
subjective models. Greenfield is highly critical of ideas 
that organisational theory should propose the way in which
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organisations can be changed.
In their "Preface to the Second Edition", of "Leadership 
and Ambiguity, The American College President", dated 
1986, Cohen and March assess their caution over the 
question of the failure of their 'Garbage Can* model, 
to provide guidance for leaders. They imply that the 
requirements of diffuse unclear technology and unclear 
goals bring out the best in administrators, requiring 
them to become flexible and cunning, as they grapple with 
the organised anarchy. However, there is a human side 
to their stance:
"...we believe that effective top executives 
are heroic; but their heroism lies not in their 
ability to lead their institutions to a pre­
chosen destiny, nor in their responsibility 
for the major successes and failures realized 
by their institutions, but in their willingness 
to try to do better in a world where neither 
the meaning of ’better* nor the route to its 
realization is clear".
(Cohen and March 1986 pXVII)
(Preface to the Second Edition)
This statement moves closer towards Greenfield's stance 
with an acknowledgement of the problematic nature of the 
word, 'better'. The evaluative nature of concepts of 
'good' and 'better', linked as they are to the idea of 
producing the 'right' consequences, are considered by 
Greenfield, in his 1986 paper, "The Decline and Fall of 
Science in Educational Administration".
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He states, when considering the "science of organisation":
"Such science takes sides in conflicts about 
the rightness of organizational purposes and 
about appropriate means for achieving them, 
but it denies it takes sides and claims to look 
dispassionately at such reality".
(Greenfield 1986 p63)
In an accompanying "Comment" article to this paper, Mark 
Holmes considers that Greenfield writes at the level of 
knowledge and theory, rather than being concerned with 
value judgements. In contrast, Holmes considers that 
there should be some concept of good values that should 
be encouraged in educational administration.
Yet, one of the strengths of Greenfield's stance is that 
it does not impose values or meaning. The imposition 
of meanings was considered earlier, (in Section 3.), in 
the development of the 'new' sociology of education and 
was seen as a departure from Greenfield's position. A 
phenomenological stance would normally respect that each 
individual is responsible for creating his own social 
reality, and, therefore, forming his own value position.
Cohen and March's implication that it is problematic to 
consider what might be better, and how a route to it may 
be achieved, does, on this point, appear to be in agreement 
with Greenfield's subjective approach.
This more recent writing of Cohen and March, in their 
preface to the second edition of "Leadership and Ambiguity", 
could indicate a move away from the philosophical concerns 
of real organisations, towards a subjective approach as 
they revaluate their work. However, they do indicate 
that they consider their original (1974) work to be 
basically sound.
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A Structuralist Approach to Loose Coupling.
There is an approach, however, that provides a perspective 
where the philosophical location of ambiguity models could 
be settled by an appeal to their historical foundations.
William Tyler, in his paper, "Loosely Coupled Schools: 
a structuralist critique"(1987), is highly critical of 
the way Weick's concept, ’loose coupling' has been taken 
up by the subjective school, and implies that the concept 
should be seen as having emerged from a functionalist 
perspective. In the abstract to his paper, he states:
"The ascendant model of the school in the 
specialist administrative and organisational 
literature is the 'loosely coupled' system.
There are, however, ambiguities in the way this
model has been a p p l i e d , ........The irony that
a model which derives from biological and 
cybernetic thinking should become a tool of 
demystification of orthodox functional theory
is interesting in itself and perhaps points 
to a major conceptual weakness in its formulation 
and application".
(Tyler 1987 p313)
Tyler reinforces the validity of Morgan's thinking that
loose coupling can be seen as allied to a cybernetic 
approach, and, as such, must be seen as a development
of systems theory. He is critical of the way the approach
has been transferred to a conflict individualistic 
perspective, (subjective?), and also at attempts to 
assimilate both the systems and conflict paradigms, which 
he considers have lost the 'promise' that the loosely
coupled models provide.
This structuralist approach is interesting because it 
draws on Bernstein's ideas of 'collective' and 'integrated' 
codes, and 'weak' and 'tight' boundary maintenance • Tyler
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sees a link with Weick's idea of tight coupling and loose 
c o u p l i n g .
The move from closed classrooms to open work areas he 
allies to the ideas of a move from loose coupling to tight 
coupling, by stating:
"We may, for example, readily identify the 
insulated units of the loosely coupled school 
with an institution patterned according to the 
principle of the ’collection c o d e ’. We may 
also, by corollary, equate the 'tightly c o u p l e d 1 
informal school, with its open plan and lateral 
lines of communication and personalised systems 
of surveillance, with that of the ’integrated 
code 1” .
Tyler 1987 p320)
Within a British context, the statement conflicts with
the fact that there have been more moves to open plan
types of classroom structure in the primary school. Yet,
it is usually the larger secondary school which is often 
regarded as more closely resembling the loose coupling 
of the ambiguity models, because its size makes it more 
likely to have units which are only loosely attached to
each other. Bush considers, for instance:
’’Teachers are expected to be responsive to the 
perceived needs of their pupils rather than 
operating under the direct supervision of 
hierarchical s u p e r o r d i n a t e s . The requirement 
that professionals make individual judgements, 
and do not necessarily act in accordance with 
managerial prescriptions, leads on to the view 
that the larger schools and colleges are 
correctly portrayed as ana r c h i e s ” .
(Bush 1986 pill)
Some answer to this comes from T y l e r ’s distinction between
tight coupling in the administrative side of schooling,
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and loose coupling between it and the professional teaching 
work that is done in the schools. His structuralist 
critique does, however, imply a power base that operates 
through certification and financial control down to the 
teaching level.
T y l e r fs paper is interesting from the point of view that 
it, again, brings together educational administration 
and sociology of education. He states, for instance:
"A less desirable effect of the fragmentation 
of the field of sociology of education in recent 
years has been the loss of the direction of 
the classical concerns in the area of school 
organisation. On the one hand there is the 
literature of organisation theory which, apart 
from a few dissident voices (Greenfield, 1980; 
Bates, 1982), has remained faithful to a 
functionalist, organismic model of the school.
On the other, the burgeoning critical literature 
of schooling (Apple, 1983; Giroux, 1981) has 
generally shown nothing but contempt for what 
is seen as the conservative, reifying and control 
- oriented tendencies of the regulative model".
(Tyler 1987 p313)
It is clear that he wishes to maintain a perspective that 
applies structuralist techniques while not following the 
limited structuralist neo-Marxist approach of the Critical 
Theorists. It should be realised though, that B e r n s t e i n ’s 
codes, on which he draws in this paper, appeared in 
"Knowledge and Control", the 'new directions' for the 
sociology of education, that, (as it was shown in Sections 
3. and 4.), led to the development of neo-Marxist 
per s p e c t i v e s .
Tyler's structuralist approach can, perhaps, be used to 
remind us of the fact that loose coupling and the ambiguity 
model ideas can over stress the 'organised anarchy* idea 
of educational institutions. As Weick says:
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"...despite variations in class size, format, 
locations, and architecture, the results are 
still recognized and can be labeled 'schools’ .
How can such loose assemblages retain sufficient 
similarity and permanence across time that they 
can be recognized, labeled, and dealt with?".
(Weick 1976 p2)
The subjective response to this would be that, although 
we recognise schools for what they are, this is a 
subjective reality, and the consensus in individual 
interpretations of schools may be more apparent than real. 
The way Tyler has been able to use the loose coupling 
concept for his structuralist approach must indicate, 
yet again, that loose coupling is philosophically distinct 
from a subjective approach.
The question of organisation or disorganisation within, 
for instance, a school, does not undermine the fact that 
individuals may interpret the perceived amount of 
organisation/disorganisation in different ways.
Concluding Comments.
The relationship between ambiguity models and the 
subjective approach of Greenfield, while complex, is 
critically important to the analysis of Greenfield's 'new 
perspe c t i v e '.
The 'Garbage Can* model of Cohen, March and Olsen and 
the 'loose coupling' ideas, within educational 
organisations, suggested by Weick, both find affinity 
with Greenfield's approach in the way they question the 
stress on order and consensus, which is characteristic 
of a functional systems perspective.
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However, this similarity cannot be allowed to blind 
researchers to the fundamental differences of philosophical 
orientation, between ambiguity models and the subjective 
approach of Greenfield.
Ambiguity models fail to treat the concept, 'organisation1
as problematic. Within the models, organisations are
treated as 'real1, in the sense that they unquestionably 
exist as entities, which can react to their environments 
and develop their own goals and strategies.
Under the 'Garbage Can' model, these goals are presented 
as diffuse and difficult to detect, but the implication 
is that they exist, and the problem for researchers becomes 
the developing of techniques to detect them. Greenfield, 
as indicated in this section, does use the term 'goal',
but only in reference to the individual subject. In other 
words, only a subject can have a goal. Greenfield, may 
acknowledge that individuals perceive organisations to 
exist, but the 'true' goals are those of individuals within 
the subjective reality of the perceived organisation.
Weick implies that loose coupling involves the meanings 
of individuals, in as much as individuals within an
organisation, faced with loosely coupled systems, may 
try to evoke subjective perceptions of meaning in order 
to cope with the lack of order and authoritative 
structures, that the ambiguity model suggests. It is 
problematic, however, as to whether this negotiation of 
meanings is a conscious process. It is more likely that 
any such construction of subjective meanings is a 
sub-conscious process to cope with the demands of the 
loose coupling within the organisation. The individual 
may well perceive such negotiations as functional to the 
organisation, as an attempt to clarify the structure of 
the organisation and his or her place within it.
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Weick's concept, 'loose coupling' does, however, find 
sympathies within educational administration. The idea 
that educational organisations are often loosely linked 
is in agreement with the idea that, in schools, teachers 
have much professional autonomy, much freedom to manoeuvre 
in their daily classroom lives and yet, at the same time, 
there can be tight coupling with certain aspects, such 
as funding and certification.
The 'Garbage Can' model of Cohen, March and Olsen also 
displays much that receives a sympathetic ear within 
educational administration especially when larger 
educational institutions, like secondary schools and 
colleges, are considered. Indeed, the model was developed 
within the context of American colleges, and the role 
the president played within each college.
The idea of diffuse goals and unclear technology resembles 
well the way in which such institutions operate, while 
the concept that problems are rarely resolved, but are 
circumvented in processes of 'flight* and 'oversight', 
so that choices are made without dealing with underlying 
problems, resembles well ideas of crises management, where 
survival is the main criterion. The 'Garbage Can' model 
suggests that some problems do not need to be resolved 
because they leave a 'choice opportunity' (a time when 
decisions can be made), before the moment of decision. 
This is when 'flight' has occurred to avoid the necessity 
of having to solve a 'problem*.
Under the concept, 'oversight' a choice is made before 
the problem has manifested itself, which, while making 
the decision easier for the administrator, does not 
necessarily mean that the problem will have no affect 
on the post-decision situation, as presumably, the name
162
’oversight* implies.
In the ’Garbage C a n ’ model, a ’p r o b l e m ’ is best defined 
as "something that prevents decisions being made!" Cohen 
and March explain, in "Leadership and Ambiguity: The
American College P r e sident"(1986) , that problems are the
concerns of people who interact with the organisation. 
They include the distribution of money, status and tasks,
and other relations between individuals, both within the 
groups of the organisation and with their own families.
When 'problems' are resolved then 'solutions' have been 
found, although these are rare events under the 'Garbage 
Can' model, where individual 'choices' are often made 
through 'flight' or 'oversight', within the terms of the
m o d e l .
'Solutions' are considered to exist, but often remain 
unattached to the corresponding 'problems'. The 'Garbage 
Cans' are 'choice opportunities', where both 'problems' 
and 'solutions' are 'dumped', but often the 'problems' 
and their corresponding 'solutions', are in different 
'Garbage Cans', and are 'dumped' and removed at different 
points of time, such that the speed of 'dumping' and
removing, is considered to be an important factor.
One of the main problems with the model, is the reliance 
on precise meanings of words like 'choice', 'problem', 
'decision', 'resolved' and 'solution'. These tend to 
make the model rather artificial and analytical.
From a subjective point of view, the model could be 
criticised because individuals may interpret these words 
in different ways. What is seen as a problem by one 
individual may not be seen in the same light by another. 
The precise definition of the word 'problem', in the model,
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indicates a philosophical link with systems approaches, 
as it could be argued that p r o b l e m s '  are treated as 
' r e a l ' , external to the individual who perceives the 
p r o b l e m .
The 'Garbage C a n 1 model is seen as appropriate to large 
educational organisations because of the property of 
'organised anarchy' which Cohen, March and Olsen consider 
to exist within their institutions. The term 'organised 
anarchy', however, appears to be a contradiction. While 
'anarchy' implies the break down of law and order, the 
term 'organisation' indicates, certainly under a systems 
perspective, an ordered system of parts, that serve the 
whole. The term 'organised anarchy', presumably, tries 
to reflect the loose ties that exist under conditions 
of ambiguity within organisations, thus providing links 
between 'Garbage Can' models and Weick's concept, 'loose 
c o u p l i n g ' .
However, as indicated earlier, Weick reminds us that, 
despite loose coupling and ambiguity, schools can still 
be recognised as schools. Also, the amount of 
organisation/disorganisation, that the ambiguity models 
imply, does not undermine the subjective stance, that 
the amount of organisation/disorganisation is a subjective 
reality, perceived by individuals, who may, indeed, 
perceive the dichotomy organisation/disorganisation in 
different ways, and at different levels.
The fact that ambiguity models evoke sympathies with 
subjective approaches, with the stress on lack of consensus 
and order, and yet, at the same time, display different 
philosophical positions over the nature of organisational 
concepts, like 'goals', helps to explain the difficulty 
of locating the relation of ambiguity models to other 
a p p r o a c h e s .
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As this section indicates, various writers have placed 
the models within systems, political, symbolic and 
structural perspectives, while Bush sees them as a separate 
category in their own right.
From the considerations of this section, it would appear 
that Greenfield would not see ’Garbage Can* models and 
loose coupling as part of his subjective approach, because 
they fail to treat concepts such as ’organis a t i o n ’, 'goal', 
and 'environment' as subjective realities, as indicated 
e a r l i e r .
Griffiths, on the other hand, has much sympathy with these 
models, because they help provide different ways of seeing 
organisations, and stress the conflict which he has 
experienced in his own work as an educational 
a d m i n i s t r a t o r .
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SECTION 7.
THE RELATIONSHIP OF G R E E N F I E L D fS "NEW PERSPECTIVE”
TO THE CONCEPTS OF PARADIGM, PARADIGM SHIFT
AND PARADIGM DIVERSITY.
In this section an attempt will be made to consider 
Greenfield's subjective approach in relation to the word 
1 paradigm *.
References to paradigm shifts, paradigm diversity and 
multidimensional paradigms, are in evidence in the recent 
literature. For instance, in Boyan's "Handbook of Research 
on Educational Administration” (1988), Culbertson,
Griffiths, Hughes, Everhart and Willower address the 
concept of the paradigm. It is curious, though, that 
none of these contributors actually refer to Greenfield's 
approach as a paradigm. It is possible to infer that 
the introduction of Greenfield's approach at the 1974 
IIP Conference marked the beginning of a period of paradigm 
diversity, and therefore, that G r e e n f i e l d ’s approach is 
a paradigm, but this does not appear to be made explicit.
Greenfield, in his 1975 paper, uses the word 'perspective1 
and this is the term Hughes uses to refer to Greenfield's 
contribution. He states:
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"At the 1974 IIP, Greenfield (1975) proposed 
a more fundamental change of perspective that 
challenged the assumptions of
structural-functional and natural-systems
theory” .
(Hughes in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p669)
One Paradigm or Many?
In his conclusion he implies that, if there was a paradigm, 
it would have to be overarching for all perspectives. 
He states:
"It is natural and inevitable that conflicting 
perspectives in the discipline of educational 
administration, whether viewed as turmoil or 
as ferment, should be reflected in the 
sub-discipline, and nothing would be gained 
by seeking to impose a single methodology, 
theoretical framework, or ideology on the 
comparative study of educational administration.
The variety and richness of the data available, 
as an international dimension is introduced 
into research, make it unlikely that an agreed- 
on orthodoxy of method or paradigm would be 
other than stultifying".
(Hughes in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p671)
Willower's use, in his contributions, of the concept, 
'paradigm s h i f t 1 also implies that there can only be one 
paradigm. He is critical of the idea of paradigm shift 
but, it could be argued, that if there has been a paradigm 
shift in educational administration, then this implies 
that there is a paradigm that has moved to a new position, 
not that multi-paradigms have been produced. Willower 
s t a t e s :
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"A word that is used over and over in many of 
the chapters is the word paradigm; its accessory 
is, of course, the term paradigm shift” .
(Willower in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p743)
In spite of Willower's statement the term 'paradigm s h i f t 1 
does not appear frequently in the other a u t h o r s 1 
contributions to the "Handbook” that have been listed
earlier. Culbertson,in his chapter does mention shifting 
n o r m s :
"...scholarship has incessantly responded to 
the shifting norms of the diverse communities 
to which professors of educational administration 
are linked".
(Culbertson in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p23)
G r e e n f i e l d ’s Stance: The Problems of Paradigmatic 
Classification.
Griffiths in his contribution to the 'Handbook1, places
Greenfield in Burrell and Morgan's antiorganizational 
theory paradigm but it is noticeable that he does not 
use the word 'paradigm' when specifically referring to 
G r e e n f i e l d .
He is also critical of Burrell and Morgan's use of the 
antiorganization theory paradigm because he claims that 
it is a stance of criticism, not of construction, in 
educational administration. Yet, an examination of 
Morgan's paper, "Paradigms, Metaphors and Puzzle 
S o l v i n g " (1980), indicates that it is his interpretive
paradigm, and not his radical humanist paradigm, that 
is closer to Greenfield's stance. For instance, on his
interpretive paradigm he states:
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"The interpretive paradigm, on the other hand, 
is based upon the view that the social world 
has a very precarious ontological status, and 
that what passes as social reality does not 
exist in any concrete sense, but is the product 
of the subjective and inter-subjective experience 
of individuals".
(Morgan 1980 p608)
While on his radical humanist paradigm, he states:
"The radical humanist is concerned with
discovering how humans can link thought and 
action (praxis) as a means of transcending their 
a l i e n a t i o n " .
(Morgan 1980 p609)
This sounds more like Critical Theory than G r e e n f i e l d ’s 
subjective stance. However, Griffiths does at least
indirectly link Greenfield's stance to a concept of
p a r a d i g m .
This is not the case with Everhart, who suggests that 
there was a period of critical consciousness brought about 
by the work of Greenfield:
"The early 1970's, however, witnessed a departure 
from logical positivism and began what Gibson 
(1979) calls a period of "critical 
consciousness". The departure started with 
Greenfield's (1975, 1986) contention that the 
Theory Movement was now a Procrustean bed into 
which "the facts" were forced".
(Everhart in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p709)
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K u h n fs Scientific Notion of a Paradigm.
This failure to link G r e e n f i e l d ’s approach with a paradigm 
would be in agreement with Kuhn's scientific notion of 
a paradigm. Kuhn discusses the idea, in the natural 
sciences, of how one paradigm after a period of crises 
or turmoil is replaced with another, which must, somehow, 
incorporate the puzzle solving abilities of the earlier 
paradigm. Kuhn states:
’’...once it has achieved the status of paradigm, 
a scientific theory is declared invalid only 
if an alternate candidate is available to take 
its place....The decision to reject one paradigm 
is always simultaneously the decision to accept 
another” .
(Kuhn 1962 p77)
The point is, though, that at any time there can only 
be one paradigm as, it could be argued, that the new 
paradigm displaces the old. The concept, 'paradigm 
diversity' in educational administration implies that 
there can be many competing paradigms.
This is the position advocated by Morgan with his structure 
of four paradigms; the Radical Humanist, the Radical 
Structuralist, the Interpretive and the Functionalist.
One Multi-dimensional Paradigm?
The point is, though, that such attempts to relate and 
interlock paradigms, as he does, could be seen simply 
as an attempt to produce one overarching paradigm. Morgan 
s t a t e s :
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"Each of these four paradigms - functionalist, 
interpretive, r a d i cal-humanist, and radical- 
structuralist - reflects a network of related 
schools of thought, differentiated in approach 
and perspective, but sharing common fundamental 
assumptions about the nature of reality that 
they address".
(Morgan 1980 pp607-608)
This is similar to the way Kuhn describes how, in the 
natural sciences, during a period of normal science, the 
scientist attempts to accommodate all facts into the 
prevailing paradigm and that, where anomalies are 
discovered, much effort is directed to making them fit 
the prevailing paradigm. It could be argued that Morgan 
is attempting to force the conflicting perspectives, that 
he interprets to be in existence, into one overarching 
p a r a d i g m .
Such ideas appear to be occurring, in a much more open 
way, in Sander and Wiggins concept of a multi-dimensional 
paradigm for educational administration. They, first 
of all, talk about four paradigms for educational 
administration:
"...it is possible to define four different 
paradigms of educational administration: (1)
administration for efficiency, (2) administration 
for effectiveness, (3) administration for
responsiveness, and (4) administration for
relevance".
(Sander and Wiggins 1985 p98)
However, later, these are apparently, able to be combined 
into a multi-dimensional paradigm:
"However, the four paradigms are heuristic 
elaborations and, as such, may not exist in 
pure form in real life. In this perspective,
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there arises a second solution that concerns 
itself with the conceptualization of a new 
paradigm through a theoretical synthesis of 
practice in educational administration. In 
fact, this integrating synthesis would constitute 
a global paradigm, based on the analysis of 
the similarities and contradictions among the 
four paradigms".
(Sander and Wiggins 1985 ppl05-106)
So Sander and Wiggins appear to be willing to talk about 
individual paradigms which can be combined into an overall 
paradigm, with linking components. This further 
complicates the idea of paradigm diversity and, it could 
be argued, shows how educational administration is 
attempting to follow the natural science path of
accommodating anomalous ideas into a prevailing structure. 
Both Morgan, and Sander and Wiggins, construct elaborate 
interlocking designs for their paradigms which could 
indicate that they are adopting mathematical scientific 
concepts in order to integrate their paradigms. It would 
appear that a scientific approach is being used to 
accommodate paradigms like Morgan's radical humanist, 
(which Griffiths relates to Greenfield), or his
interpretive (which, as has been indicated earlier, could 
be regarded as an alternative link to Greenfield), and 
the administration for relevance of Sander and Wiggins 
which appears to represent the subjectivist, interpretive 
approaches that are regarded as criticising scientific
methods in educational administration.
Is a Scientific Concept of Paradigm Applicable to 
Educational Administration?
This raises the whole question of whether a concept like 
paradigm, that has been developed in respect to the natural 
sciences, should be taken up by social scientists and
applied in their fields.
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Willower, in his contribution in the 'Handbook' states
t h a t :
"As is well known, the meaning of paradigm in 
Greek was "pattern, example, or model." However, 
the word has been commonly used in the social 
sciences to refer to a theory, as when 
P a r s o n s .... discussed his "four-function
paradigm," or to a codified presentation of 
the main problems, concepts, and relationships 
in a given theory or area of study".
(Willower in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p743)
Greenfield's 'new p e r s p e c t i v e 1 is probably not a theory
as such, since it does not produce an ordered set of 
concepts and ideas. Neither can it be regarded as a 
codified presentation of problems and concepts, as, while 
Greenfield does consider problems with the existing 
concepts of the fNew M o v e m e n t 1, and systems approaches 
in general, he does not present new concepts that can 
be integrated into relations with his area of study, which 
could be regarded as the subjective concerns of the human 
consciousness. In the last section, it was suggested 
that Greenfield's perspective is really a different
philosophical orientation to that provided by systems 
theory and, in this respect, is different from many other 
approaches e.g. ambiguity, political and democratic, where 
concepts of the 'realness1 of theory like goals,
environments and organisations are regarded as real, even
if they are difficult to understand, or predict, because 
of their diffuse unclear nature, as in the ambiguity 
s t a n c e .
Masterman's Classification of Natural Science Paradigms.
However, this concept of a philosophical orientation is 
covered within Kuhn's concepts of paradigm. Margaret
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Masterman in her article, 'The Nature of a P a r a d i g m 1 
identifies twenty one different ways in which Kuhn uses 
the term. However, she considers that it is possible 
to classify them into three main groupings. First, there 
are the metaphysical paradigms, which she considers to 
be philosophical in nature. This seems to be close to 
what Greenfield is providing with his 'new p e r s p e c t i v e 1:
"Kuhn's second main sense of 'paradigm', however, 
which is given by another group of uses, is 
a sociological sense. Thus he defines 'paradigm' 
as a universally recognized scientific 
a c h ievement” .
(Masterman in Lakatos and Musgrave (Eds.) 1970 
p65)
Although Masterman refers to this type as sociological 
paradigms, it would seem that their nature is to define 
an acknowledgement of new theory in the natural sciences. 
This would appear to be the way Morgan, and Sander and 
Wiggins, are applying the words in the sense that, it 
could be argued, their work consists of attempts
at theory building with their M o d e l s *  construction of 
paradigms, which attempt to combine the various different 
theoretical and philosophical orientations within 
educational administration. Masterman's third type is 
where Kuhn uses the notion of paradigm in a very specific, 
almost practical way:
"Finally, Kuhn uses 'paradigm' in a more concrete 
way still, as an actual textbook or classic
w o r k  as supplying t o o l s  as actual
instrumentation.... and more psychologically, 
as a gestalt-figure and as an anomalous pack
of c a r d s .......I shall call paradigms of this
last sort artefact paradigms or construct 
p a r a d i g m s " .
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(Masterman in Lakatos and Musgrave (Eds.) 1970 
p65 )
Gestalt Switching.
However, this third type of paradigm, could easily be 
linked to Greenfield through the concept of Gestalt 
switching. Kuhn, himself, talks about "ways of seeing":
"...the scientist does not preserve the gestalt 
subject's freedom to switch back and forth 
between ways of seeing. Nevertheless, the switch 
of gestalt, particularly because it is today 
so familiar, is a useful elementary prototype 
for what occurs in full-scale paradigm shift".
(Kuhn 1962 p85)
Greenfield talks about fundamentally different ways of 
looking at social reality:
"The conflicting views on organizations of which 
I have been speaking represent vastly different 
ways of looking at social reality".
(Greenfield in Hughes (Ed.) 1975 p76)
Such ideas have also been used by Gronn and Griffiths 
when referring to the subjective/systems debate:
"In only one place does
h e " ....(Greenfield)...."spell out his a priori 
sense of 'meaning't and he does so in ways 
strikingly reminiscent of the phrase 'ways of 
s e e i n g 1 which has been used already in this 
discussion of his work".
(Gronn 1983 p21)
In relation to Griffiths, Gronn states:
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"But clearly, Griffiths has moved an
extraordinarily long way towards a position 
of self-awareness and self-reflection which 
is in the spirit of Greenfield's own questioning 
and consistent with the Gestalt-switching
terminology referred to earlier (i.e. 'ways 
of seeing')".
(Gronn 1983 p31)
Kuhn implies that in the natural sciences Gestalt switching 
can only be an aid to discovery, an aid to understanding 
the nature of a physical, chemical or biological process 
because, eventually, the scientist has to decide which 
way of seeing is most appropriate for exploring the
phenomena involved. It could be argued that with concepts 
like wave/particle duality the scientist is, in 
contemporary times, content to view light both as a wave 
and as a particle (two ways of seeing) but even here
applicability is important. In certain situations e.g. 
diffraction effects, the wave model is used whereas in
other situations e.g. photoelectric effect, the particle
model is applied. In educational administration, though, 
the tendency is to use different ways of seeing 
simultaneously. For instance, Greenfield's subjective
approach focusing, on the individual's subjective 
interpretation of the organisation, has to be argued, and 
held up, alongside approaches that view the organisation 
as being real, and able to operate independently of the
individual members that comprise it.
Rules and Puzzle Solving Activities.
Another aspect of the concept of paradigm is its relation 
to so called puzzle solving activities. Kuhn considers 
that, when normal science within one paradigm is being 
undertaken, the activity is that of puzzle solving:
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"Bringing a normal research problem to a 
conclusion is achieving the anticipated in a 
new way, and it requires the solution of all 
sorts of complex instrumental, conceptual, and 
mathematical puzzles".
(Kuhn 1962 p36) 
and he claims that:
"A paradigm c a n ,  even insulate the community
from those socially important problems that are 
not reducible to the puzzle form, because they 
cannot be stated in terms of the conceptual 
and instrumental tools the paradigm supplies".
(Kuhn 1962 p37)
Perhaps, it could be claimed that, if Greenfield's approach 
is a paradigm, it insulates the community, (of 
subjectivists), from problems associated with viewing 
organisations as real identities, that have a life of 
their own, and can react with their environment.
However, Kuhn's notion of puzzle solving also raises the 
question of whether there are rules to guide the activity. 
Puzzles, as in mathematical puzzles, jig-saw puzzles and 
construction puzzles, would normally be confined by some 
rules. In mathematical puzzles rules are often laid down 
when the puzzle is posed, e.g. you must make a square 
by only moving one match. In jig-saw puzzles the way 
the pieces are laid down and are able to interlock, itself, 
poses rules, and in construction puzzles, the physical 
limits of the construction toy itself, limit the way it 
can be solved, for example, moving a Rubik cube.
Kuhn, when considering puzzles within a paradigm, comes 
to the conclusion that there are no rules. Masterman 
has pointed out this problem in Kuhnian construction of
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paradigms, in normal science. She states:
"One sign that Kuhn takes seriously the notion 
that normal science consists of puzzle-solving... 
is that he immediately, asks h i m s e l f .... 1 If 
there is puzzle-solving, where are the r u l e s ? 1
He is then brought up short....by the fact that, 
three quarters of the time, there are no rules.
Faced with his own inability to find any rules,
Kuhn then takes two incompatible ways out.
The first....is to assert tough-mindedly that 
there need not be any rules. The second, 
characteristically, is to say....that by 'rule1 
he did not really mean 'rule1 , but 
'preconception1, or 'established viewpoint'".
(Masterman in Lakatos and Musgrave (Eds.) 1970 
p84)
The rules could be, though, simply the rules of logic. 
The normal puzzle solving activity of science is confined 
by logic. Any theory or idea can be developed to explain 
any phenomena as long as the presenter of that idea follows 
a logical path.
Paradigm as a 'Family Resemblance'.
However, Kuhn does seem to be preoccupied with the notion 
of rules. One way round the problem, that he considers, 
is to use Wittgenstein's notion of 'family resemblance'. 
This idea is discussed by Magee, in "The Great 
P h ilosophers"(1987), in relation to Wittgenstein's thoughts 
about the meaning of the word 'game'. Magee states:
"A prolonged analysis of the concept of a
g a m e  would show, perhaps surprisingly, that
there is no one thing that all games have in 
common by virtue of which they are games. They 
have certain features in common with innumerable 
other human activities - for instance, that 
they are characteristically learnt from others, 
and characteristically rule-governed - but of
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course these features are not enough to make 
something a game. And that means that there 
is no one thing that the word 'game' stands 
fo r ” .
(Magee 1987 pp327-328)
Kuhn considers that, probably, paradigms also exhibit 
the property of having no specific thing in common. He 
s t a t e s :
"For Wittgenstein, in short, games,...are natural 
families, each constituted by a network of 
overlapping and criss-cross
resembl a n c e s .... Something of the same sort may 
very well hold for the various research problems
and techniques that arise within a single normal-
scientific tradition. What these have in common 
is not that they satisfy some explicit or even
some fully discoverable set of rules and
assumptions that gives the tradition its
character and its hold upon the scientific mind.
Instead, they may relate by resemblance and
by modeling to one or another part of the
scientific corpus which the community in question 
already recognizes as among its established
a c h i e v e m e n t s ."
(Kuhn 1962 pp45-46)
In other words it is more a case of looking for common 
characteristics within the components of a paradigm, rather 
than achieving specific rules.
Searle considers how Wittgenstein was aware of the problems 
of rules, even within the notion of a game. Searle states 
t h a t :
. . ."his"....(Wittgenstein's) "discussion
of rules is one of his most important 
contributions to philosophy. His first
observation is that rules do not account for 
every possible eventu a l i t y .... There always are 
many gaps left open by any system of rules. 
He gives the example of throwing a tennis ball
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when you serve. There is no rule that says
how high you have to throw it. I suppose that
if somebody could throw the ball five miles
high, and thus delay tennis games, the
authorities would have to make a new rule".
(Searle in Magee 1987 p337)
It could be argued that this implies that rules are not
something that exist prior to a game, but are brought 
in after the game has been invented, to control the game. 
The rules of a game, to a certain extent, evolve with
the game as it becomes more precise and are often linked
with attempts to make the game fair. There may be certain
ground rules that do appear at the time a game is
constructed, but in the case of traditional long existing
games, these may often have been simply the physical
constraints of the game e.g. goal posts in football. 
It is when a new way of getting round the rules is
discovered by a player that the rules have to be refined, 
but, as Searle states, pre-existing rules cannot cover 
every possible eventuality.
In the case of a scientific paradigm, it may be the case 
that the rules have to evolve with the paradigm in a 
similar way. The process of seeking resemblances, and 
using models, may be constructions devised to attempt
to formulate rules within the paradigm. However, as 
mentioned earlier, the basic rules of logic must always
apply in the natural sciences, and it could be argued,
the rules being considered here are rules of a higher 
construction, based on logical premises of deduction and
p r o c e d u r e .
Masterman has suggested that computer analysis may be 
able to throw light on these problems, if inexact matching 
techniques are used. She states:
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"Now there are two forms of formal thinking 
which are relevant to the analysis of 
main-feature replication; both of these have
emerged from the computer sciences. The first
of these,....is the mathematics of
classification, or of 'clumps1; i.e. the
formalization of the process of finding
Wittgensteinian families. The second of these,.,
is the set of procedures for making a digital 
computer make an 'inexact match' between two
formulae which are highly similar to one another,
but not quite the same".
(Masterman in Lakatos and Musgrave (Eds.) 1970
pp85 - 8 6 )
Applying such techniques in the social sciences would 
be much more problematic. It has been mentioned elsewhere, 
how Greenfield is highly critical of computer techniques, 
while Cohen and March, with their ambiguity models, are 
in favour of such methods.
Paradigmatic Rules within Educational Administration.
The question of whether there are rules in the paradigms 
of educational administration is much more problematic. 
It could be claimed, in Greenfield's subjective stance, 
that it is a rule that the subjective integrity of the 
individual, his interpretations of his subjective meanings 
through his experience, must always be preserved in any 
postulates that are advanced. On the other hand, when 
the question of intersubjectivity is considered, there 
are enormous problems in trying to preserve this rule 
and, as was considered in Section 2., phenomenologists 
such as Husserl and Schutz have not successfully overcome 
this problem. The less rigid concepts of resemblance 
and modelling, that Kuhn considers, may be more appropriate 
to the social sciences, including educational 
administration.
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Puzzle solving within the social sciences is probably, 
of necessity, a looser process. The question of whether 
basic rules of logic must always apply in the social 
sciences is also debatable. The presence of value 
judgements and concepts of right and wrong mean that
appeals to logic have to be mediated with the respect 
for individual rights and beliefs. Also, the presence 
of irrational behaviour may prevent logical deductions 
being made in some circumstances. For instance, within
a subjective framework the individual may not interpret 
his experience in a rational way. The requirement that
the subject's interpretation of reality must be respected, 
requires that subjectivists attempt to cope with the idea 
that such individual interpretations do not follow logical 
p a t t e r n s .
Paradigms and Metaphors.
In organisation theory, Morgan, in "Paradigms, Metaphors 
and Puzzle Solving in Organisation Theory” (1980), relates 
puzzle solving to paradigms through the concept of 
* metaphor 1.
This puts an extra stage between the concept, fp a r a d i g m f 
and the notion of how puzzle solving activities take place 
within the paradigm. Morgan states:
"Any metatheoretical paradigm or world view 
may include different schools of thought, which 
are often different ways of approaching and
studying a shared reality or world view (the 
metaphor level....)"
(Morgan 1980 p607)
In these four interconnected paradigms, functionalist, 
interpretive, radical humanist and radical structuralist, 
there are schools of thought at what he describes as the
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metaphor level. Hence, loose coupling is regarded as 
a school of thought, (metaphor), within the functionalist 
paradigm of organisation theory. The puzzle solving would 
occur, then, under the metaphor of loose coupling where, 
presumably, the concept is applied to a particular 
organisation. This would indicate a difference of order 
in organisation theory to that of natural science, where 
the metaphor is constructed to try to solve the problem 
of the phenomenon, in this case, the organisation being 
studied. In the natural sciences, under 'normal science*
within a paradigm, it would appear that puzzle solving 
is an activity to try to develop the theory, (metaphor?), 
that can then successfully be applied to the phenomenon. 
This perhaps, indicates a fundamental difference between 
the social sciences and the natural sciences when research 
is being conducted. The natural scientist is much more 
confined by possible logical consequences, which enable 
him to try many differing puzzle solving techniques to 
see which fit the phenomena. In the social sciences, 
the researcher would probably make no progress at all 
unless, paradoxically, he brings some preconceived ideas, 
(metaphors), to his study.
In Greenfield's case, it could be claimed that he is 
bringing subjective notions, which cannot be logically 
proven, to organisation theory within educational
administration in order to see if this provides new 
insights, different from those of a systems approach.
Griffiths' and Bates' Views on Metaphors.
Griffiths also considers the notion of metaphors in 
relation to educational administration, in his "Handbook” 
chapter. He mentions the work of Bates, whose Critical
Theory approach is buttressed by the concept, 'metaphor'. 
Bates states:
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"A critical analysis of the metaphors that 
a r t i c u l a t e o u r  beliefs and actions is, 
therefore, one powerful way of ensuring that 
we do not remain trapped within the evidently 
transparent prison of the fly-bottle".
(Bates 1982 pl6)
This reference to the fly-bottle is linked to his earlier 
citation of Wittgenstein, implying that words can cloud 
our understanding of situations. Bates considers that:
"It was Wittgenstein (1953) who spoke of the 
bewitchment of our intelligence by the means
of langu a g e  The directions for escape, he
insisted, were not to be found in the dictionary 
but in the world of real experience where the 
meaning of words is revealed in their use".
(Bates 1982 pl4)
His call for analysis of the metaphors we use to interpret 
educational situations is somewhat different to what Morgan 
is proposing. Bates appears to imply that the metaphors 
we use, instead of being aids to understanding, could, 
in fact, cloud our interpretations, whereas Morgan appears 
to imply that the use of metaphors is a good thing. For 
instance, he states:
"Viewing organizations systematically as 
cybernetic systems, loosely coupled systems, 
ecological systems, theatres, cultures, political 
systems, language games, texts, accomplishments, 
enactments, psychic prisons, instruments of 
domination, schismatic systems, catastrophes, 
etc., it is possible to add rich and creative 
dimensions to organization theory".
(Morgan 1980 p615)
This quotation is cited by Griffiths in his "Handbook"
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article and he appears to endorse this position, linking 
it to gestalt switching ideas. He states:
"At present, organizations are being viewed 
through many different glasses, and, as a result, 
new metaphors are being developed. The new 
metaphors, in turn, change the way people think 
about organizations".
(Griffiths in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p47)
Griffiths points out how the prevailing metaphors were, 
initially, those of positivistic science which, in more 
recent times, people have reacted against. He points 
out that:
"The present interest in metaphors springs from 
a dissatisfaction with the older metaphors, 
the introduction of paradigms such as the 
interpretive and radical structuralist into 
organizational science, and changes in 
assumptions underlying functionalism, that so 
far has had the greatest impact on educational 
administration".
(Griffiths in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p46)
However, Gri f f i t h s 1 attitude to metaphors reflects, in 
a way, it could be argued, a logical application of 
metaphors. The notion of seeing things through different 
glasses is to be used as a tool in educational 
administration. Morgan, with his four dimensional 
paradigm, incorporating various metaphors, seems even 
to include the concept of metaphors within a logical 
deductive approach to organisations.
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Metaphors and Greenfield.
This does not, however, appear to be the way Greenfield 
understands the concept of metaphor. His argument seems 
to be that metaphors, being literary, are almost artistic 
images to aid subjective understanding, and are in 
opposition to scientific concepts. In "Organization Theory 
as I deology"(1979) , he states:
"Wittgenstein and the Bhagavad-Gita show us
a vision of the world and action within it.
They offer metaphors and artistic images as 
keys to understanding".
(Greenfield 1979 pl06) 
and later when referring to these images he states:
"...the symbols of nonrational discourse are 
not intended to be tested by methods of proof
and, paradoxically, this independence of normal 
scientific truth-making gives them their 
interpretative power".
(Greenfield 1979 pl06)
These various views of the concept, M e t a p h o r s ' ,  indicate 
that the relation of metaphor to paradigms must be more
than an interrelated part of a world view as Morgan
implies. The question could be posed as to whether, within 
educational administration, metaphors can exist outside 
any world view. Could a metaphor be simply an end in 
itself, a similarity with something outside educational 
administration, without being linked to a world view, 
in other words, a philosophical structure implemented
within educational administration? Also, does Greenfield's 
notion of metaphor prevent his 'new perspective' from 
being paradigmatic because, being n o n - r a t i o n a l , his 
metaphors do not link back, in the way Morgan implies,
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to G r e e n f i e l d ’s world view?
Paradigm Shifts: Internal or External Influences?
Another problem of regarding Greenfield's approach as 
a paradigm, in the Kuhnian sense, is the fact that 
Greenfield considers that educational administration theory 
should be developed within educational administration.
In his 'new perspective* paper, Greenfield states:
"Phenomenologically based research, on the other 
hand, aims at dealing with the direct experience 
of people in specific situations” .
(Greenfield in Hughes (Ed.) 1975 p85)
There can be no transplanting of theory from other 
organisations to educational administration, as the systems 
approach has tended to adopt, through the work of Taylor, 
Fayol, etc.
However, when Kuhn considers paradigms, he makes it clear 
that often the beginning of a paradigm shift occurs when 
someone brings new ideas of a fresh approach to the field. 
When referring to D a l t o n ’s atomic theory, Kuhn states:
"What all of Dalton's accounts omit are the 
revolutionary effects of applying to chemistry 
a set of questions and concepts previously 
restricted to physics and meteorology. That 
is what Dalton did, and the result was a 
reorientation toward the field, a reorientation 
that taught chemists to ask new questions about 
and to draw new conclusions from old data".
(Kuhn 1962 pl38)
189
So Dalton's breakthrough occurred not because he was a 
chemist, but because he was not a chemist. The chemical 
paradigm had shifted as a result of imports from other 
fields. Paradoxically, Greenfield, by introducing the 
philosophical concept of subjectivity into educational 
administration is reducing the scope of educational 
thinking because of the restrictions of the subjective 
stance. The new arrival has brought with it its own set 
of restrictions which, (if allowed to do so), can restrict 
the whole intellectual basis of the field. For instance, 
if organisations are not real then there is nothing to 
study in relation to the concept, 'organisation'. Of
course, they could be studied as if they were real and 
still perhaps preserve the subjectivist stance, at least
in part, but generally, the focus under this stance has 
to be the subjective consciousness of each individual 
who makes up the organisation, and their interpretations 
of any organisation that may appear to exist. For 
instance, Greenfield states:
"...organizations are to be understood in terms 
of people's beliefs about their behaviour within 
them. If we are to understand organizations,
we must understand what people within them think
of as right and proper to do".
(Greenfield in Hughes (Ed.) 1975 p83) 
and later:
"It is this process, the placing of meaning 
upon experience, which shapes what we call our 
organizations and it is this process which should 
be the focus of the organization theorist's 
work" .
(Greenfield in Hughes (Ed.) 1975 p96)
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The question could be asked, why should the placing of 
meaning upon experience be the focus of work in
organisational studies? System theorists and those who
suggest a pragmatic approach, like Willower, do not agree. 
The restriction of individual paradigmatic influences, 
(if that is what they are), could provide a strong argument 
for paradigm diversity within educational administration.
Paradigms as Total World Views.
Generally, as has been considered, the applicability of 
K u h n fs notion of paradigm to the social sciences is a 
matter of some debate. Willower states:
"One usage (Kuhn,......1 9 7 0.) was to define
a paradigm as a universally recognized line 
of scientific thought, a usage which seems to 
be favored in the physical and biological 
sciences. Another definition equates a paradigm 
with a total world view. This use is found
most often in the social sciences, although
Kuhn himself had reservations about applying
the concept to the social sciences at all".
(Willower in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p743)
The total world view, the philosophical metaphysical
paradigm, that Masterman interprets from Kuhn, appears
the most appropriate application to be used in the social
sciences; for instance, it could be argued that, although
♦
Greenfield has proposed a total world view, the 
subjectivist stance, he has not provided elaborate 
theories. There is, though, the problem discussed earlier, 
of whether there can only be, at any one time, only one 
paradigm, one world view. This does not appear to be 
the case, although attempts are being made e.g. Morgan, 
and Sander and Wiggins to provide the overall world view. 
Another point, that should not be missed, is that those 
who have talked about paradigm shifts, are often considered
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as breaking away from scientific conceptions, such as 
those proposed by the "New Movement", and yet, there is 
the irony that Kuhn's conception of paradigm, from which 
they have often borrowed the term, is based on concepts 
within natural science.
The History of Educational Administration.
One way of interpreting the history of educational 
administration is to say that originally, there was the 
paradigm of the scholar practitioners, as exemplified 
by Barnard, with whom Greenfield has much sympathy, because 
his ideas were based upon practice, which it could be 
claimed, is not that far away from experience, the term 
Greenfield prefers.
This paradigm was then in the 1950's and 1960's replaced 
by the scientific concepts of the "New Movement", 
exemplified in the work of Simon, of which Greenfield 
is so highly critical. It could then be argued, that, 
this approach is now gradually being superceded by 
subjective paradigms and those of Marxist Critical Theory. 
Willower however, does not consider that such approaches 
have had any real impact on educational administration:
"Because they attack a straw man, an obsolete,
extremely scientistic positivism, subjectivists 
and Marxian critical theorists in educational 
administration both appear to believe that a 
radical change, or in one of their favorite 
phrases, a paradigm shift, is occurring that
will leave (one of?) them triumphant. Both 
proclaim crisis and the complete collapse of
current modes of thought in educational
administration. However, mere proclamation, 
even loud proclamation, does not make something 
true. In the present case, we have a clear 
example of wishful thinking, fed in part at
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least, by mentalities given to simplistic
d i c h o t o m i e s " .
(Willower 1985a pl9)
Griffiths has noted how most work in educational
administration employs positivistic techniques:
"When the view of research and theory is 
restricted to educational administration, one 
finds the same kind of theory being espoused 
as 25 years ago. - positivism, but the research 
being done is now somewhat less in the positivist 
m o d e ."
(Griffiths in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p48)
Cyclical Patterns of Paradigms within Educational
Administration?
The challenge, then, of the new paradigms at a practical 
level may not, in the long run, be successful. However, 
another way of considering the history of educational 
administration is to argue, as Culbertson does in his 
article in the 'Handbook1, that there are cyclic patterns 
in the paradigms. Culbertson points out that Greenfield
was not the first to propose phenomenological approaches 
in educational administration, that he was preceded, 95 
years earlier, by Harris:
"Like Greenfield, William Harris, Superintendent 
of Schools in St. Louis from 1868 to 
1880.... argued for a phenomenological approach 
to inquiry. Both Harris and Greenfield stressed 
that physical and social phenomena differ and 
that human constructs are more important than 
sense data. In contrast to Greenfield, however, 
Harris, contended that a science of education 
and management was needed and could be 
a c h i e v e d .... The fact that both Greenfield and 
Harris could support similar research approaches
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and yet differ in the role of science in enquiry 
is explained by their contrasting concepts of 
science, concepts linked to the respective 
intellectual and social contexts of their times".
(Culbertson in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p3)
It appears then, that any cyclical nature would have to
be mediated by the passage of time and the effects this 
has when the 'new' paradigms are proposed. It could be 
claimed that a similar situation occurred in physics where, 
initially, N e w t o n ’s corpuscular theory of light was found 
to be inadequate to account for the fact that light travels 
more slowly through a denser medium, so it was replaced 
by wave theory, which settled these problems, only to
find later, that a particle theory was required to explain 
the photoelectric effect. The point is, that the modern 
quantum theory of light incorporates ideas of waves, and 
is much more sophisticated than Newton's original idea.
Similarly, although:
"Greenfield drew upon the long tradition of
idealistic thought, as did Harris",
(Culbertson in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p23) 
as Culbertson indicates earlier, he had stated that Harris:
"...contended that many fields, including 
"phenomenology", would have to be used to build 
the needed science",
(Culbertson in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p3) 
and later that, Harris:
"...did not reject narrowly defined natural 
science methods in the study of objects, 
including the human body; rather, he assigned 
to speculative reason a higher role in the study
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of human institutions and processes than he 
did to predictive science",
(Culbertson in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p5)
In other words, Harris' stress on speculative reasoning 
in educational administration, it could be claimed, was
elaborated by Greenfield into the subjective interpretive 
view of educational administration.
Philosophical and Sociological Inputs into Educational 
Administration.
Greenfield's elaborated view was possible for him because 
of the progress in subjective philosophical and
sociological thinking that had arisen in the passage of 
nearly a century. So the cyclical concept of paradigm 
has to be mediated by the passage of time.
Another way of interpreting the situation would be to
say that there has always been paradigm diversity and
the fact that it has now surfaced as a prominent
phenomenon, may just be a question of prominence in the 
literature. In other words, Harris' ideas were, perhaps, 
not as widely appreciated as Greenfield's, nor perhaps,
did they receive the same publicity. As Culbertson says:
"Payne and Harris won almost reverential respect 
from their peers. However, their long-range 
influence upon the science of education and
management was limited. Harris's 1898 book,
Psychological Foundations of Education, a
monumental intellectual achievement that brought 
him a Doctor of Philosophy causa honoris from
the University of Jena in Germany, came at the
end of an e r a ........ Their work predated the
existence of full-time professors of educational 
administration".
(Culbertson in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p6)
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Text Books as Historical Accounts.
An appeal to history also indicates that the replacement 
of one paradigm with the next, in the natural sciences, 
is not the smooth transition that science textbooks often 
project. Kuhn considers how often science textbooks are 
written in a way that suggests that there has been a 
gradual evolution of thinking in science, that has taken 
it from its earliest stages to where we are today. This 
is not a true reflection of the real situation, however, 
as he indicates:
"For reasons that are both obvious and highly
functional, science t e x t b o o k s   refer only
to that part of the work of past scientists 
that can easily be viewed as contributions to 
the statement and solution of the text*s paradigm 
problems. Partly by selection and partly by 
distortion, the scientists of earlier ages are 
implicitly represented as having worked upon 
the same set of fixed problems and in accordance 
with the same set of fixed canons that the most 
recent revolution in scientific theory and method 
has made seem scientific".
(Kuhn 1962 pl37)
Kuhn, then states:
"No wonder that textbooks and the historical 
tradition they imply have to be rewritten after 
each scientific revolution".
(Kuhn 1962 pl37)
The progressive nature of science would only be preserved, 
under such conditions, for the new generation of
s c i e n t i s t s .
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Textbook Accounts of Educational Administration.
It is difficult to imagine a textbook on educational 
administration showing a gradual progression from earlier 
stages to where we are today. It may have been possible 
when the "New Movement" held sway, if such ideas could 
be sold as the culmination of theory in educational 
administration. The perceived paradigm diversity of the 
contemporary situation, would not make such an orderly 
route possible.
Willower, in his "Synthesis and Projection", the last 
chapter in the "Handbook of Research on Educational 
Administration", confesses that his title is too grandiose:
"Even though the chapter's originally assigned 
title has been kept, the title is too pretentious 
for what will be presented. There will not 
be much synthesis, and the projections that 
are made emerge from a crystal ball that is 
as clouded as any".
(Willower in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p729)
He also mentions the diversity of theories, ideas and
methods, that are included within the pages of the
'H a n d b o o k ':
"Such diversity leads to a fragmentation wherein 
various groups of scholars have greatly different 
interests and dissimilar theoretical
vocabularies. Even though they are housed within 
programs in educational administration, they 
might have difficulty communicating substantively 
with one another".
(Willower in Boyan (Ed.) 1988 p730)
However, it could be argued, that a strength of educational 
administration is that it retains these diversities within
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its 'textbooks’ and gives a more realistic picture of 
the development of the field to the newcomer.
Kuhn considers that natural science textbooks do an 
injustice to newcomers by presenting a unified approach. 
He states:
"...that is not the way a science develops.
Many of the puzzles of contemporary normal 
science did not exist until after the most recent 
scientific revolution. Very few of them can 
be traced back to the historic beginning of 
the science within which they now occur. Earlier 
generations pursued their own problems with 
their own instruments and their own canons of 
solution".
(Kuhn 1962 ppl39-140)
In other words historical information is lost to produce 
conciseness within the text. This conciseness is, however, 
often regarded as one of the strengths of the natural 
sciences; the ability to produce a viewpoint that appears 
to offer explanation for all natural phenomena observed 
within its particular field of study. It could be claimed 
that the historical input of natural science texts serves 
only as a form of classification. The use of discoverers' 
names to label theories, concepts and units, has produced 
some requirement for a brief description of their 
discoveries within a historical context. In physics, 
it could be argued that it is quite conceivable to adopt 
a system where theories, units and concepts were named, 
say, after different kinds of food, or plants, or Greek 
gods. The theories would still operate as explanations 
of observed phenomena, but the new names would not provide 
any historical links.
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Indicating the Reward System.
One of the functions of the historical input to the natural 
sciences is to provide a clear indication to newcomers 
of the rewards of discovering new theories, phenomena 
or relationships. In other words, that o n e ’s name can 
become attached to the discovery and can even be used 
for a new unit. As Kuhn indicates, there are often 
distortions and injustices in this process, but the 
possible recognition is there for the newcomer to 
a p p r e c i a t e .
Educational administration is, perhaps, too youthful to 
offer such incentives to newcomers. The likelihood of 
any theory standing the passage of time seems remote. 
It is true that 'Garbage Can' theory is linked with Cohen, 
March and Olsen and 'loose coupling' with Weick, but what 
status will these theories have in a hundred years time?
Greenfield's 'new perspective' is already beginning to 
suffer from the incorporation into overarching paradigms, 
discussed earlier, and it could be argued that this is 
occurring, perhaps, more quickly say than 'Garbage Can' 
theory, because it is a philosophical orientation which 
denounces the use of natural scientific theory within 
educational administration. This, of course, is another 
example of the prevalence of attempts to make educational 
administration adopt the canons of natural science; in 
spite of Greenfield's approach. Generally, it could be 
argued, that the controversial nature of much of what 
is proposed in educational administration makes the 
retention of a historical perspective within textbooks 
more appropriate. Providing this historical discourse, 
gives the newcomer a perception of the controversies and 
the difficulties with which the field has to grapple.
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Concluding Comments.
There are, then, many difficulties in regarding 
Greenfield's subjective approach as a paradigm. Its lack 
of a clear theoretical construction makes it difficult 
to fit the concept of a paradigm as a theory. However, 
the philosophical orientation, based on the subjective 
interpretation of the human consciousness, does enable 
it to be classified as a paradigm, if a paradigm is 
regarded as a philosophical world view, which was one 
of the ways Masterman identified Kuhn's use of the concept, 
'paradigm*. To see Greenfield's perspective as a competing 
paradigm, within a discipline of educational 
administration, where there is paradigm diversity, poses 
the problem of whether educational administration, as 
a social science, can accept paradigm diversity, and can 
be different from the natural sciences, where there is 
always the prevailing paradigm which only changes, in 
the Kuhnian sense, with scientific revolutions. Talk 
of paradigm shifts, however, supports the natural science 
view that there can only be one paradigm which, presumably, 
has undergone a 'shift' in orientation. Yet, as outlined 
in the last section, Bolman and Deal, admittedly discussing 
organisation theory in general, imply that it is possible 
to 'flip frames' to look at organisations in different 
ways. Hughes links their ideas of frames to competing 
paradigms, implying that paradigms can be used 
alte r n a t i n g l y , or even simultaneously, when viewing 
organisations. There are some links here with Griffiths' 
concept of viewing organisations through different glasses. 
These ideas, too, can be linked to Kuhn's concept of a 
paradigm as a Gestalt, a way of seeing. However, it could 
be argued that, if a paradigm is a philosophical 
orientation, or a total world view, then this implies 
commitment to a philosophical position.
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Greenfield's 'new perspective', appears to fit this 
category with his own writing, although others, like 
Griffiths, have tried to link his approach to a 'way of 
seeing'. In other words, it appears that the term 
'paradigm' can be applied in different ways and can 
represent different concepts in the mind of the individual. 
In the natural sciences, the way textbooks have presented 
paradigm shifts poses the problem of providing accurate 
historical discourse, something that educational 
administration may avoid, if, paradoxically, it never 
succeeds in reaching a prevailing paradigm stage in the 
natural science concept of Kuhn.
An alternative view, is to see paradigms within educational 
administration as almost cyclical in nature. The idea, 
as Culbertson indicates, that Greenfield re-discovered 
Harris's phenomenological perspective, must be qualified 
by the fact that Greenfield's views were elaborated on 
a more sophisticated sociological and philosophical base 
in accordance with development in the social sciences 
g e n e r a l l y .
This is, perhaps, quite a feasible line of development 
for educational administration in the future. In other 
words, because textbooks may tend to preserve the 
historical development of the subject, future researchers 
within educational administration will 'discover' old 
concepts, but develop them within a future philosophical 
and sociological context, that will provide insights that 
at the moment cannot be predicted. Such thoughts would 
indicate that discussions over the nature of paradigmatic 
development within educational administration will never 
be resolved. Apart from the problem of deciding whether 
a new approach is a paradigm, or a paradigm shift, there 
will also be the question of whether it is really 'new'. 
It has been considered, in Section 3., how Greenfield's
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'new perspective' was criticised over the question of 
'newness' and it would seem to be that, if the cyclical 
concept of paradigm development prevailed, each 
re-discovery of concepts, from earlier times, would always 
be open to this challenge, and would raise the question 
of whether an approach, to be a paradigm, has to be 
completely novel. In educational administration, the 
way ideas are often 'borrowed' from other disciplines 
would probably indicate that new approaches do not need 
to be of this nature.
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SECTION 8.
AN ATTEMPTED ANALYSIS OF THE INLOGOV REPORT
(A REPORT PREPARED FOR STRATHCLYDE REGIONAL COUNCIL
BY THE CENTRE FOR EDUCATION MANAGEMENT AND POLICY
STUDIES: UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM) IN THE LIGHT OF
THE SUBJECTIVE/SYSTEMS AND WIDER PARADIGMATIC DEBATES.
The INLOGOV Report was a report prepared for Strathclyde 
Regional Council, in March 1989, under the title, 
"Education in the Community", by the Centre for Education 
Management and Policy Studies, at the Institute of Local 
Government Studies (INLOGOV), and the School of Education, 
University of Birmingham. The Report subjected the 
Education Department of Strathclyde Regional Council, 
in Scotland, to a major overall review.
In this section, an attempt will be made to analyse the 
INLOGOV Report from the point of view of the various 
theoretical, philosophical and paradigmatic debates which 
exist in educational administration, providing an example 
of the importance of these issues, in a specific 
administrative and managerial context.
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Consultation?
The Report tends to focus on consulting and the need to 
seek information and ideas from administrators, teachers, 
lecturers, parents and the public in general. For 
instance, the Report states:
"The Department needs, as a whole, to learn 
to see the service from the point of view of 
the parents and the community".
(INLOGOV 1989 Para 4.8 p23) 
and later:
"...are staff who serve the public directly 
valued within the Department? Do the staff 
welcome parents and members of the community?".
(INLOGOV 1989 Para. 4.10 p23)
At a first glance, this would tend to show sympathies 
for a subjective stance and an attempt to incorporate 
the views, (meanings?), of the individual into any policy 
or management decisions that are made. In the first 
citation, there is even an implication that Gestalt 
switching is required, with the need to view the service 
through the eyes of the parents and the community.
However, there is also an underlying tone in the Report 
that indicates that such accommodation has to operate 
within a systematic management structure, (systems 
perspective?). For example, the Report states:
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"Here is a system which will allow policy and 
financial modelling, the key to strategic 
management of change. Members and officers 
can identify and compare the costs of different 
policy options and monitor their implementation."
(INLOGOV 1989 Para 4.29 pp27-28)
Management and Administration: W h a t ’s the Difference?
Another problem is the distinction the Report makes between 
management and administration. These words are often 
viewed as interchangeable focusing on the ideas that in 
Britain the term educational management is used, while 
in North America, it is educational administration that 
is preferred. For instance, Glatter states in "Approaches 
to School Management":
"I want to suggest that we in Britain stumbled 
on the use of the term ‘educational management' 
almost by accident, because of the growth of 
the subject in Britain at a time when there 
was increasing interest, training, and research 
in management in other parts of the public sector 
and in the private sector. What we were actually 
doing was no different in essence from what 
in America was called 'educational
administration', namely research and teaching 
focused on the internal organization of schools 
and other educational institutions, drawing 
upon concepts and frameworks developed in a 
number of social science disciplines".
(Glatter in Bush et. al. 1980 pp26-27)
In referring to the works of Greenfield, Griffiths and 
Willower, and other North American writers, the term 
'administration' is the term that is nearly always found, 
and is the term that has tended to be used in the earlier 
sections. This is probably a reflection of the existence 
in North America of "Professors of Educational 
Admini s t r a t i o n ” at Universities and other academic centres.
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In Britain, the term ’m a n a g e m e n t 1 tends to be used, for 
example in Scotland the H.M.I. report, "Learning and 
Teaching in Scottish Secondary Schools: School Management" 
(1986), clearly uses the term management, for instance:
"The report describes the growth of current 
management systems in secondary schools and 
assesses their principal aspects and the means 
of support afforded to them by authorities".
(H.M.I. Report 1984 p5)
However, the INLOGOV Report is specific about the 
differences in the meanings of the terms, and regards 
this difference as central to its report. It states, 
for instance:
"The challenge for the Education Department 
is to change its emphasis from administering
to managing the S e r v i c e  This is our central
conclusion".
(INLOGOV Report 1989 Para 2.1 pll) 
and later:
"Administrators seek to implement efficiently 
within a given framework of rules. Managers 
create the framework. The administrator responds 
passively and routinely to an unchanging world.
The manager responds actively and innovatively 
to shape a changing world".
(INLOGOV Report 1989 Para 2.7 pl2)
This could be contrasted sharply with G l a t t e r ’s remit, 
which he states at the beginning of his article: 
"Educational ’P o l i c y ’ and 'Management': One Field or Two?" 
in "Approaches to School Management":
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"...was to defend educational management as 
a ’p r o p e r 1 subject of study within the broader 
field of educational administration".
(Glatter in Bush et. al. 1980 p26)
It could be argued that Glatter's remit places 
administration at a higher level, incorporating the ideas 
of management, whereas the INLOGOV Report implies that 
management is the superior activity.
Strategic Management.
The reasons for this distinction, between the terms being 
central to the INLOGOV Report, is tied up with the emphasis 
the report places on strategic management at the top level. 
When proposing a new management structure it is stated:
"The task is to develop Headquarters as a tier 
of strategic management and the Divisions as 
a tier of operational management".
(INLOGOV 1989 Para 5.94 p63)
Headquarters is to be responsible for policy planning, 
quality assurance and public accountability, whereas the 
Divisions, (the localised administrative units in 
Strathclyde Region), as far as education is concerned, 
are to be responsible for implementation plans, monitoring 
quality and providing support to individual institutions, 
such as schools and colleges.
Such ideas inevitably create a hierarchy of management 
tasks. When this is coupled with statements such as:
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"A tier of strategic management needs to be 
introduced into the organisation above the 
administrative and the operational” ,
(INL0G0V 1989 Para 5.10 p43)
it could be argued that there are strong implications 
that administrative tasks are placed below management 
tasks. At one point, the report implies that it is 
management activity, not administrative activity, that 
highlights the importance of information:
”You can't manage without information, it 
distinguishes the manager from the
administrator” .
(INL0G0V 1989 Para 4.17 p24)
This is linked to the idea that the strategic management 
tasks of headquarters require it to become a learning 
department, receiving information:
"If the education department is to achieve the 
excellence it properly aspires to it must become 
a learning organisation. It must become open 
to and responsive to the expressed needs of 
the public".
(INL0G0V 1989 Para 4.16 p24)
Central then to strategic management is responsiveness. 
Headquarters is to respond to the needs of the community 
through the information it obtains as a learning 
d e p a r t m e n t .
Responding to the Collective.
This, at first, might appear to show sympathies with the 
subjective approach and the emphasis on the individual. 
However, as the Education Department, according to INL0G0V
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would only be able to respond to the collective wishes 
of groups of people within the community, it appears to 
have a more political implication.
Sander and Wiggins, as mentioned in the last section, 
consider "Administration for Responsiveness" as one of 
their paradigms of educational administration. They state:
"The concept of responsiveness presupposes a 
real and true commitment to the social objectives 
and political demands of the community, including
its educational s y s t e m  The interest and
concern about responsiveness, as a criterion 
of the political performance of administration, 
reveal a capacity of responding and acting based 
on the social and political demands of the 
community, including its educational system".
(Sander and Wiggins 1985 pl02)
Accountability.
They also see this as linked to accountability:
"The English term responsiveness, as it arose 
in the theory of contemporary administrative 
theory, reflects the capacity of meeting the 
politically expressed demands of the external 
community. In other words, responsiveness is 
the criterion of performance that measures the 
capacity to produce the solution or response 
desired by the participants of the larger 
community. In certain aspects, the concept 
of responsiveness is associated with that of 
social responsibility or accountability, 
according to which administration is obliged 
to answer for its own acts on the basis of the 
concerns and priorities of the community".
(Sander and Wiggins 1985 plOl)
The last part of this citation is very close to what
INL0G0V is proposing:
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"Many believe that public service management 
should begin by listening to the public and 
to their expression of needs and should conclude 
by returning, and negotiating, an account to 
the public for the quality of what has been 
achieved. It is such a concern for continually 
working with,and accounting to, the public which 
distinguishes the best of contemporary ideas 
about the pursuit of excellence in public service 
management in local government".
(INLOGOV 1989 Para 4.59 p36)
Loose Coupling.
This question, of being responsive to the community and 
accountable to it, is also linked by Sander and Wiggins 
to the loose coupling of Weick:
"Responsiveness manifested through participatory 
methodology has the potential effect of 
uncoupling otherwise tight organizations.... 
Weick, and Pfeffer and Salancik, view open 
systems with loose coupling as adaptive, 
facilitating enactment, and responsive".
(Sander and Wiggins 1985 pl02)
At one point, the Report mentions coupling under the title, 
"Managing in a Political Context":
"...contemporary studies of *the management 
of excellence* (in the private sector) define 
qualities from which managers in the public 
sector can learn a great deal. Excellent
organisations are shaped by ....... loose-tight:
control values, monitor performance and devolve 
the day-to-day".
(INLOGOV 1989 Para 2.9 ppl2-13)
This would imply that the loose coupling occurs down a
line management structure with the concept of devolving
the day-to-day, rather than loose coupling within the
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sideways structure of organisations, which is the way 
it appears to be interpreted when linked to concepts of 
ambiguity within organisations.
INLOGOV and Ambiguity.
The INLOGOV Report, with its clear concept of promoting 
excellence within a management system, would not wish 
to be associated with ambiguity, and yet, as was considered 
in Section 6., Bush links loose coupling to ambiguity 
models. He states in his "Theories of Educational
M a n a g e m e n t " (1986) :
"Ambiguity models suggest that organizations 
are characterized by fragmentation. Institutions 
are broken down into groups which have internal 
coherence based on common values and goals.
Links between the groups are more tenuous and
unpredictable. W e i c k ...... uses the term 'loose
c o u p l i n g 1 to describe relationships between 
subunits".
(Bush 1986 pllO)
The INLOGOV Report, however, stresses common values that 
are to be all pervasive within the organisation, in its 
case, Strathclyde Regional Council, Education Department 
and much stress is placed in the Report on trying to 'sell 
the stressed values', to all levels of the administrative
structure. On the question of loose coupling and
responsiveness, Weick states:
"It is conceivable that loosely coupled systems 
preserve more diversity in responding than do 
tightly coupled systems, and therefore can adapt 
to a considerably wider range of changes in 
the environment than would be true for tightly 
coupled systems".
(Weick 1976 p7)
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Now, INLOGOV stresses that Strathclyde should be responding 
to changes in the community, (environment?), and that 
its proposals for strategic management are in response
to managing in a time of rapid change:
"The conditions for realising this difficult 
objective is for Strathclyde *s Education
Department to establish a new approach to the
management of change: developing
*new values of public service and participation.
*a new style of management that provides both 
strategic leadership and responsiveness to the
public locally as well as regionally.
*a modernised organisation".
(INLOGOV 1989 Para 1.31 plO)
There could be an argument that, if the region is to be 
adaptive and responsive, then there is a greater place 
for loose coupling than the Report implies. As indicated, 
the loose coupling occurs, perhaps, between the 
headquarters and the divisions, as it is the divisions 
that are to be responsible for routine administration, 
while headquarters is involved with strategic planning.
Officers Making Political Decisions?
The political implication of responsiveness, that Sander
and Wiggins consider, is acknowledged by the authors to 
be a matter of their own definition:
"...for the purposes of this discussion, 
responsiveness is conceived within a political 
perspec t i v e " ,
(Sander and Wiggins 1985 pl02)
but if their stance is applied to the INLOGOV Report,
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then there is the implication that, in asking managers 
to respond to the community directly, it is asking them 
to make political decisions, which, it could be argued, 
is the function of the elected members of the education 
committee and not that of paid officials. If, by Education 
Department they include elected members, then this still 
does not rule out the possibility that paid officials 
could become involved in making political decisions.
It is probably correct to conclude that reference in the
Report to the ’Education Department' and ’headquarters', 
does infer the committee structure of the elected members 
to Strathclyde Regional Council, because at the end of 
the Report proposals are made to reform that structure:
’’The organization of committees should focus
the attention of members on the strategic 
leadership of the service as a whole: clarifying
values and policy priorities for the management 
of the service".
(INLOGOV 1989 Para 7.3 p90)
Such proposals have brought criticisms from the Director 
of Education over the very issue of the fact that the
Report is becoming involved in the political process. 
In his "Implementation Plan" (1989), he states:
"Decisions regarding the committee structure
are primarily for members themselves to
d e t e r m i n e  There may be a case for having
’strategy' and 'performance' sub-committees.
This, however, is a matter for political
determination".
("Implementation Plan" 1989 p22)
Political Implications of Strategic Management.
The INLOGOV Report certainly sees the process of strategic 
management, not simply as a management structure, but
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also reaching into the political sphere, which it considers 
appropriate for it to comment upon.
This partly raises the question again of the difference 
between administration and management. It would appear 
that managers are required to become involved in political 
decision making, whereas routine administrators do not. 
This again, has the effect of undermining the importance 
of routine administration.
Clarifying Values.
Not only does the Report become involved in the political 
process with the recommendation for Education Committee 
structure reform, it also considers it acceptable to 
clarify the values that Strathclyde Regional council has 
put forward in its various reports over recent years.
If Strathclyde Regional Council has shared values, then 
from a subjective perspective, they are the perceived 
values of a perceived organisation, and will thus be based 
on a political consensus and cannot, therefore, be the 
values of individuals. This implies that a political 
perspective is being taken by the Report in this matter, 
from the point of view of a subjective approach.
The Report states:
"Our study has enabled us to distil the values 
which have informed a number of the interviews 
and papers we have read and we reflect these 
back to the Authority. It is, however, the 
A u t h o r i t y ’s responsibility to make its vision 
of public education clear and accountable.
We shall describe Strathclyde's educational 
values and purposes in three categories:
♦values of educational purpose.
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*values of learning experience.
*values of educational management".
(INLOGOV 1989 Para 3.3 pl5)
It would be interesting to speculate what subjectivists 
would make of this classification. Only shared values, 
with the political implication they have, could be 
classified in this way. From a subjective perspective, 
values, existing only in the perception of the human mind, 
could be open to misinterpretation in any data collecting 
attempts and, perhaps, not even being manifest to the 
subject, who may perceive his or her values in a different 
way to those of the observer.
Greenfield's more recent justificatory philosophical 
source, Hodgkinson, makes it clear that he considers that, 
to be moral, the choice of values must be made only by 
in d i v i d u a l s :
"...all that the proponents o f ......... contending
positions can do is to seek to persuade their 
audience by reason and rhetoric and all the 
powers at their disposal, that they have the 
better values. In the end the act of choice 
is individual; and if free and conscious, then 
m o r a l " .
(Hodgkinson in Greenfield 1986 p64)
Even though INLOGOV claims that it is the authority's 
responsibility to clarify its own values, they consider 
it acceptable to classify what they perceive as the values 
of the authority.
Organisations with Values?
At one point, the Report uses the word 'organisation' 
stating, directly, that it can have values. Paragraph
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4 .1 s t a t e s :
"Strategic management in a public service 
organisation is about carrying its values into 
practice with clear objectives and priorities".
(INLOGOV 1989 Para 4.1 p22)
This statement forms the first paragraph under the heading 
"The Process of Strategic Management" and, presumably, 
is regarded as one of the key issues of strategic 
management. If this is the case, then there is a clear
departure from subjective approaches.
Not only has Greenfield argued that organisations only 
exist in the minds of individuals who perceive them to
exist, but also Hodgkinson has implied that it is only 
an individual mind that can impute value to anything.
"Life is a series of moment-fact-events to which 
subjectivities impute value".
(Hodgkinson 1983 p31)
This was first cited in Section 2., and indicates the 
political implication of the Report's assumption about 
values. If an organisation can have values, these so 
called shared values can not possibly be shared by 
everybody. The Report tries to sell itself by implying 
that if members of an organisation, (real or imaginary!), 
understand what the values of the organisation are this
will mean that they will be fully committed to implementing 
them. Much stress is placed upon headquarters, where
the strategic management is to take place, being a learning 
department, so that it is aware of what is happening in 
the community:
218
"A learning department will need to develop
a new style of learning from the public as well 
as extending its capacity to learn from research 
and information".
(INLOGOV 1989 Para 4.7 p23)
This, presumably, implies that the process of strategic
management is able to make so called shared values
acceptable, if they are based on factual knowledge which
is highly comprehensive. Much of this would probably
be criticised by Greenfield because he would see it as
a systems perspective, where an organisation was responding 
to its environment, (the community).
In his paper, "Environment as Subjective Reality"(1983),
it is clear that he regards the concept, 'environment1
as only existing in the minds of individuals. This is
because he implies that the environment just refers to
other people in other organisations. He states:
"For the most part, when people in organisations 
relate to the world about them they are not
dealing with a cohesive and objective force 
called the environment but with more people 
in other organisations".
(Greenfield 1983 p38)
Separating Fact from Value.
However, it can also be criticised from a subjective 
perspective, on the grounds that it tries to separate 
fact from value. The factual information of the 'learning 
department' is to be used to add weight to the shared 
values that the department wishes to promote. Even if 
it is argued that the 'learning department' will learn 
values of the community, these values will inevitably
be processed as facts to be weighed up and considered 
against the background of the existing 'shared values'.
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Greenfield implies that we should be aware of what is 
fact and what is value, but that facts and values are 
intertwined. He criticises the S c i e n t i f i c 1 approach 
of the "New Movement" because it tried to imply that 
administrators can make rational decisions, free of any 
moral implication. In his paper, "The Decline and Fall 
of Science in Educational Administration"(1986), he states:
"If nothing else, we must understand that the
new science of admi n i s t r a t i o n " ....... (his
subjective p e r s p e c t i v e )........ "will be a science
with values and of values".
(Greenfield 1986 p75)
Shared Values: A Political Perspective?
The conception of shared values implies a political 
perspective, because it emphasizes consensus within a 
group about particular values, and again, brings up the 
question of whether managers should be creating policy 
rather than implementing it. Statements such as:
"A major task for the new management of education 
in Strathclyde is to reaffirm and clarify its 
chosen valu e s " ,
(INLOGOV 1989 Para 3.21 pl9)
do not make it clear that the chosen values are those 
of the Education Committee, rather than professional 
administrators.
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A Cybernetic Approach?
Another way in which the concept of the learning department 
can be interpreted is that of a cybernetic approach.
The concept, 'responsiveness' could be interpreted in
this way. Paragraph 4.16 states:
"If the education department is to achieve the
excellence it properly aspires to it must become 
a learning organisation. It must become open 
to and responsive to the expressed needs of 
the public. The department will want to know 
how its services are received by parents and
the community. It will want to review and
evaluate its achievements".
(INLOGOV 1989 Para 4.16 p24)
The last part of this citation could imply feeding
information into the system. Another passage could even 
suggest that the feedback idea is incorporated into an 
annual cycle. Under the title, "The Cycle of Strategic 
Management", the Report states:
"Whether we have been discussing learning from 
the public, policy planning and budgeting, staff 
development or performance review we have been 
describing a cycle in the process of strategic 
management. The process of clarifying purpose, 
elaborating guidelines, developing plans and
monitoring achievement become the annual routines 
at the heart of strategic management".
(INLOGOV 1989 Para 4.71 p38)
Morgan, in "Paradigms, Metaphors and Puzzle Solving in 
Organization T heory"(1980), implies that there is a 
cybernetic metaphor, which he places within a functionalist 
paradigm. He states:
"The cybernetic metaphor encourages theorists
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to view organizations as patterns of information, 
and focuses attention upon the way in which 
states of homeostatic balance can be sustained 
through learning processes based on negative 
feedback11.
(Morgan 1980 p615)
There is some indication, in the INLOGOV Report, that 
a balance is to be achieved in the quest for excellence. 
The requirement to learn from the community, (or 
environment), to feed relevant information back, is all 
part of the attempt to produce excellence within the
educational system.
Presumably, the learning is to be carried out in an attempt 
to refine the system, to achieve this excellence. If 
such a state could be achieved, then has the organisation
of education within Strathclyde reached homeostatic 
balance? It could be claimed that this implies some 
mediocre concept and that excellence is outwith the 
possibilities of administrative control. The term
certainly is used in a way that does not make it clear 
whether excellence refers to educational attainment within 
institutions, or excellence in the running of the 
administrative process.
For instance, paragraph 4.16, quoted earlier, refers to 
excellence of the education department at the start of 
the passage:
"If the education department is to achieve the 
excellence it properly aspires to” ,
(INLOGOV 1989 Para 4.16 p24)
but refers to promoting excellence of educational
achievement at the end:
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"A learning education service will have the 
confidence to involve the public i n .... promoting 
excellence of educational achievement".
(INLOGOV 1989 Para 4.16 p24)
Some clue to this is, perhaps, provided in the following 
p a r a g r a p h :
"An A u t hority needs accurate information
about what it is actually providing so that 
gaps can be identified in relation to need as 
well as information on the quality of provision".
(INLOGOV 1989 Para 4.17 p25)
The feedback into the system involves refining the system 
to eliminate gaps in provision, as well as the excellence 
of the service, where it is being provided. The concept 
of negative feedback could be relevant here, as the gaps, 
in a sense (minuses), presumably, would be filled (pluses).
The departure from the cybernetic model, perhaps, came 
in that striving for excellence was, may be, the feature 
of the system rather than excellence itself and, as such, 
cannot result in a homeostatic system, because striving 
implies attempting change.
However, if cybernetic influences can be identified it 
is interesting that this would, according to Morgan, imply 
links with a functionalist paradigm, which is often, as 
considered in earlier sections, tied philosophically to 
a systems perspective of administration.
INLOGOV and Functionalism.
There is much in the INLOGOV Report that implies 
functionalist systems perspectives. The concept,
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’strategic mana g e m e n t ’, itself, is seen as strong
management. At one point, the Report states:
’’These controls are powerful. The instruments 
of strategic management provide the only 
effective tools for controlling the direction 
of the service and ensuring its overall coherence 
in a time of rapid change";
(INLOGOV 1989 Para 5.12 p46)
almost an implication that the system must survive the 
changes occurring round about it. Also, in spite of the 
emphasis on participation and shared values being 
encouraged throughout the service, there are clear 
indications of line management control within the 
statements of the Report. For instance, paragraph 5.44 
s t a t e s :
"We recommend that there will be a clear line 
management relation between H.Q. and Divisions 
within the new framework. The Divisional 
Education Officers report to the Director of 
Education through the Senior Deputes. These 
senior officials have the authority if necessary 
to instruct the D.E.O.'s to take a particular 
course of action".
(INLOGOV 1989 Para 5.44 p52)
This line management outlines the structure of the system 
between headquarters, where the strategic management 
occurs, and the Divisions (local areas within Strathclyde 
Region) where the operational management and administration 
(using the Report's definition of the term, i.e., routine 
administration), takes place. INLOGOV states quite 
clearly, as a recommendation, that:
"...the function for the new Divisions is to 
concentrate upon the implementation of regional
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policy, together with operational management, 
administration and support to areas and their 
institutions".
(INLOGOV 1989 Para 5.34 p50)
Again, there is an implication here that the Divisions 
are where 'true' administration occurs, implementing the 
policy which has, presumably, been created at headquarters 
partly by paid officials who in creating policy must be 
making political decisions.
This is reinforced by the line management statement that 
Divisional Educational Officers, (D.E.O.s), who in effect 
are the heads of the Divisions, are directly accountable 
to Senior Deputes within headquarters.
Structure: the Adaptation of a Systems Concept.
The Report is also clear that it sees the structure of
the system as vitally important:
"Structures are important because they establish 
the principles of organisational working. This 
means that organisational leaders need, 
continually, to review the design of their 
organisation as they alter purpose and 
direction".
(INLOGOV 1989 Para 5.81 p60)
Here, the concept of structure is linked directly to
organisational working, in a way that implies the systems 
concept of a real organisation, with clear interlocking 
parts, that serve the whole.
It could be argued that there are traces here of the
organismic concept of organisation which Greenfield sees 
as the epitome of pos i t i v i s t i c , (systems), approaches.
For instance, in his 'new perspective' paper he states:
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"In systems theory, the prevailing image of 
the organization is that of an organism. 
Organizations exist; they are observable entities
which have a life of their o w n ......Following
the Darwinian logic inherent in their image 
of the organization, systems the o r i s t s .... see 
small, quick-witted, democratic organizations 
replacing the ponderous, bureaucratic forms
now expiring around us".
(Greenfield in Hughes (Ed.) 1975 pp79-80)
It could almost be claimed that INLOGOV is trying to 
replace a bureaucratic organisation with, if not a smaller, 
a more cohesive structure of organisation which, through 
the process of strategic management, would be quick-witted 
with the concept of concentrating policy decisions at 
headquarters, while the call for the Education Department
to be a learning department and responsive to the
community, emphasizes the feeling in Greenfield's statement 
for democracy.
Staff Control.
Emphasis on control is also exemplified in the Report 
by its attitude to staffing. It is critical of the
existing structure where administrative appointments to 
the Education Department are made through a personnel
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department, whereas teachers and manual staff appointments 
are made within the Education Department, and proposes 
that all appointments be made within the Education 
D e p a r t m e n t :
"The Education Department should have the same 
responsibility for all its staff in the field 
of personnel management".
(INLOGOV 1989 Para 6.5 p77)
This is linked clearly to tighter control of staff. 
Paragraph 6.7 states:
"Staff would be managed closer to the point 
of delivery and accountability would be
sharpened".
(INLOGOV 1989 Para 6.7 p77)
There is an implication that staff should settle disputes 
within the Department rather than through trade union 
a c t i v i t y :
"Education would negotiate more with its own 
staff. At the moment industrial relations are 
highly centralized. If personnel management 
responsibilities were to be delegated to 
education, then it should take on more 
responsibility for negotiating with staff, 
particularly at the divisional level, with the 
role of the Personnel Department being minimal".
(INLOGOV 1989 Para 6.6 p77)
This could be interpreted as an attempt to prevent the 
publication of disputes and give an appearance to outsiders 
of a cohesiveness, (sharing of values?), that perhaps 
does not exist.
Griffiths saw trade union activity as a counter balance
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to systems perspectives on organisations. In "Intellectual 
Turmoil in Educational Administration"(1979), he states:
"Theories of organizations have been written 
as though there are no u n i o n s .... Failure to 
incorporate unions into organizational theories 
have caused the theories to be incomplete in
that a major influence on the behaviour of both 
managers and workers has been omitted".
(Griffiths 1979 p47)
In an attempt to reduce industrial relations activity
at central level in the settling of disputes, it could
be argued that the INLOGOV Report is proposing a tight
systems perspective, in terms of personnel control. There 
is certainly a strong emphasis, in the Report, on 
accountability and staff appraisal:
"We recommend...... that the Authority and the
Department will have to place more emphasis 
on quality control and assurance, inter alia,
b y : ......3, 'Implementing a scheme of appraisal,
initially for managers within the Department, 
for professional officials such as advisers, 
educational psychologists etc., and for promoted 
teachers and lecturers in schools and colleges:"
(INLOGOV 1989 Para 4.69 p37)
Indications of Looser Control at the Periphery.
However, except perhaps on the question of staff appraisal 
within schools, such concepts of tight control and 
systematic approaches, while existing both within and 
between headquarters and the Divisions, do not appear 
to apply between Divisional Offices and the level of 
individual schools and colleges, where the emphasis is 
on strengthening local autonomy.
The Report may be reflecting the constraints of
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contemporary government decisions about school boards, 
but it appears to endorse such autonomy. This is part
of the R e p o r t ’s strategy to achieve the responsiveness 
it requires in its organisational structure:
’’The purpose of our organisational design is 
to improve the responsiveness of the Service 
to the needs of children and adults, and parents, 
employers and the community".
(INLOGOV 1989 Para 5.47 p52) 
and in the next paragraph it states:
’’This can be achieved we recommend by creating 
a strong counterpoint at the periphery to the 
Department: by strengthening the institutions
and by strengthening the capacity of an area 
to identify local ne eds” .
(INLOGOV 1989 Para 5.48 p52)
This is partly to be achieved through Community Forums, 
which are to have a grant giving capacity:
"We recommend that the Community Forums have 
a grant giving capacity which can enfranchise 
users of education in order to encourage greater 
responsiveness of service providers to the needs 
of the community".
(INLOGOV 1989 Para 5.71 p57)
Such ideas introduce possibilities for political influence 
at the local level to individual institutions, but by 
operating as a social collective of individuals would 
not imply an individual subjectivist input.
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More Indications of Varied Coupling.
The proposal of strengthening the periphery could be 
analysed from the point of view of organisational coupling. 
It appears that tight coupling is to operate between 
headquarters and the Divisions but looser coupling is 
to operate between the Divisions and the individual schools 
and colleges. Yet, there is a contradiction here, because, 
while the hierarchy between headquarters and the Divisions 
suggests tight coupling the type of managerial 
responsibility within the Divisions suggests loose 
c o u p l i n g .
Could this be an indication that an ambiguity model is 
appropriate? It was suggested earlier in this section 
how Weick considered that loose coupling was linked to 
responsiveness and adaptation to change, a central feature 
of the INLOGOV Report, but do the R e p o r t ’s attempts to 
be responsive to changed needs and requirements imply 
that the model they have constructed, of strategic 
management and operational management, shows ambiguity 
over the exact functions and links between the different 
stages? The concept of coupling could be used to interpret 
this as being the case, as indicated above.
If there is ambiguity, can this be linked to a subjective 
approach? Bolman and Deal linked ambiguity models within 
their symbolic approach, as considered in Section 6. 
In that section, it was considered that Bolman and Deal's 
symbolic approach most closely resembled the approach
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of Greenfield, because it did not emphasise rationality, 
and because it had an emphasis on meaning for the 
i n d i v i d u a l .
The link between subjective and ambiguity models for Bolman 
and Deal came through the idea that such approaches
involved myths, rituals and ceremonies. However, it was 
considered earlier how such concepts could mask 'true'
subjective meaning, or impose meanings on the individual; 
a departure from Greenfield's position. INLOGOV may 
suggest ambiguity over the exact functions and links
between different stages of the system but, if this is
to be related to subjective approaches, it would be 
necessary to establish that myths or rituals are involved. 
The question could be posed as to whether the concept
of responsiveness to changed needs and requirements could
be linked to the myth of change for change's sake, in 
other words the myth that change must be good.
However, it would appear that to imply that INLOGOV has
subjective sympathies, because it displays some signs 
of ambiguity, is to endorse a tenuous connection. Many
other commentators within educational administration, 
as indicated in Section 6., do not link subjective 
approaches with ambiguity models.
Concluding Comments.
The problem of trying to analyse the INLOGOV Report from 
a theoretical point of view is that it sends out so many 
conflicting signals. It is possible to find passages 
that indicate a sympathy with a subjective approach, with 
suggestions of seeing things from other people's point 
of view, (Gestalt switching?), and endorsing a 
participatory theme where the views of the community, 
(their meanings?), are to be absorbed into the decision
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making structure.
The Report places high emphasis on the need for structure, 
(systems perspective?), and the concept of strategic 
management operates through a structure that clearly exists 
between the headquarters, where the strategic management 
is to take place, and the Divisions, where operational 
management occurs. The linking of operational management 
with routine administration also poses the problem of 
the meanings of the words A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 1 and 
* m a n a g e m e n t 1. The Report appears to define these words 
purely for its own ends to help it justify the importance 
of strategic management. However, the emphasis on the 
involvement of strategic management with policy decisions 
raises the question of the political nature of such 
management, and whether paid officials are being asked 
to make political decisions. When this is linked to the 
stress on responsiveness, in the Report, then there is 
a strong indication that a political perspective is being 
proposed, within the terms of Sander and W i g g i n s 1 
classification.
The fact that Sander and Wiggins see responsiveness, tied 
to a participatory methodology, as able to uncouple tight 
organisations, is relevant to the INLOGOV Report because, 
as indicated earlier, evidence can be found of loose 
coupling between the Divisions and individual institutions, 
(schools and colleges), and there is evidence of loose 
coupling between headquarters and the Divisions, over 
the management tasks involved and yet, tight coupling, 
(line management), in terms of the hierarchical structure 
of responsibility. As implied earlier, this could be 
cited as an indication of ambiguity.
There are indications too of a cybernetic metaphor being
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applied, under Morgan's classification, with the striving 
for excellence through the feedback of information into 
the system, and the concept of the Education Department 
being a 'learning department'.
Sympathies with subjective approaches could at first sight 
appear to be evident with the stress the Report places 
on values. Closer examination, however, reveals that 
these values are not the individual values of subjects, 
but collective values which are, in effect, to be imposed 
on the departmental staff, although this is disguised 
through the concept that, if staff understand the values, 
they will be more likely to accept them.
Shared values inevitably imply more indications of a 
political perspective, as shared values must be agreed 
within a group of individuals, and the Report itself 
considers it acceptable to synthesize the values of the 
Education Department, from the reports that the Department 
has produced.
Greenfield would criticise the INLOGOV Report, immediately, 
on the grounds that it uses the concept, 'organisation' 
u nproblematically, as if organisations are real entities, 
with a life of their own, and can react to other real 
organisations, (the environment), around them. There 
are even indications that organisations are viewed as 
interlocking parts, that serve the whole, the organismic 
approach, that Greenfield's critics see as extreme 
scientism, and not characteristic of a more open systems 
approach. For instance, Willower attacks Greenfield for 
his extreme scientism, as indicated in earlier sections.
The need to adapt to change, that the Report proposes, 
would be criticized by Greenfield, as quick-witted 
organisations adapting to their environments, in order
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to survive and prosper.
As indicated in earlier sections, G r e e n f i e l d ’s stance 
is in many ways unique, because it proposes a different 
philosophical orientation to the study of organisations,
through the concept that all organisational activity must 
be seen as human constructs, through the eyes of the 
individual subject. While there may be many conflicting 
signals sent out by the INLOGOV Report in terms of 
theoretical approaches to educational
administration/management, the underlying philosophy would 
probably be seen by Greenfield as positivistic and
functionalist, and not part of his subjective orientation. 
It is only G r e e n f i e l d ’s approach that stresses the 
subjective reality of organisations. All other 
perspectives, including ambiguity models, treat the 
concept, ’organisations' as real and unproblematic, as
indicated in earlier sections.
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SECTION 9.
INTERSUBJECTIVITY, C U L T U R E , CHAOS AND THE
IRREVERSIBILITY OF TIME; THE WAY AHEAD?
In the preceding sections it has become clear that 
Greenfield's subjective approach provides new insights 
into educational administration. For instance, the 
emphasis on the individual and the attempt to see 
educational organisations through his meanings and 
interpretations, brings into focus the problem of the 
objective reality of organisations.
Yet, at the same time, these new insights are provided 
at a cost. For instance, his view that organisations 
can only be studied through the eyes of the individual, 
the meanings and interpretations he brings to the 
situation, makes it difficult to carry out studies on 
individual educational organisations. The emphasis on 
the subject leads Greenfield, as indicated in earlier 
sections, to propose ethnographic individual case studies 
as the direction for research in educational 
administration, with a criticism of systems approaches, 
with their emphasis on statistical analysis and computer 
aided research.
Attempts to bridge the gap between systems approaches 
and subjective approaches provide difficult challenges 
in educational administration. The same problem, however,
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appears within the justificatory philosophical sources 
upon which Greenfield draws.
It has been indicated earlier, (Sections 1. and 2.), that 
Greenfield draws on W e b e r ’s 'verstehen' approach, based 
on the ’method of understanding’, which Greenfield 
originally interpreted as phenomenological, rather than 
the work of Schutz, who, although regarded as a 
ph e n o menologist, attempts to tackle the concept, 
’intersubjectivity’ .
In ’’Alfred Schutz: An Intellectual Biography*'(1983), Wagner 
describes how Schutz criticised and elaborated on Husserl's 
attempts to tackle the problem of intersubjectivity. 
Wagner states that:
"... h e ” ....(S c h u t z )  "drew up ’a partial
catalogue of the main difficulties.’ (1) In
transcendental reduction, 'no transcendental 
community, no transcendental We, is ever 
established.' Each transcendental ego does 
constitute the world and all other subjects, 
but 'just for himself.' (2) The formulation, 
’a plurality of transcendental egos', must be
put in doubt. The transcendental ego is
'conceivable only in the singular.' The 
assertion of a transcendental community is
proble m a t i c  (3) The ’constitution of
transcendental intersubjectivity' is performed 
by 'I, the meditating philosopher' who, after 
the transcendental reduction, exists in 'a unique 
philosophical solitude' yet is also said to
perform the transcendental epoch£ in community 
with others. How could that be possible?"
(Wagner 1983 p319-320)
Schutz appears to try to approach the problem of 
intersubjectivity through the concept of the 'life-world'. 
Wagner states that Schutz considered:
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"...that the life-world is 'the basis of meaning 
of transcendental phenomenology,' while the
latter, after having itself cut off from this 
basis by way of phenomenological reduction, 
constitutes the 'world' and with it 
intersubjectivity".
(Wagner 1983 p314)
The philosophical problem is that an individual can only 
perceive other individuals as similar to himself or herself 
in terms of being conscious individuals, but can in no 
way enter these other consciousnesses. The existentialist 
concept of 'being-in-the-world' tries to overcome this 
problem by immersing these individual subjective 
consciousnesses in a shared life-world, presumably in 
the world of shared experiences.
It has been indicated earlier, (Sections 1. and 2.), that 
Greenfield does at times move towards an existentialist 
position, but with his later use of Hodgkinson as indicated 
in Section 2., he never really appears to fully endorse 
an existentialist position, perhaps because it represents 
a departure from the integrity of the subject and his 
own individual meanings that he brings to a situation.
C u l t u r e .
It is possible that the philosophical problems of 
intersubjectivity in educational administration could 
be side-stepped through the concept, 'culture'; the idea 
that, although individual consciousnesses are unique and 
incapable of combination, they can share something called 
'a c u l t u r e '.
However, this term is also difficult to define. In 
"Cultural Analysis"(1984), Wuthnow, Davison Hunter, 
Bergesen and Kurzweil state:
239
” ...culture may be provisionally defined as 
the symbolic - expressive aspect of human 
behavior. This definition is sufficiently broad 
to take account of the verbal utterances, 
gestures, ceremonial behavior, ideologies, 
religions, and philosophical systems that are 
generally associated with the term culture".
(Wuthnow et. al. 1984 p3)
However, the authors of "Cultural Analysis" imply that 
the analysis of the term has been hindered by seeing it 
in too much of a subjective way. They consider that:
"...cultural analysis has been inhibited... b y .. . 
assumptions about the nature of culture itself.
These assumptions have relegated culture to 
the realm of subjective thoughts and feelings 
held by individuals and have attempted to explain 
them away rather than identify systematic
patterns among the elements of culture itself".
(Wuthnow et. al. 1984 p7)
Such assumptions about the nature of culture clearly do
not help culture to be used, as a tool, to bridge the
intersubjective gap. However, much later in their final
section, they state:
"The advantages of incorporating subjectivity
in cultural analysis are not
i n significant... Cultural reality, in as much
as it is a human phenomenon, is necessarily 
rooted at some level in human subjectivity.
And while culture is clearly analytically
distinct from human subjectivity, it profoundly
and continuously affects human consciousness".
(Wuthnow et. al. 1984 p242)
The problem, however, as seen with Greenfield's subjective 
approach, lies in the difficulties of reconciling and 
accommodating many individual subjective meanings. Wuthnow
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et. al. state:
"...a variety of unresolved problems plague 
the task of incorporating subjectivity into 
cultural analysis; problems that translate into 
unqualified disadvantages. Empirically, this 
general approach argues that access must be 
gained to the inner ruminations of the actor 
to determine the subjective intentions in a 
social situation. These must be reconstructed 
for each unique social situation in which the 
actor is involved."
(Wuthnow et. al. 1984 p243)
Culture: Subjective Thoughts and Objective Social Action.
Williams sees two approaches to the study of culture which 
have failed adequately to address each other's problems. 
One is a subjective approach which he describes thus:
"Dilthey defined method through the difficult 
concept of 'verstehen' - a 'sympathetic 
understanding' or 'intuitive grasp' of human
social and cultural f o r m s  This emphasis
passed into the work of Max Weber and thus into 
one tendency in modern sociology".
(Williams 1981 pl5)
Clearly, there is a link here to Greenfield, through the 
'method of understanding', 'verstehen', which, through 
Weber, has formed one of Greenfield's main concepts.
The other approach Williams sees as the concentration 
on cultural facts through the observation of cultural 
institutions; in other words, a more objective approach. 
This forms the other contribution to modern sociology 
when he states:
"...different ideas were also contributing to
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the formation of modern sociology. These 
stressed the discovery, by the different method 
of objective observation and recording (often 
by analogy with the natural sciences), of the 
laws of social organization” .
(Williams 1981 ppl5-16)
Like the authors of "Cultural Analysis", Williams sees 
problems in trying to incorporate 'verstehen1, (a 
subjective approach) into a study of culture. He considers 
t h a t :
"The method of 'verstehen* could be quite 
insufficiently explanatory, or could fall back 
for explanation on a (theoretically circular) 
'informing spirit'",
(Williams 1981 pl6) 
but sees problems too with the 'scientific' method:
"The method of objective observation, while 
accumulating indispensable empirical data, was 
often insufficiently conscious of the nature 
of some of the less tangible cultural processes, 
of these as elements of history and, crucially, 
of the effects on observation of the specific 
social and cultural situation of the observer".
(Williams 1981 pl6)
The effects of observers on studies have been considered 
earlier in the ethnographic and anthropological section, 
while the 'less tangible cultural process' could link 
back to the debate that subjective ethnographic techniques 
provide richness at the expense of systematic rigour.
Hence, according to Williams, culture analysis divides 
into the subjective/objective dichotomy in much the same 
way as the subjective/systems debate within educational 
administration. He states, for instance:
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"The study of cultural forms and works continued, 
by an obvious affinity, to be practised by 
exponents of 'verstehen1. Elsewhere, within 
mainstream sociology, the cultural facts which 
were most amenable to observational analysis 
were primarily institutions and the cultural 
'products' of institutions".
(Williams 1981 pl6)
Wuthnow et. al. consider that there may be much to be 
said for ignoring the subjective implications of culture 
and focusing on observable manifestations of culture.
They state that:
"While there are certain benefits gained by 
including the subjective dimension in cultural 
analysis, much appears to be gained by excluding 
it from explicit consideration in analysis as 
well. The primary benefit as far as scientific 
advancement is concerned is that the elementary 
units of culture become, by definition, strictly 
ob s ervable".
(Wuthnow et. al. 1984 p246)
So presumably, by focusing on the observable aspects of 
culture, the ceremonial behaviours, ideologies, religions 
and philosophical systems in their original definition, 
(in the first citation by Wuthnow et. al. in this section), 
scientific advancement becomes possible.
However, it seems that as soon as one does this, one loses 
any linking concepts that culture may be able to provide 
between the subjective realm and the objective realm.
Like Williams, it is the relating of culture to the social 
structure that is seen by the authors of "Cultural 
Analysis", as the traditional approach to culture through
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traditional sociology. They state:
"...cultural analysts have long operated within 
the framework of a perspective which has sought 
scientific explanations for cultural phenomena 
in different configurations of social interaction 
- the social structure. Indeed the dominant 
tendency has been to reduce culture - its causes, 
its form and quality - to social structural 
considerations".
(Wuthnow et. al. 1984 p247)
Communication and Human Behaviour.
In his work "Culture and Society 1780-1950",(1961),
Williams sees a link between communication and the
’experience of men', which could be interpreted in a 
subjective way to imply subjective experience. If this
is the case, then Williams appears to suggest that
subjective experience is a necessary pre-condition for 
communication, which, for changing cultures, can effect 
’aspects of activity' which, presumably, forms part of 
the objective domain visible through direct observation. 
He states:
"The minds of men are shaped by their whole 
experience, and the most skilful transmission 
of material which this experience does not 
confirm will fail to communicate. Communication 
is not only transmission; it is also reception 
and response. In a transitional culture it 
will be possible for skilful transmission to 
affect aspects of activity and belief, sometimes 
decisively. But, confusedly, the whole sum 
of experience will reassert itself, and inhabit 
its own world".
(Williams 1961 p301)
The last sentence of the above quotation implies the 
strength of subjective experience to withstand cultural
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transmission.
Wuthnow et. al. also suggest that communication could 
provide the required link between the subjective and the 
objective realm. They consider that it is possible:
"...to define communication as an analytic aspect 
of human behavior from the standpoint of the 
observer; hence, behavior can be regarded as 
having expressive qualities whether its intended 
purpose is primarily communication or not.
In these terms cultural analysis becomes the 
examination of the symbolic - expressive aspect 
of behavior, whether that behavior is oriented 
primarily toward the discussion of values or 
the rational - purposive manipulation of the 
material world".
(Wuthnow et. al. 1984 p255)
By linking behaviour, something that can be observed for 
individual subjects, to communication, which has links 
to the social structure through the system of 
communication, with the accompanying rituals, ceremonies 
and practices in the observable objective world, a useful 
definition for cultural analysis has been provided. 
However, it is still questionable as to whether the gap 
between subjective and objective has really been bridged. 
Behaviour tends to be seen in terms of actions, in as 
much as both are observable for the individual human 
subject. Greenfield's approach, however, goes beyond 
this to the unobservable meanings that the actor brings 
to a situation. So while defining culture as the ’symbolic 
- expressive' aspect of human behaviour, (in order to 
see possible links with the results of the collective 
behaviour of individual subjects on the social world,) 
may have bridged the gap at the level of individual 
actions/consequences for society, it may still leave the 
problem of intersubjectivity at the level of how the 
meanings of individual consciousnesses can link with their
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resulting social behaviour, (which can be observed.) 
Whilst in the transcendental phenomenological sense each 
subject may be an island of common thoughts isolated from 
all others, as soon as he starts to act on those thoughts 
he may take into account the action and behaviour of
o t h e r s .
The problem is still to relate the cultural aspects of 
thought patterns to the cultural aspects of behaviour, 
with the added problem of whether there is a common 
cultural aspect between the two different levels of thought 
and action.
It is possible that this common aspect could be language. 
While not all thoughts are linguistic, many are, and 
can thus be linked to verbal behaviour. In as much as
language is culturally produced, it is evidence of culture 
entering into the meanings and interpretations of 
individual subjects.
Wuthnow et. al. consider its importance. They state:
"Just as formal language exists according to 
identifiable patterns, so the 'language' of
tacit communication in ordinary social life 
more generally may conform to observable rules.
Schutz (and Berger a fortiori) drew on the fact 
of different styles of language within different 
contexts as a basis for identifying discrete 
provinces of meaning".
(Wuthnow et. al. 1984 p262)
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It may be that it is the language itself that acts as
the cultural transmitter between subject, thought and 
social action, rather than the system of communication, 
i.e. speech or the written word. However, the problem 
of whether culture pervades the interaction between 
subjects and the subjective meanings they bring to that 
interaction when non-verbal communication is used, i.e. 
gestures, images, etc., would remain problematic.
For instance, does culture provide a link between the 
subjective meanings of an artist which he brings to his 
picture, and the meanings, (interpretations), that the 
viewer takes from the picture? Viewing a painting could 
perhaps, at first sight, be regarded as an ultimate 
subjective experience, in as much as the viewer probably 
brings his own subjective meanings to the painting and
interprets it for himself.
Yet, at the same time, the artist may influence the 
meanings of the viewer, even if he does not impose his 
meanings on him. The artist may intend not to influence
the viewer; he may think he is providing an artistic 
experience that can be interpreted in many different, 
perhaps conflicting, w a y s .
However, he may unwittingly communicate cultural patterns 
to the observer through his painting. It is certainly 
feasible that culture could pervade non-verbal
c ommu n i c a t i o n .
Another problem with regarding language as the primary 
cultural transmitter is the question of what happens when 
communication cuts across language boundaries, through 
translation. If a subject communicates through an 
interpreter to another subject, how much cultural 
transmission is lost in the translation? Does not the
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input of a third subject, the translator, help to block 
cultural transmission, by providing a mediating influence 
in the process? Even if both subjects are bilingual, 
can aspects of culture simply be lost in translation?
From a subjective point of view, the first subject either 
has to translate his meanings before attempting to 
communicate them verbally, or rely on the second subject 
interpreting them through his own translation. All this 
must cast doubt on whether there can be common cultural 
aspects between the levels of thought and action. It 
would seem that a subject must be greatly influenced by 
the language he normally thinks in and yet, at the same 
time, it would appear that there are cultural aspects 
even to non-verbal communication, as indicated.
The notion of intersubjectivity is strengthened through 
the concept of cultural transmission and the sometimes 
unwitting influence of one subject or another.
However, in the case of the artist, there is the question 
of whether his subjective thoughts are linked culturally 
to his actions in painting the picture. He could produce 
something different to what he initially intended, 
especially if the painting was produced over several 
sittings, and was influenced by subsequent meanings 
inspired by the contemporary state of the painting. If 
this is the case, he has failed to communicate his initial 
subjective meanings to his actions on the canvas.
This could weaken the notion of cultural influence as 
his initial subjective meanings could be mediated by later 
subjective meanings, imposed by the physical situation 
at a later time, (i.e. the state of the painting), which, 
in turn, affects his consequent actions. His initial 
intentions, (meanings), with any accompanying cultural
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aspects that may permeate them, may be lost. This 
highlights the problematic nature of trying to bridge 
the vast gulf between the thought processes of one subject 
and those of another.
Cultural Boundaries.
The authors of ’'Cultural Analysis" suggest that progress 
may be made through the concept of cultural boundaries 
and what happens at the margins of cultural concepts. 
They state:
"Regarding culture as an observable aspect of 
human behavior lays emphasis on the realities 
of symbolic boundaries. Not only do they exist 
as conceptual distinctions in person's minds; 
they are publicly visible in the manner in which 
social interaction occurs, in discourse, and 
in tangible objects".
(Wuthnow et. al. 1984 p261)
A link between the subjective and social realm is provided 
because these boundaries exist in the meanings of 
individuals, in as much as they perceive them to exist, 
and also, in the resulting boundaries within the observable 
culture patterns within society. However, there is always 
the risk that the perceived boundaries may not correspond 
with the observed boundaries in society, and that 
individual subjects may not perceive the observable 
cultural boundaries in the same way. So called, observable 
cultural boundaries, that exist within the social structure 
could be interpreted in different ways. This could 
certainly be true of the cultural boundaries of status, 
qualifications, salaries, etc. that might appear in 
educational organisations. While Wuthnow et. al. stress 
'the realities of cultural boundaries', Greenfield would 
probably question the reality of these boundaries as being
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subjective reality. Thus the tacitly accepted cultural 
boundaries within educational administration, between 
status levels, qualifications, responsibilities, salaries, 
etc. just like the concept, 'organisation* itself, could
be seen, by Greenfield, to have no meaning except that 
which individual subjects perceive.
Again, the fact has to be faced that the observable 
cultural boundaries in the social structure of, say,
educational institutions are, to take a subjective 
approach, simply observed through the eyes of individual 
subj e c t s .
As indicated earlier, in as much as culture is transmitted 
through language, the one cultural boundary that may appear 
to coincide for both subject and the observer is that 
of a language barrier. If a subject is unable to speak 
a foreign language, when he visits a country, where that 
language is almost exclusively spoken, this must seem
like a real cultural boundary to him. He has to create 
subjective meaning out of a reality that may appear 
incomprehensible to him at first. At this stage the
socially observed cultural boundary of language must seem 
very real, yet the subjectivist may still claim that this 
reality is apparent reality, seen through the eyes of 
the subject; that he only perceives the cultural boundary 
of language. For the subject placed in the situation 
will, after a while, find ways to communicate through 
gestures and visual images, providing the possibility 
of culture transmission through non-verbal communication, 
yet cultural analysts would probably argue that his success 
in communicating will be limited, and that the language 
difference still presents a real culture boundary to him.
So an analysis of cultural boundaries may fail to provide 
the links between the subjective and the objective domain 
of the world surrounding the individual subject.
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C h a o s .
Care needs to be taken in the use of the word ’chaos* 
to describe the state of educational administration. 
'Chaos' in the sense of the conflict produced by lack 
of agreement is acceptable, for instance, when Greenfield 
is seen as 'plunging educational administration into chaos' 
after the 1974 I.I.P. address.
However, it is important to realise that this should not 
be taken to imply chaos in the sense of randomness. It 
could be argued that the Greenfield/Griffiths debate and 
the resulting paradigm diversity that followed, was not 
random; that clear arguments on both sides were put forward 
and, as has just been shown in this section over the 
question of culture, the subjective/objective divide 
appears often in the social sciences and is not a question 
of randomness, but a question of the apparent 
incompatibility of ideas.
Chaos in the sense of randomness, especially as it is 
now appearing in the natural sciences, to imply an inherent 
property of nature, cannot be easily extended to the field 
of educational administration, because of wilful human 
intervention. This is particularly true of a subjective 
approach, like G r e e n f i e l d 's , where the emphasis is clearly 
on subjective meanings, which are to be treated with 
integrity. This is certainly not a random process, as 
the individual is responsible for his subjective meanings, 
the interpretation he brings to a situation.
However, it is possible that the natural science concept 
of chaos could find application in the 'Garbage Can' model 
of educational administration.
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The ’Garbage C a n 1 Model and Chaos.
It is important to realise that there could be links 
between 'Garbage Can' models and the notion of chaos that 
is emerging in the natural sciences. The apparent 
universality of the application of the mathematics of 
non-linear equations to the various natural sciences and 
economics suggests that links with educational 
administration might be worthy of consideration.
Cohen and March, in their 'Preface to the Second Edition', 
of "Leadership and Ambiguity"(1986) , state:
"First, we do not say and do not believe that 
university decision processes are chaotic in 
the sense of exhibiting total disorder. On 
the contrary, the discussions of organized 
anarchy and garbage can models of decision making 
emphasize the existence of considerable order.
What makes the processes seem disorderly and 
confusing is not the absence of order but the
fact that the order that we observe is different 
from that assumed in conventional theories of
ch o i c e " .
(Cohen and March 1986, Preface to the Second 
Edition pXV)
The notion of chaos in the natural sciences, is also, 
not of total disorder. Gleick, in "Chaos: Making a New
Science"(1988), considers that:
"Chaos has created special techniques of using 
computers and special kinds of graphic images,
pictures that capture a fantastic and delicate
structure underlying complexity".
(Gleick 1988 p4)
and later:
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"...chaos brought an astonishing message: simple 
deterministic models could produce what looked 
like random behavior. The behavior actually 
had an exquisite fine structure, yet any piece 
of it seemed indistinguishable from noise".
(Gleick 1988 p79)
The paradox of chaos theory, in the natural sciences, 
is that randomness and order seem so closely tied, and 
this tie occurs, not because of the introduction of 
conditions that cause randomness, but from the system 
itself. The mathematics of the system that is modelled 
by non-linear equations produces its own chaos; the chaos 
is inherent in the natural system being considered and 
is not due to external factors. To look for 'chaos1 in 
this sense in educational administration, it would be 
necessary to study a system in isolation.
Cohen and March state:
"A key to understanding the processes within 
organizations is to view a choice opportunity 
as a garbage can into which various problems 
and solutions are dumped by participants".
(Cohen and March 1986 p81)
If the participants, together with their problems and 
solutions, are part of the system then the 'Garbage Can' 
model may satisfy this condition. The fact that the 
'Garbage Can' model is capable of simulation on computers, 
also implies a mathematical process that is capable of 
isolation. Cohen and March state:
"Though the specification of the model is quite 
simple, the interaction within it is rather 
complex, so that investigation of the probable 
behavior of a system fully characterized by 
the garbage can process and our specifications
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requires computer simulation".
(Cohen and March 1986 p90)
Process Rather than State.
The fGarbage Can' model, capable of simulation on a 
computer, is a process that evolves over time. The timing 
of the problems and solutions arriving in the ’Garbage 
C a n 1, (choice opportunity), effects the operation of the 
system. Cohen and March state:
"Such a view of organizational c h o i c e  changes
over time. It calls attention to the strategic 
effects of timing (in the introduction of choices 
and problems)".
(Cohen and March 1986 p81)
The notion of the strategic effects of time were mentioned 
in Sections 5. and 6., where ’Garbage C a n ’ processes were 
considered. For this argument, it is important to notice 
that there is an emphasis on ’process'. Cohen and March 
consider that:
"The great advantage of trying to see garbage 
can phenomena together as a process is the 
possibility that that process can be understood".
(Cohen and March 1986 p91)
This is exactly what chaos theory is seen as, in the 
natural sciences. Gleick states:
"To some physicists chaos is a science of process 
rather than state, of becoming rather than 
b e i n g " .
(Gleick 1988 p5)
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The application of chaos in the natural sciences is always 
to a system that evolves over time, that is time dependent. 
Whether it is animal populations, economic systems, weather 
systems or the workings of the heart, the system is
modelled as it evolves over time. When chaos emerges,
it emerges over time, and is not present at all times,
when modelled by a non-linear equation, where one of the 
variables is time. It is possible that the computer 
simulation of the 'Garbage Can' process could rely on 
non-linear mathematical relationships, and so have the 
possibility of exhibiting chaos.
Application of the theory requires the system to operate 
free of effects produced by conscious decisions of 
indiv i d u a l s .
This does not mean that individuals within the system 
do not make conscious decisions and act on them, but that 
the effects on the whole system are not apparent. An
economic system obviously entails humans making decisions, 
but the global effects are not noticeable. (Everybody 
does not decide to spend all their money next Tuesday!).
If the 'Garbage Can' process is capable of computer 
simulation it would seem to accommodate this principle. 
It is difficult to see how individual conscious decisions, 
that could happen at any moment, and have an infinite 
nature of varieties, could be programmed into the computer.
It would seem that for educational administration 
approaches to exhibit the natural science notion of chaos, 
as mathematically inherent in the system, it must be 
capable of computer simulation. Other approaches, like 
systems approaches, may use computers to analyse data 
from organisations, but this is not the same as computer 
simulation of a process within an organisation.
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The emphasis on the whole process, that chaos theory 
implies, does not lend itself to application within a 
subjective perspective, where the emphasis, as indicated 
many times, is on the subject's meanings and perceptions 
of a situation.
The Concept, 'Theory*.
Trying to locate Greenfield's subjective approach amongst 
the background of the ideas and issues of educational 
administration presents great difficulties. It has been 
shown in earlier sections that Greenfield's approach stands 
out because of its different philosophical orientation. 
Other approaches do not question the reality of 
organisations even if, as with the ambiguity models, they 
imply that the manifestations of organisations, i.e. goals, 
environments and roles are difficult to detect. Subjective 
approaches also question the nature of theory by suggesting 
that the concept, 'theory' in the natural sciences, in 
terms of hypothesizing on the results of research data, 
is not applicable to educational administration. 
Greenfield, as considered many times in earlier sections, 
sees theories as sets of meanings of individual subjects. 
If the scientific concept of theory is not permissible 
then some concept of theory is required that is acceptable 
to all approaches, whatever their philosophical 
o r i e n t a t i o n .
The precise definition of the nature of theory is 
difficult, but Merton, in "Social Theory and Social 
S t r u cture"(1957), reminds us of its importance. He
considers that:
"Like so many words which are bandied about,
the word theory threatens to become emptied
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of meaning. The very diversity of items to
which the word is applied leads to the result 
that it often obscures rather than creates
u nderstanding".
(Merton 1957 p5)
Greenfield tends to focus on theory being developed in
individual situations, while systems approaches try to
develop more general scientific theories across wider 
areas. If theory is defined as an attempt to tackle issues 
which are pervasive over wide areas within educational 
administration, then it need not imply hypothesis building 
and testing. The issues of intersubjectivity, complexity 
and chaos are issues that are pervasive from one particular 
educational administration context e.g. a particular 
school, to another, say, a particular college. It could 
be argued that to try to bridge the intersubj ective gap 
is to imply the scientific notion of theory, in the sense 
that it is attempting to construct a hypothesis that links 
the two domains of subjective and objective together. 
It would seem likely, as indicated in this section, that 
such attempts fail because they are faced with 
irreconcilable problems of philosophical orientation.
One is trying to link theoretically, (in the scientific 
sense), two philosophical positions that, by their very 
nature, preclude each other's existence. However, if 
theory is seen as the act of clarifying these issues, 
in as much as one is considering issues that can pervade 
all areas of educational administration, and are highly 
abstract in nature, then it could be argued that one is 
involved with theoretical matters, (the attempted 
clarification of abstract issues,) without actual 
scientific hypothesis building being involved.
In other words, one can be engaged in theoretical matters 
without actually developing a theory, in the sense of
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creating a working scientific hypothesis and, as such, 
provide a distinction between the word 'theo retical1 and 
the word 'theory1. This could go some way to accommodating 
Greenfield's subjective position on the nature of theory.
It is also the stance taken to the concept 'theory' in 
this thesis. This thesis claims to be theoretical in 
the sense that abstractions from educational administration 
situations, e.g. the notion of paradigms, metaphors, 
approaches, (e.g. subjective, systems, ambiguity, neo- 
Marxist Critical Theory, etc.) and philosophical
orientations, have been examined in an attempt to clarify 
their nature and to look for both links and clear 
incompatibilities between them.
Taking an interdisciplinary approach and drawing on the 
fields of sociology of education, anthropology and 
ethnography, and organisation theory in general, and
relating ideas from these fields to educational 
administration, has reinforced the stance that theoretical 
issues are being considered through comparative study.
However, Section 8., on the INLOGOV Report, was included 
to indicate that these issues and ideas can have 
application in a particular educational administration
setting. The notion of theory being put forward in this 
thesis can be 'practical', in the sense that it has 
significance for individual educational institutions.
For instance, in the case of INLOGOV, the Report examines 
the procedures of administration and management in a 
particular local government education department.
This reinforces the point that these issues are important, 
that they do have application in the day-to-day workings 
of educational institutions, even if they are often 
disguised amongst a complexity, (that may be apparent
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or real!), and appear chaotic.
The Implications of Time Irreversibility for the Field 
of Educational Administration.
In Section 5., the anthropological and ethnographic concept 
of the importance of time was suggested as being applicable 
to educational administration. It was pointed out how 
Bourdieu suggested that natural science overcame the 
progression of time by making experiments repeatable, 
so that they could become time independent, capable of 
repetition at any point of time. Also, through the concept 
of gift exchange, Bourdieu stressed the strategic effects 
of timing which, as was pointed out, had application in 
Cohen, March and Olsen's 'Garbage Can' model of educational 
administration. They had suggested that, in their model, 
the strategic effects of timing had application in terms 
of the time pattern of available energy for dealing with 
the introduction of choices and problems to the model. 
This was elaborated in Section 6. into the concept, 'load' 
i.e. the rate at which problems arrive and are dealt with 
in the 'Garbage Can' model. Indeed, Cohen and March 
suggested that as the load increased, so did the way the 
problems were handled, increasing the use of 'flight' 
and 'oversight', (Cohen and March's terms defined in 
Section 6.), which could be seen as evasive action to 
deal with the load burden.
However, if the strategic effects of timing in the 'Garbage 
Can' model can be linked to the strategic effects of timing 
in gift exchange, then there is the possibility of a link 
between subjective and systems approaches. Gift exchange 
between one individual and another certainly has an element 
of intersubjectivity in it, if not subjectivity itself. 
At the same time, in Section 6., the 'Garbage Can' model, 
as an ambiguity model, was shown to be linked to systems
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approaches in terms of philosophical orientation. So 
could the importance of time provide the elusive link 
between the subjective and systems domains?
The Repeatability of Experiments.
If systems approaches are scientific do they exhibit the 
scientific concept of time independency through the 
repeatability of experiments? It may appear that it could 
be possible to construct systems experiments involving 
organisational goals, etc. that would be repeatable, and 
perhaps, capable of simulation on a computer, like the 
‘Garbage Can* model.
In the computer all variables are either controllable 
or ignored, and the simulation could be re-run at a 
different point of time, with the same variables, but 
what happens when the experiment is conducted in a real 
situation? Suppose an attempt was made to conduct the 
experiments at two points in time, with all physical 
variables apparently the same, and even the same people 
acting out their roles. For example, a planning meeting 
of an education committee could be re-enacted on two 
occasions using the same staff and the same outputs of 
information, policy, etc. There is the problem of the 
knowledge of the first experiment being carried forward 
by the participants to the second experiment. There is 
no going back to the time of the first experiment and, 
if nothing else, the biological clocks of the actors have 
moved forward, in other words, in the second experiment 
they are older!
They are not the same, even it they were able to cleanse 
their minds of all notions of the first experiment. 
Clearly, a systems experiment is not repeatable in the 
exact sense and, in this way, it shows the effects of
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the progression of time with subjectivists, like 
Greenfield, who claim that apparent organisations, as 
manifested in the subjective reality of individuals, can 
only be studied individually, one by one, at specific 
points of time.
Natural Science Experiments: Are They Really Time
Independent?
However, are experiments in the natural sciences really 
time independent? In biology, it is easily seen that 
an experiment involving the growth of a plant cannot 
possibly be repeated with the same individual specimen, 
repetition only being possible with a similar specimen. 
What is the position with physics experiments? In Section
6., it was suggested that the time variable can be 
reproduced because of the tight control of all other 
variables. But tight control is not absolute control, 
and it comes down to a question of the degree of control, 
and whether physicists consider that the errors are 
a c c e p t a b l e .
It may seem that physics experiments are repeatable. 
For instance, white light passing through a prism was 
performed by Newton and is repeatable by us today. But 
what about radiation experiments? In this case an 
individual source specimen is locked into its own decay 
pattern with the progress of time. A radioactive decay 
experiment is only repeatable with another specimen, (just 
like the plant in the biology experiment). However, it 
would seem, at first sight, that white light passing 
through a prism is an experiment that is time independent.
The problem is, how is the experimenter to make sure that 
the light source at both times is identical? If it is 
a tungsten filament lamp a slight change in the supply
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voltage to the lamp could produce a different spectrum, 
as the light emitted depends on the temperature of the 
lamp. If sunlight is used the time of day, (and year ), 
affects the colour of the sunlight as well as atmospheric 
factors. Then there is the prism. Even if the same 
specimen is used in both experiments, the molecular 
configuration could have changed slightly as its 
temperature will be above absolute zero* So even physics 
experiments, in an absolute sense, are locked into the 
progression of time. For all science, there is a link 
through the progression of time to subjective approaches, 
which respect that studies are individual, occurring in 
specific situations and specific points of time.
Can the Subjective Approach and the Systems Approach Share 
the Same Spatial/Time Universe?
If one imagines the subjectivist trying to interpret the
meanings of a perceived organisation at a specific point 
in time, and simultaneously imagines the systems researcher 
evaluating the organisation that he regards as real, then 
both are locked into the same time progression and, in 
as much as time is real and irreversible, they share a
common universe. Suppose an attempt is made to put the 
two together, to bring the subjective consciousness and 
the systems consciousness into one individual, then there 
is a problem.
It could be argued that it is not possible for one 
consciousness to have simultaneous thought patterns, i.e. 
one along subjective lines and one along systems lines, 
as the brain is only capable of having one thought track
at any one moment of time.
In Section 2., it was considered how Hodgkinson describes 
subjective reality in terms of levels which allowed
262
scientific investigation at lower levels, but not at the 
highest subjective levels. Greenfield uses this concept 
to argue for the integrity of the individual subject at 
the higher levels of subjective reality. Scientific 
penetration is available into the lower levels of reality, 
but not the highest levels, that are considered by 
Greenfield to be uncontrollable and unpredictable. The 
uniqueness of space/time, as it manifests itself in the 
individual human consciousness, presents the problem of 
whether Hodgkinson/Greenfield1 s levels of reality are 
capable of simultaneous appreciation within the one 
subj e c t .
Imposed Meanings and Schutzian Phenomenology.
Greenfield's implication that it is not possible to control 
these higher levels is at odds with Schutzian 
phenomenology, as outlined in Sections 2. and 3. In 
Section 3., it was indicated how Schutz attempts to grapple 
with this problem by stratifying the Life-world, in the 
context of space and time, into the zones of actual, 
restorable and obtainable reach. Schutz places special 
significance on the actual or potential reach, (that which 
is happening at present and that which is happening soon 
enough into the future to be anticipated,) because the 
subject sees the world as one to be controlled by him, 
under Schutzian phenomenology and, as such, this present 
and near future are of crucial importance, because it 
is in these points of time that the control will manifest 
itself. Presumably, the past, by definition, can not 
be controlled, because it is a 'fait accompli' and, as 
one progresses into the future, prediction becomes 
progressively more difficult, with a resulting 
deterioration in controllability.
The point is, that Schutz, with the benefit of his
acceptance of the imposition of meaning, was forced to 
consider the problems of the space/time instant, and the 
difficulties it presents for control and thus, imposed 
m e a n i n g s .
In Section 4., it was indicated that Schutz saw meaning 
as evolving over time, and not in the instant, and yet, 
it was pointed out that Greenfield saw meaning as occurring 
in the instant. This is a paradox in Greenfield's thinking 
for, although he classifies different levels of subjective 
reality, the meanings the subject brings to a situation 
are perceived in the instant, and would seem to suggest 
that Greenfield considers it possible to have a 
simultaneous subjective consciousness at different levels, 
those that are available to scientific enquiry, and those 
that are impenetrable.
False Consciousness and Hegemony.
The concept, 'imposed meanings' provides a link to false 
consciousness, defining the term as 'conditioning of the 
mind', as indicated in Section 4., where it was indicated 
that this concept could be useful, if stripped of its 
neo-Marxist ideological trappings. Such concepts as mass 
hysteria and charismatic appeal, would indicate that the 
mind can be conditioned to respond in certain ways outside 
the normal logical patterns of thought development. It 
is then possible to contemplate the concept, 'hegemony', 
discussed in Section 4., as being a useful tool, especially 
as Habermas sees the term being used, to indicate 
'distorted communication'. Habermas sees intersubjective 
activity resulting in only 'pseudo-communication' with 
individuals thinking they have understood each other when,
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in fact, understanding has not taken place. Such lack 
of communication could indicate an inability to penetrate 
the ultimate subjective reality of the other individual, 
as Greenfield suggests.
The question could be posed as to whether this lack of 
communication is linked to the inability of the human 
mind to think at different levels simultaneously. If 
one is responding in a conditioned way, when communicating 
with another subject, such that Habermas'
'pseudo-communication' is taking place and one's mind 
is conditioned through a false consciousness of the 
situation, then can the mind, at the same time, be 
responding at a higher level to process these thoughts 
as if they are true objective reality? In other words, 
can a subjective input be retained in the mind, at the 
highest level, while engaging in attempted intersubjective 
communication? If it is assumed that the mind is incapable 
of simultaneous thought in the instant of time, then again, 
it is impossible to link subjective meanings to the 
imposition of meanings that Habermas' hegemony and 
Schutzian phenomenology seem to imply.
Time irreversibility has the paradoxical effect of making, 
even compatible philosophies, incapable of combination 
within the individual consciousness, at any specific period 
of time progression.
Implications for Paradigm Diversity.
Such ideas certainly support the idea that paradigm 
diversity is here to stay. As pointed out in Section
7., it is not clear what is meant by a paradigm. It has 
been defined as a world view, a metaphor or a philosophical 
orientation. If paradigms are metaphors, then it raises 
the question as to whether they are manifested as literary
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thoughts, or as images in the mind? Time dependency is
involved, in as much as these images, or literary thoughts, 
evolve over time and provide a question as to whether 
paradigms are ’b o r n ’. Do they evolve out of a flash of
inspiration of through longer development of thought 
patterns? In Section 6., it was considered how there
is a distinction between abstract thought and innovative 
thinking, where it was postulated that abstract thinking, 
if it was at too complex a level, might inhibit innovative 
thinking, in as much as an uncluttered mind is freer to 
in n o v a t e .
Then it was pointed out that there is a problem over the 
extent to which innovative thinking is synonymous with 
inspirational thought. Horton's 'causal linkage* was 
discussed, the idea that abstract thinking encourages
thinking along certain preconceived, (pre-programmed?), 
lines of thought and it was indicated that the innovative 
mind might be able to resist causal linkage if it attempts 
to work within, outwith and across causal linkages. 
Such a mind, it was claimed in Section 5., might be capable 
of higher levels of innovative thinking than those 
restricted to innovation from concrete situations.
The time dependency of metaphor development depends, then, 
on whether it evolves out of inspirational thought through 
innovative thinking that may occur as flashes during a 
prolonged period of innovative thinking, or whether it 
is built up out of logical deductions from high levels 
of abstract thinking, hopefully free of the problems of 
causal linkage that Horton describes.
If paradigms, however, are philosophical orientations 
or total world views, then it would appear that they 
develop over longer periods of time as a result of much 
social interaction, in a similar way, perhaps, to the
266
way the Greenfield/Griffiths debate helped to crystallise 
out the parameters of the subjective approach.
In Section 7., it was indicated that paradigms might be 
rediscovered over long periods of time, but thought to 
be new, because the rediscovery would be mediated by the 
passage of time. As indicated, Greenfield's 'new 
perspective' could be thought of as a rediscovery of 
Harris' phenomenological thinking, that Culbertson reminds 
us about.
The Subjective/Systems Dichotomy.
However, returning to the subjective/systems dichotomy, 
as indicated earlier in this section, attempts to use 
the irreversibility of time to link subjective and systems 
approaches only works within the context of different 
subjects simultaneously working under the two perspectives. 
If it is assumed that educational administrators working 
on the earth are not subject to significant relativistic 
effects of time, then the uniqueness of the instant of 
present time, and the problems of simultaneous thought, 
make the two approaches irreconcilable within the one 
human consciousness. So the concept, 'irreversibility 
of time' has to join, intersubjectivity, culture and chaos 
as only providing very limited success in the attempts 
to reconcile the subjective and systems approaches.
If one were presenting a legal argument, then the weight 
of evidence would indicate a guilty verdict, in the case 
of 'the incompatibility of systems and subjective 
approaches within educational administration'.
However, as Greenfield reminds us, (Section 2.), proof 
of incompatibility, or indeed, disproof of compatibility 
are both problematic. Greenfield indicates this with
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the example of the swans. One black swan does not 
invalidate the premise, "all swans are white" for the 
swan could be dyed black, or it could have been crossed 
with another bird to produce a "swan like creature".
In the case of the systems and subjective approaches one 
has only been able to make a 'case1 for their
incompatibility. This does not constitute scientific 
proof, and indicates again that the field of educational 
administration cannot be seen purely in scientific terms.
Implications for Research, Training and Practice of 
Educational Administration.
The incompatibility of systems and subjective approaches
has, however, created a healthy creative tension in
educational administration, that goes back beyond 
Greenfield's 1974 1.1.P. address. Griffiths and the
followers of the "New Movement" provided, in the late 
1950's and early 1960's, an intellectual base to the study 
of educational administration, with their attempt to apply 
scientific principles of organisation theory to the field. 
It was this intellectual framework that Greenfield was
then able to criticise, and so lead to the present state
of paradigm diversity.
In other words, the incompatibility of the ideas of systems 
and subjective thinking is providing a rich intellectual 
debate, that has thrown up many important issues and ideas, 
(as indicated in this thesis), that may not have surfaced 
without the stimulus of the irreconcilability of the
subjective/systems dichotomy.
It would appear that research should continue to be
directed at intersubjectivity, if only to see what other 
ideas may surface.
2.68
The task of those wishing to train educational 
administrators is going to be very exacting, for they 
will require to introduce the trainees to the debate, 
and present it as highly significant to their development 
as administrators. In Section 7., it was considered how
textbooks on educational administration would have to 
adopt a historical perspective, in order to bring the 
student up to the present day situation. The scientific
notion of leaving out all but the most recent paradigm, 
(as Kuhn suggests scientific textbooks do), would not
be appropriate to educational administration because of
the present paradigm diversity.
A historical approach is probably the best way of 
introducing students to the debate, although great care 
will be required with any attempt to condense this history, 
in order to tailor it to course requirements.
When the students go out to practice educational 
administration they will take this knowledge with them 
which, whilst not obviously having application on their 
first day in their new post will, perhaps, over the years 
mingle with their experience, to provide new insights 
into specific situations they encounter.
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SECTION 10.
GREENFIELD 1S CONTRIBUTION TO
EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION.
In this final section, an attempt will be made to assess 
Greenfield's lasting contribution to educational 
administration. It is proposed to consider this 
contribution by reference to particular aspects of what 
might be regarded as 'mainstream' educational 
administration.
Such 'mainstream' educational administration concepts, 
i.e., those that practising educational administrators 
are most likely to be familiar with, it has to be said, 
will have been derived from systems theory. One thinks 
of concepts like 'organisation', 'goal', 'environment', 
'accountability', 'leadership', 'resources' and 'training' 
as forming the key concepts of systems theory.
It is proposed to take each of these concepts in turn 
and to try to assess what impact, if any, Greenfield has 
made in these areas, and then to reconsider what Greenfield 
proposes for future research. Finally, an assessment 
will be made of the consequences of Greenfield's 'new 
perspective' for the future of educational administration.
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O r g a n i s a t i o n .
Sections 2. and 6., have indicated the problematical nature 
of Greenfield's attitude to the concept, 'organisation'. 
In Sections 1. and 2., it was highlighted that Greenfield 
sees organisations as a subjective reality, with no 'real' 
existence, other than that which individual subjects 
perceive to exist. An organisation is simply a group 
of individuals who have come together for an overtly common 
purpose, although there is plenty of scope for conflict 
and tension under a subjective model.
This is widened in Section 6., on the ambiguity models 
where Weick's concept, 'loose coupling', highlights the 
division within organisations, and the 'Garbage Can' models 
of Cohen, March and Olsen stress that educational 
organisations can exhibit 'anarchy' in their workings.
However, the ambiguity models still treat the term, 
'organisation', unprobl e m a t i c a l l y , as if it is a 'real' 
concept that exists external to individual subjective 
perceptions. In other words, it is an entity which is 
treated as a 'concrete' object of the universe.
Greenfield's main contribution in relation to the concept, 
'organisation', is to highlight this problematical nature. 
In other words, while it could be argued that schools 
or college buildings are real, in a natural sense, along 
with all the artefacts inside them, and that people (the 
subjects) are real, in as much as they have a biological 
existence, what is not real are the groupings, 
arrangements, hierarchies, ambitions and, of course, goals 
of the schools and colleges.
Under Greenfield's perspective, these do not have a 
material existence in the physical sense, but merely exist
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as constraining ideas in the minds of individual subjects,
which, although they can be regarded as socially created,
in the final analysis, exist as constraints on the
behaviour of individuals (subjects). In other words, 
one is dealing with intangibles, that cannot be detected 
directly by the senses of the individual subject but are
inferred through interpretations of what his or her senses 
have detected.
G o a l .
Greenfield's contribution to the concept, 'goal' is very
much a consequence of his attitude towards the concept, 
’o r g a n i s a t i o n 1. As an organisation is not 'real1, but 
a subjective reality, he questions how it can have a goal. 
For Greenfield, as indicated in earlier sections, only
individuals can have goals. The 'apparent* goals of an
organisation are really the goals of individuals within 
the organisation. As indicated in Section 6., on the 
ambiguity models, one of the clearest indicators that 
ambiguity models should not be part of a subjective 
philosophical orientation is that, while they indicate 
that organisational goals may be indistinct and 
ill-defined, the implication is that they exist, if only
the appropriate methods could be developed to detect them. 
Thus Greenfield's main contribution, here, is to stress 
the problematical nature of organisational goals. Again, 
he has highlighted the fact that they do not exist in 
a physical sense and cannot be detected by the senses 
of human beings. They can only be inferred through the 
interpretations subjects place upon them.
Systems approaches often discuss the need for organisations 
to clarify their goals, and to relate them efficiently 
and effectively to all within the organisation, in order 
to contribute to the smooth running of the organisation.
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This, of course, is linked to the systems approach stress 
on consensus.
Ambiguity models, on the other hand, in stressing the 
unclear nature of organisational goals, are in sympathy 
with the subjective idea that consensus cannot be assumed. 
The point is, though, that the subjective approach takes 
this a step further, by implying that clarification of 
organisational goals would have to become clarification 
of the goals of individuals within the organisation, to 
other individuals within the organisation, with all the 
difficulties of interpretation of meaning, between 
individual subjects, that this implies. In other words, 
not only does the goal of a subject have to be clarified 
in his or her own mind, through his or her own meanings 
and interpretations, but then these subjective 
interpretations have to be relayed to another subject, 
and also be accepted by the receiving subject. Under 
Greenfield's orientation, (as stressed in Sections 2. 
and 3.), meanings cannot be imposed on the subject as 
they can under a Schutzian phenomenology.
In other words, such 'clarification of goals' would impose 
all the problems of crossing the intersubjective divide 
that were highlighted in the last section.
E n v i r o n m e n t .
Greenfield questions the systems idea of an organisation, 
reacting to its environment, by pointing out that 
'environment', is simply more people grouped in other 
organisations. In other words, when an organisation is 
seen to be taking account of the environment in which 
it operates, it is really the case that the subjective 
meanings of individuals, within the organisation under 
consideration, are taking account of the subjective
274
meanings of other individuals, who are not perceived to 
be part of their own organisation.
The relation of an organisation to its environment also 
raises questions about the nature of the boundary between 
the two concepts. If Greenfield's stance is taken, in 
relation to environments, then the organisation/environment 
boundary is really an organisation/organisation boundary. 
However, under Greenfield's subjective approach, since 
organisations are subjective realities, so must be their 
boundaries as well.
In other words, an organisational boundary is really a 
perception in the mind of an individual, who considers 
that boundary to exist. The systems view encourages 
organisations to 'clarify their boundaries', as lack of 
boundary clarification could lead to lack of organisational 
awareness and control.
Greenfield's approach, on the other hand, would suggest 
that the precise position of an organisational boundary 
cannot be determined, simply because different subjects, 
both within and out with organisations, would perceive 
it to be in different places, just as the nature of an 
organisation itself, under a subjective approach, only 
depends on the perceptions and interpretations of an 
individual. In other words, it only exists through the 
eyes of that individual, so that the precise position 
of a boundary can only exist within the interpretations, 
(meanings), of one individual subject.
As Greenfield 'honours' the integrity of the subject, 
i.e., his or her interpretation must be respected as valid, 
then it follows that the subjective perceptions of a 
boundary must be valid also. Hence, Greenfield has made 
a contribution by highlighting the diffuse nature of
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boundaries and questioning the possibility of boundary 
maintenance. In other words, if boundaries cannot be 
clearly defined, how can initiatives be developed to ensure 
their continued existence?
Accountability.
Under a systems perspective, the term A c c o u n t a b i l i t y 1 
can be considered to have three interpretations.
Firstly, individuals or groups v/ithin an organisation 
can be asked to explain, (give an account of), their 
actions to others. This could be to their superiors or 
to other groups within or outwith the organisation under 
consi d e r a t i o n .
Greenfield's contribution, in this respect, would focus 
on the fact that giving an account means explaining, or 
in subjective language, interpreting, one subject's actions 
to another subject, as under a subjective approach the 
interpretations of actions can only occur within the brain 
of individual subjects. Whilst there is scope for 
misinterpretation, and the individualistic nature of a 
subjective approach implies that different subjects will 
interpret in different ways, nonetheless, it would appear 
that Greenfield would see accountability, rendering an 
account, as a legitimate exercise.
However, it should be borne in mind that it can only occur 
at individual to individual level, and that there can 
be no 'real' concept of group accountability, either to 
other groups or individuals, as such group accountability 
could only be a subjective reality, only existing as 
perceptions in the minds of individuals.
The second aspect of accountability, under a systems
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perspective, would be the notion of justification; the 
idea that to explain actions is not enough. The individual 
or group, rendering the account, is also expected to 
justify their actions, to defend them as the ’right* 
actions to take in a certain situation.
G r e e n f i e l d ’s contribution to this concept of accountability 
would be linked to his ideas on values. Under his 
subjective perspective, the ’rig h t n e s s ’ or 'goodness' 
of values can only exist in the minds of individual 
subj e c t s .
Imputing value to something is a subjective process, unique 
to each individual. Hence, under Greenfield's subjective 
approach, to give an account at this level would not be 
possible, because, even at the level of an account from 
one individual to another, there is the problem of 
communicating the subjective values of one human 
consciousness to another; the idea that the 'rightness' 
of actions, within the subject giving the account, while 
valid to him or her, cannot be transposed to the receiving 
subject. In other words, the receiving subject cannot 
be expected to perceive the 'rightness' of the course 
of action in the same way.
The third aspect of accountability, under a systems 
perspective, is where the term also implies some form 
of corrective action. In other words, after the 'account' 
has been given, 'remedies' are provided to modify action 
in the future.
This notion of accountability would clearly not be 
acceptable to Greenfield, because it implies the notion 
of imposition of meaning. Even at the level of individual 
to individual accountability, there is the implication 
that the person receiving the account is, in some way,
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superior to the person giving the account. Either in 
terms of knowledge or experience of the situation, the 
receiving person is justifiably able to impose his or
her interpretations, (meanings), on the person giving
the account, in order that future action is modified. 
In other words, at the level of meaning behind actions, 
the account giving subject is expected to adopt new
meanings into his or her own interpretations of the 
subjective reality of organisational procedures with which 
they are involved.
Whilst such procedures may be acceptable under a Schutzian 
phenomenology, as indicated many times, imposition of
meaning does not form part of G r e e n f i e l d ’s orientation.
L e a d e r s h i p .
It is very difficult to tease out a Greenfield position 
on leadership. At first sight, the fact that Greenfield 
does not accept imposition of meaning could indicate that 
his attitude to leadership would be entirely negative.
However, the key point, under the subjective approach 
of Greenfield, is that the subject should interpret 
meanings for him or herself.
If leadership is displayed in such a way that subjects 
are able to interpret the leadership commands, styles, 
appeals, etc. for themselves, then this may well be more 
acceptable, under the subjective approach of Greenfield. 
An emphasis on leadership by example, rather than 
leadership by command, would probably reinforce this 
a c c e p t a n c e .
Useful pointers could, perhaps, be provided by the position 
of ambiguity models. Cohen and March, for instance, in
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"Leadership and Ambiguity: The American College President" 
(1986), suggest that ambiguity models do not undermine 
the concept, ’leadership’ itself, but there are certainly 
requirements for leaders to become very self-conscious
of their style.
They suggest that leaders are required to be heroic, but
not in the sense of great military commanders but more 
in a sense of displaying skills of tact and insight as 
they grapple with problems. The leadership displayed 
may need to be unobtrusive but, nevertheless, effective 
for the organisation.
The development of self-awareness in leaders would be 
looked upon in a positive way by Greenfield, because it 
is encouraging the self evaluation, (interpretation of 
meanings,) within the individual subject who happens to
be a leader.
If leaders are aware of their status as subjects, with 
interpretations of situations and contexts which, while 
valid to them, under a subjective approach, may not be 
valid to other subjects, then this is an equally valid 
interpretation of a s u b j e c t ’s situation as a focus on 
the subordinate subject. In other words, in as much as 
Greenfield's subjective approach can be thought of as
phenomenological, then there is no reason why one should 
not talk of the phenomenology of the college principal, 
or headteacher.
If the concept, ’lead e r s h i p ’ can be put into such terms, 
that there is no imposition of meaning, then there is 
no reason why it should not be seen as a valid concept, 
under Greenfield's subjective approach.
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R e s o u r c e s .
Under a systems perspective, organisational resources 
would be categorized under the headings, ’materials' 
and 'human r e s o u r c e s ’. Materials, in other words, 
inanimate objects and animals, but not humans, would be 
regarded as resources by an organisation, if they are 
of value to the operation of the organisation.
So, in regarding an object as a resource, an organisation 
is imputing value to a particular artefact. Greenfield 
would criticise this, because, drawing on the work of 
Hodgkinson, he would consider that only a subject can 
impute value to an object. Hodgkinson, who became one 
of Greenfield's major justificatory philosophical sources, 
in later work stresses that the value placed on an object 
is purely a subjective exercise.
While one person may treasure something, another may regard 
the same object as worthless. Of course, structuralists 
would claim that the value one places on something is 
affected greatly by other people's interpretations of 
its value. Auctions are, perhaps, good examples of 
situations where such influence is strong, with supply 
and demand quickly affecting the value of objects.
Subjectivists, on the other hand, would probably claim 
that, in the final analysis, the decision to bid, taken 
as it is, in an instant, must come from the subjective 
consciousness of an individual.
Within an organisation, decisions over materials are often 
made after lengthy discussion. However, it is true that 
the different interpretations, (meanings,) of subjects, 
means there can be much disagreement over priorities when 
material resources are being ordered. Subjectivists would
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claim that this points to the different values that 
individuals place on the resources.
When attention is turned to human resources, s u b j e ctivists, 
like Greenfield, would point to the fact that human 
resources focus on the abilities and skills of individuals, 
with the precise distribution of each of these being 
peculiar to each individual subject.
When organisations attempt to group people according to 
these personal attributes, they would be seen by 
subjectivists as dehumanising, by failing to focus on 
the talents of each individual.
Tr a i n i n g .
Greenfield suggests that educational administrators should 
be trained by exposing them to total life situations, 
where they totally take over the life of other vocations. 
He suggests they become monks, bartenders, bouncers in 
discos, workers in mental homes, and even that they assume 
the role of a mental patient.
Greenfield considers that, by immersing themselves in 
life-e xperiences, would-be educational administrators 
will acquire the necessary experience of life to encourage 
a subjective awareness of the individuals around them, 
who will have their own interpretations and meanings 
that they bring to the context of an educational 
organisation.
'Mainstream' concepts of training, based on systems 
principles of scientific management, would not be 
acceptable because they fail to treat as subjective 
realities the very concepts discussed so far in this 
section. Presumably, the total socializing influences,
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which he suggests for trainee educational administrators, 
would encourage a development of perception to see these 
subjective realities for what they are.
As indicated in the earlier section, it is difficult to 
imagine would-be educational administrators taking up 
Greenfield's demanding training!
R e s e a r c h .
As indicated many times in this thesis, Greenfield is 
highly critical of scientific methods of research. His 
dislike of quantification, statistics, and computer aided 
research preclude the use of sampling methods.
Such techniques as random sampling or representative group 
sampling, would not be acceptable, because the researcher 
is attempting to negate the effect of individuals on 
research findings, rather than take them into account. 
Hence, as indicated in Section 5., a subjective approach 
to research within educational administration must focus 
on individual case studies, using ethnographic techniques 
like participant observation.
The various pitfalls of such methods of research were 
indicated in Section 5., where the problems of 
misinterpretation and deception were indicated. Greenfield 
however, could be considered to have made a contribution, 
simply by focusing attention on the problems of 
ethnographic based research, although clearly his stance 
reduces the research options open to those working within 
educational administration.
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The Consequences of G r e e n f i e l d ’s fNew P e r s p e c t i v e 1 for 
the Future of Educational Administration.
There is no doubt that Greenfield has made the field of 
educational administration critically aware of the 
subjective aspects of educational administration.
However, it is more difficult to assess his impact on 
the future of the field.
In academic circles, Greenfield, as indicated, has been 
partly responsible for the paradigm diversity which now 
exists, although there is no doubt that neo-Marxist 
Critical Theory is also responsible for the conflicting 
views of the contemporary situation. At a theoretical 
level, the last section has indicated the difficulty of 
trying to bridge the gap between subjective and 
structuralist approaches of various kinds; but no doubt 
the various debates will continue.
. However, at the practical level of the day-to-day workings 
of educational institutions, the writer has no doubt that 
much of this theoretical debate will be pushed aside in 
the interests of expediency.
Educational administration will continue to exist as a 
field of study, primarily for those who wish to control 
educational organisations.
Hence, in training, the focus will be on how to control, 
what can be controlled, and also how to 'limit' the damage 
when control is not effective. This is what those who 
pay for training, for example, government organisations, 
will wish to promote in order to encourage what they see 
as 'effective' educational administration.
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The same will be true for research. Scientific based 
research, will be considered to provide the 'hard facts' 
as to what is going on in educational institutions and 
suggest remedies for 'improving' their performance.
Again, governments providing finance for research, will 
want to get a 'global view' of what is going on in 
educational institutions and to see the overall effects 
of any pilot studies, or initiatives, that they have 
intr o d u c e d .
Hence, it is statistics, not individual case studies, 
that will impress authorities responsible for the provision 
of education.
Within the actual day-to-day workings of educational 
institutions, those within educational organisations most 
likely to be committed to the 'goals' of the organisation, 
as perceived by government agencies, will be those who 
hold high office. They, in turn, will be more likely 
to have control of organisational budgets, and so will 
favour 'tight' scientific methods, that encourage 
efficiency through organisational control.
Subjective aspects, that focus on the individual's needs 
and requirements, are only likely to receive
acknowledgment, in as much as they encourage commitment 
and diligence, in striving to achieve the perceived
organisational goals of those in charge.
So, in the training, research and the actual workings 
of educational institutions, it is the writer's opinion 
that there will be some in the field who will find it 
convenient to pretend that Greenfield's 1974 I.I.P. Address 
never happened. Others will seek to marginalise his
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contribution, by seeing it as an interesting 
theoretical/philosophical debate that, nonetheless, can 
have, or will have, little impact on the day-to-day
workings of educational institutions.
These kinds of stances are most likely to occur where
those in the field consider that their political masters 
are only interested in 'hard' (systems based) training, 
research and functioning of educational administration.
However, there is no doubt that Greenfield has made a 
significant contribution to educational administration 
by raising the intellectual level of debate within the
field. His subjective input has forced others, working 
within the field, to examine the theoretical implications 
of the various approaches. At the same time, Greenfield
has made educational administrators critically aware of 
the significance of philosophical orientations to 
educational administration, by drawing on the work of 
philosophers to justify his subjective approach.
So, while there does not appear to be any final resolution 
to the problems of conflicting paradigms within educational 
administration, this should be regarded as a creative 
'healthy tension' encouraging the striving for knowledge 
and understanding within the field.
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